The short arm of the law: judicial institutions and local governance in Brazil

This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.

[Archives de la Parole]. , Son-in-law-at-home : a fable in Parja from Bastar (C.P) [i.e. Central Provinces] / [Sir George Grierson], éd. ; Linguistic survey of India ; [Bhima Parjā], voix

[Traditions. Asie. Inde. Madhya Pradesh. Chhattisgarh]

Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, June 30, 2005

State Audit Reports

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Iowa Women and the Law

Information on the laws that affect Iowa women.

Sexual Harassment in Education: It's Against the Law

An informational sheet about workplace sexual harassment produced by Iowa Commission on the Status of Women.

Sexual Harassment in Housing: It's Against the Law, 2001

An informational sheet about housing and sexual harassment produced by Iowa Commission on the Status of Women.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Annual Report, 2006

FY 2006 Annual report for the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy as directed by the Director E.A. "Penny" Westfall

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary, July 1, 2005 thru June 30, 2006

Pursuant to the Code section 307.12(14)the DOT is providing the summary of contracts let from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2006.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Annual Report, 2005

FY 2005 Annual Report Per Director Westfall

Investigation of Luther City Council Violation of Open Meetings Law, 2006

Case File 0603454 The Ombudsman received a complaint on August 29, 2006 alleging violations of the Iowa Open Meetings Law by the Luther City Council (Council) in its meeting on August 2, 2006. Based upon my review of the complaint, I identified the following allegations for investigation: • The Council violated Iowa Code section 21.5 by failing to announce the reason session on the August 2, 2006 meeting agenda. • The Council violated Iowa Code section 21.5 by holding a closed session for an impermissible reason. • The Council violated Iowa Code section 21.5(2) by discussing unrelated issues in the closed session.

Lost in translation : euro-compatibility, legal security, and the autonomous implementation of EU law in Switzerland

This article presents the legislative and judicial practice relating to the "autonomous implementation" of EU law in Switzerland. Given that "euro-compatibility" is the central consideration behind this legislative policy, one would expect Swiss authorities to have devised legislative and hermeneutical techniques guaranteeing high fidelity to EU "mother law". That is not the case, however, and as this article shows much is lost in the translation from EU to Swiss Law

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report