Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

On the monotonic core

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Hierarchy of interactive functions in father-mother-baby three-way games

In developmental research, the family has mainly been studied through dyadic interaction. Three-way interactions have received less attention, partly because of their complexity. This difficulty may be overcome by distinguishing between four hierarchically embedded functions in three-way interactions: (1) participation (inclusion of all participants), (2) organization (partners keeping to their roles), (3) focalization (sharing a common focus) and (4) affective contact (being in tune). We document this hierarchical model on a sample of 80 families observed in the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation across four different sites. Hierarchy between functions was demonstrated by means of Guttman scalability coefficient. Given the importance of the child's development in a threesome, the pertinence of this model for family assessment is discussed.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Behavioural types and ecological effects in a natural population of the cooperative cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher

The ecological relevance of behavioural syndromes is little studied in cooperative breeding systems where it is assumed that the behavioural type might influence individual decisions on helping and dispersal (e.g. shy, nonaggressive and nonexplorative individuals remain philopatric and helpful, whereas bold, aggressive, explorative individuals compete for vacancies outside their group and disperse). We measured the behavioural type of 19 subordinates in the cooperatively breeding cichlid fish Neolamprologus pulcher in their natural environment by quantifying six behavioural traits up to four times ('trials') in three different contexts, by presenting them with a conspecific intruder, a predator or nothing inside a tube. We found only moderate within-context repeatability (intraclass correlation coefficients) of the focal individual's behaviour, except for attacking either the conspecific or the predator inside the tube. The focal individual's attack rate of the tube was also positively affected by its group size. Averaging traits per context removed the between-trial variation, and consequently the across-context repeatability was very high for all six traits, except for territory maintenance. Trait values depended significantly on the context, except for territory defence. Consequently, individuals could be classified into different behavioural types based on their reaction towards the tube, but surprisingly, and opposite to laboratory studies in this species, ranging propensity and territory maintenance were not included in this behavioural syndrome. We suggest that more studies are needed to compare standardized focal personality tests (e.g. exploration propensity) with actual behaviour observed in nature (e.g. ranging and dispersal).

Feasibility of Cooperative Development of Wetland Mitigation Projects, TR-526, 2006

The Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) currently performs wetland mitigation on a project-by-project basis. At the same time, other agencies like the Iowa Department of Natural Resources and Natural Resource Conservation Service are performing wetland restoration projects, and counties and cities may be mitigating wetland losses as well. This project examined the feasibility of developing cooperative wetland mitigation projects in order to utilize state and local resources more efficiently to benefit both Iowa and local communities. The project accomplished the following objectives: (1) Identified and characterized cooperative wetland mitigation programs nationwide; (2) Developed a needs assessment through a survey of state, county, and large city agencies in Iowa to describe wetland mitigation programs and determine challenges with mitigation and program improvements, including long-term risks associated with maintenance and monitoring programs; (3) Surveyed state, county, and city agencies and organizations to identify resources available for developing cooperative mitigation projects and procedures; (4) Developed a conceptual framework for cooperative wetland mitigation.

A Spanish version of the short Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale (sMARS)

The aim of this studywas to adapt and assess the psychometric properties of the Spanish version of the sMARS in terms of evidence of validity and reliability of scores. The sMARS was administered to 342 students and, in order to assess convergent and discriminant validity, several subsamples completed a series of related tests. The factorial structure of the sMARSwas analyzed by means of a confirmatory factor analysis and results showed that the three-factor structure reported in the original test fits well with the data. Thus, three dimensions were established in the test: math test, numerical task and math course anxiety. The results of this study provide sound evidence that demonstrates the good psychometric properties of the scores of the Spanish version of the sMARS: strong internal consistency, high 7-week testretest reliability and good convergent/discriminant validity were evident. Overall, this study provides an instrument that allows us to obtain valid and reliable math anxiety measurements. This instrument may be a useful tool for educators and psychologists interested in identifying individuals that may have a low level of math mastery because of their anxiety.

The equity core and the core

In this paper we study the equity core (Selten, 1978) and compare it with the core. A payo vector is in the equity core if no coalition can divide its value among its members proportionally to a given weight system and, in this way, give more to each member than the amount he or she receives in the payo vector. We show that the equity core is a compact extension of the core and that, for non-negative games, the intersection of all equity cores with respect to all weights coincides with the core of the game. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, core. JEL classi cation: C71