Recursive contracts

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contractingproblems involving incentive constraints. Under these constraints,the corresponding maximization (sup) problems fails to have arecursive solution. Our approach consists of studying the Lagrangian.We show that, under standard assumptions, the solution to theLagrangian is characterized by a recursive saddle point (infsup)functional equation, analogous to Bellman's equation. Our approachapplies to a large class of contractual problems. As examples, westudy the optimal policy in a model with intertemporal participationconstraints (which arise in models of default) and intertemporalcompetitive constraints (which arise in Ramsey equilibria).

Fixed-term contracts and the duration distribution of unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts.Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studiesthe implications of such reforms for the duration distribution ofunemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the durationdependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectionaldata drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyzethe chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction offixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased sincesuch reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that forlong spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased sincesuch reform.

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.

La construction argumentative des émotions dans les débats parlementaires français sur l'abolition de la peine de mort

Ce travail se situe au carrefour de la rhétorique, des théories de l'argumentation et de la linguistique du discours : il s'intéresse aux modalités diverses selon lesquelles une émotion peut être sémiotisée par un locuteur, et cela dans le cadre spécifique d'un discours de type argumentatif. Le questionnement vise à reprendre à nouveaux frais le concept rhétorique de pathos et porte, de façon générale, sur les rapports complexes qui unissent l'argumentation, d'une part, et l'émotion, d'autre part. L'hypothèse développée a trait à ce que l'on peut appeler l'argumentabilité des émotions. Les locuteurs ne font pas seulement « appel » à l'émotion dans le but d'accroître l'efficacité d'une argumentation visant à établir le bien-fondé d'une opinion ou l'opportunité d'une action : ils peuvent aussi, dans certains cas, chercher à argumenter pour ou contre l'émotion elle-même. Ils s'efforcent alors de formuler les raisons pour lesquelles il convient ou, au contraire, il ne convient pas d'éprouver cette émotion. La construction de l'émotion est dite « argumentative », dans le sens où l'émotion en vient à constituer l'objet même de l'argumentation : l'effort argumentatif des locuteurs porte moins sur des dispositions à croire et à agir que sur des dispositions à ressentir. Parler de l'« argumentabilité » des émotions, c'est insister sur le fait - essentiel, mais rarement relevé - que les émotions donnent elles aussi prise aux opérations argumentatives que l'on recense traditionnellement (mise en doute quant à la légitimité, justification ou, au contraire, tentative de réfutation). Ce travail ne vise pas seulement à apporter une contribution théorique aux études sur l'argumentation : il entend aussi mettre en pratique l'analyse argumentative sur un corpus de textes. Il s'agit des comptes-rendus écrits des principaux débats parlementaires français relatifs à l'abolition de la peine de mort (1791, 1848, 1908 et 1981). Bien qu'il s'échelonne sur une période de près de deux siècles, ce corpus présente une forte cohésion, dans la mesure où les textes qui le composent traitent d'un même thème et appartiennent à un même genre de discours. Cette cohésion est essentielle, dans la mesure où elle autorise une pratique raisonnée de la comparaison en diachronie : l'enjeu est de décrire l'évolution des stratégies argumentatives à travers le temps. Observé sur une longue durée, le pathos que développent les parlementaires favorables ou au contraire hostiles à l'abolition présente des visages multiples. On cherche à décrire aussi rigoureusement que possible la logique qui, lors de chaque débat, préside à la construction d'émotions comme la peur, la pitié, l'indignation ou encore la honte.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Database construction and Peptide identification strategies for proteogenomic studies on sequenced genomes.

Since the advent of high-throughput DNA sequencing technologies, the ever-increasing rate at which genomes have been published has generated new challenges notably at the level of genome annotation. Even if gene predictors and annotation softwares are more and more efficient, the ultimate validation is still in the observation of predicted gene product( s). Mass-spectrometry based proteomics provides the necessary high throughput technology to show evidences of protein presence and, from the identified sequences, confirmation or invalidation of predicted annotations. We review here different strategies used to perform a MS-based proteogenomics experiment with a bottom-up approach. We start from the strengths and weaknesses of the different database construction strategies, based on different genomic information (whole genome, ORF, cDNA, EST or RNA-Seq data), which are then used for matching mass spectra to peptides and proteins. We also review the important points to be considered for a correct statistical assessment of the peptide identifications. Finally, we provide references for tools used to map and visualize the peptide identifications back to the original genomic information.

Causes of subcontracting: Evidence from panel data on construction firms

This paper examines factors explaining subcontracting decisions in the construction industry. Rather than the more common cross-sectional analyses, we use panel data to evaluate the influence of all relevant variables. We design and use a new index of the closeness to small numbers situations to estimate the extent of hold-up problems. Results show that as specificity grows, firms tend to subcontract less. The opposite happens when output heterogeneity and the use of intangible assets and capabilities increase. Neither temporary shortage of capacity nor geographical dispersion of activities seem to affect the extent of subcontracting. Finally, proxies for uncertainty do not show any clear effect.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).