The modal nature of structures in ontic structural realism

Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality amounts to. This paper proposes to fill this lacuna by arguing that the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers. Applying the debate about causal vs. categorical properties in analytic metaphysics to ontic structural realism, I show that the standard argument against categorical and for causal properties holds for structures as well. Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it can provide for a complete and coherent view of the world that includes all domains of empirical science.

The structural nature of perceptual experiences

Intuitively, we think of perception as providing us with direct cognitive access to physical objects and their properties. But this common sense picture of perception becomes problematic when we notice that perception is not always veridical. In fact, reflection on illusions and hallucinations seems to indicate that perception cannot be what it intuitively appears to be. This clash between intuition and reflection is what generates the puzzle of perception. The task and enterprise of unravelling this puzzle took, and still takes, centre stage in the philosophy of perception. The goal of my dissertation is to make a contribution to this enterprise by formulating and defending a new structural approach to perception and perceptual consciousness. The argument for my structural approach is developed in several steps. Firstly, I develop an empirically inspired causal argument against naïve and direct realist conceptions of perceptual consciousness. Basically, the argument says that perception and hallucination can have the same proximal causes and must thus belong to the same mental kind. I emphasise that this insight gives us good reasons to abandon what we are instinctively driven to believe - namely that perception is directly about the outside physical world. The causal argument essentially highlights that the information that the subject acquires in perceiving a worldly object is always indirect. To put it another way, the argument shows that what we, as perceivers, are immediately aware of, is not an aspect of the world but an aspect of our sensory response to it. A view like this is traditionally known as a Representative Theory of Perception. As a second step, emphasis is put on the task of defending and promoting a new structural version of the Representative Theory of Perception; one that is immune to some major objections that have been standardly levelled at other Representative Theories of Perception. As part of this defence and promotion, I argue that it is only the structural features of perceptual experiences that are fit to represent the empirical world. This line of thought is backed up by a detailed study of the intriguing phenomenon of synaesthesia. More precisely, I concentrate on empirical cases of synaesthetic experiences and argue that some of them provide support for a structural approach to perception. The general picture that emerges in this dissertation is a new perspective on perceptual consciousness that is structural through and through.

Cognitive efficacy of quetiapine in early-onset first-episode psychosis: a 12-week open label trial.

Twenty-three adolescents with psychotic disorders, aged from 13 to 18 years, participated in a 12-week open label trial (17 adolescents completed the study) in order to examine the impact of quetiapine on clinical status and cognitive functions (encompassing processing speed, attention, short-term memory, long-term memory and executive function). An improvement in Clinical Global Impression and Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (P's ≤ 0.001) was observed. In addition, after controlling for amelioration of symptoms, a significant improvement was observed on one executive function (P = 0.044; Trail Making Part B). The remaining cognitive abilities showed stability. In addition, we observed an interaction between quetiapine doses (>300 mg/day or <300 mg/day) and time, where lower doses showed more improvement in verbal short-term memory (P = 0.048), inhibition abilities (P = 0.038) and positive symptoms (P = 0.020). The neuropsychological functioning of adolescents with psychotic disorders remained mainly stable after 12 weeks of treatment with quetiapine. However, lower doses seemed to have a better impact on two components of cognition (inhibition abilities and verbal short-term memory) and on positive symptoms.

Male cognitive performance declines in the absence of sexual selection.

Sexual selection is responsible for the evolution of male ornaments and armaments, but its role in the evolution of cognition--the ability to process, retain and use information--is largely unexplored. Because successful courtship is likely to involve processing information in complex, competitive sexual environments, we hypothesized that sexual selection contributes to the evolution and maintenance of cognitive abilities in males. To test this, we removed mate choice and mate competition from experimental populations of Drosophila melanogaster by enforcing monogamy for over 100 generations. Males evolved under monogamy became less proficient than polygamous control males at relatively complex cognitive tasks. When faced with one receptive and several unreceptive females, polygamous males quickly focused on receptive females, whereas monogamous males continued to direct substantial courtship effort towards unreceptive females. As a result, monogamous males were less successful in this complex setting, despite being as quick to mate as their polygamous counterparts with only one receptive female. This diminished ability to use past information was not limited to the courtship context: monogamous males (but not females) also showed reduced aversive olfactory learning ability. Our results provide direct experimental evidence that the intensity of sexual selection is an important factor in the evolution of male cognitive ability.

Naturaleza humana y lenguaje en el pensamiento de Descartes

Frente a interpretaciones estandarizadas, el presente trabajo pretende poner de relieve elmomento de trascendencia del cogito, acudiendo al concepto de 'naturaleza' y a la noción de 'lenguaje'. Destácase la importancia del concepto de 'encarnación' como idea clave para la constitución del 'hombre verdadero', así como su dimensión intersubjetiva.

A Statistical Analysis of Iowa Premature Concrete Pavement Deterioration, Supplementary Study, HR-1063, 1997

This supplementary project has been undertaken as an effort to continue work previously completed in the Pooled Fund Study of Premature Concrete Pavement Deterioration. As such, it shares the objective of "Identifying the variables that are present in those pavements exhibiting premature deterioration," by collecting additional data and performing statistical analysis of those data. The approach and philosophy of this work are identical to that followed in the above project, and the Pooled Fund Study Final Report provides a detailed description of this process. This project has involved the collection of data for additional sites in the state of Iowa. These sites have then been added to sites collected in the original study, and statistical analysis has been performed on the entire set. It is hoped that this will have two major effects. First, using data from only one state allows for the analysis of a larger set of independent variables with a greater degree of commonality than was possible in the multi-state study, since the data are not limited by state to state differences in data collection and retention. Second, more data on additional sites will increase the degrees of freedom in the model and hopefully add confidence to the results.

A critical analysis of three psychological research programs of doping behaviour

Objectives To consider the various specific substances-taking activities in sport an examination of three psychological models of doping behaviour utilised by researchers is presented in order to evaluate their real and potential impact, and to improve the relevance and efficiency of anti-doping campaigns. Design Adopting the notion of a "research program" (Lakatos, 1978) from the philosophy of science, a range of studies into the psychology of doping behaviour are classified and critically analysed. Method Theoretical and practical parameters of three research programs are critically evaluated (i) cognitive; (ii) drive; and (iii) situated-dynamic. Results The analysis reveals the diversity of theoretical commitments of the research programs and their practical consequences. The «cognitive program» assumes that athletes are accountable for their acts that reflect the endeavour to attain sporting and non-sporting goals. Attitudes, knowledge and rational decisions are understood to be the basis of doping behaviour. The «drive program» characterises the variety of traces and consequences on psychological and somatic states coming from athlete's experience with sport. Doping behaviour here is conceived of as a solution to reduce unconscious psychological and somatic distress. The «situated-dynamic program» considers a broader context of athletes' doping activity and its evolution during a sport career. Doping is considered as emergent and self-organized behaviour, grounded on temporally critical couplings between athletes' actions and situations and the specific dynamics of their development during the sporting life course. Conclusions These hypothetical, theoretical and methodological considerations offer a more nuanced understanding of doping behaviours, making an effective contribution to anti-doping education and research by enabling researchers and policy personnel to become more critically reflective about their explicit and implicit assumptions regarding models of explanations for doping behaviour.

The handaxe and the microscope: individual and social learning in a multidimensional model of adaptation

When individuals learn by trial-and-error, they perform randomly chosen actions and then reinforce those actions that led to a high payoff. However, individuals do not always have to physically perform an action in order to evaluate its consequences. Rather, they may be able to mentally simulate actions and their consequences without actually performing them. Such fictitious learners can select actions with high payoffs without making long chains of trial-and-error learning. Here, we analyze the evolution of an n-dimensional cultural trait (or artifact) by learning, in a payoff landscape with a single optimum. We derive the stochastic learning dynamics of the distance to the optimum in trait space when choice between alternative artifacts follows the standard logit choice rule. We show that for both trial-and-error and fictitious learners, the learning dynamics stabilize at an approximate distance of root n/(2 lambda(e)) away from the optimum, where lambda(e) is an effective learning performance parameter depending on the learning rule under scrutiny. Individual learners are thus unlikely to reach the optimum when traits are complex (n large), and so face a barrier to further improvement of the artifact. We show, however, that this barrier can be significantly reduced in a large population of learners performing payoff-biased social learning, in which case lambda(e) becomes proportional to population size. Overall, our results illustrate the effects of errors in learning, levels of cognition, and population size for the evolution of complex cultural traits. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Rhétorique et cognition : perspectives théoriques et stratégies persuasives

D'une certaine manière, la rhétorique est un art cognitif. L'art de discourir en situation concrète dans l'espoir de faire adhérer l'auditoire à une thèse suppose une forte aptitude cognitive: celle de se représenter la façon dont l'auditoire lui-même se représente une situation rhétorique. Or, à partir du moment où agir sur les représentations d'autrui est facilité par des techniques rhétoriques ou sophistiques, la question de la tromperie verbale s'est immiscée dans des affaires de régulation sociale et, avec elle, des enjeux tant de crédibilité que de crédulité. Dans le cadre démocratique rendant encore plus aiguë une forme de dépendance à l'information d'autrui, la nécessité de croire tout comme la possibilité d'être leurré mettent à l'épreuve tant le fonctionnement social de la Cité que l'évaluation des informations et de leurs auteurs. Le but des contributions de cet ouvrage n'est pas de dénoncer les effets de certains schèmes argumentatifs que d'aucuns jugeraient fallacieux ni d'ajouter une couche nouvelle aux critiques des sophismes, mais d'étudier leur fonctionnement et leurs effets cognitifs hic et nunc. Quels sont les mécanismes langagiers et cognitifs qui expliquent la «performance» des arguments réputés fallacieux? Comment fonctionnent les stratégies rhétoriques à l'intersection entre cognition, sciences du langage et société? Cet ouvrage, issu du colloque Communication et Cognition: manipulation, persuasion et biais dans le langage, tenu à Neuchâtel du 26 au 28 janvier 2011, propose plusieurs propositions originales ou hypothèses stimulantes dans l'espoir qu'elles inspireront tant les chercheurs spécialisés en rhétorique et sciences du langage à aller voir du côté de la psychologie cognitive que les spécialistes de ce domaine à mettre en évidence la rhétoricité de leurs recherches. English version: In a way, rhetoric is a cognitive art. The art of speaking in concrete situations in the hope of gaining the audience's consent on a given issue requires the operation of a cognitive ability: that of being able to represent the way an audience represents itself a rhetorical situation. Nonetheless, once we consider that rhetorical or sophistic techniques influence people's representations, verbal deception becomes a matter of social regulation, together with issues of credibility and credulity. In a democratic context fostering a form of dependence towards other people's information, the necessity of believing everything and the possibility of being duped are challenges for both the social management of the City and the evaluation of information and of its sources. The contribution of the chapters of this volume is neither to be found in the condemnation of the fallacious effects of specific argument schemes nor in the addition of yet another layer to fallacy criticism, but in the study of how fallacies work, hic et nunc. What are the linguistic and cognitive mechanisms at play behind the "performance" of fallacious arguments? How do rhetorical strategies work at the interface of cognition, language science and society? This book gathers papers that were presented during the international conference Communication & Cognition: manipulation, persuasion and biases in language, held at the University of Neuchâtel in January 2011. A number of original proposals and stimulating hypotheses emerge from them: we hope that these will inspire researchers in the language sciences who specialise in rhetoric to take on board cognitive scientific insights but also researchers in cognitive science to engage with the rhetoricity of their own research.

Meanings and perceptions of patient-centeredness in social work, nursing and medicine: A comparative study.

Answering patients' evolving, more complex needs has been recognized as a main incentive for the development of interprofessional care. Thus, it is not surprising that patient-centered practice (PCP) has been adopted as a major outcome for interprofessional education. Nevertheless, little research has focused on how PCP is perceived across the professions. This study aimed to address this issue by adopting a phenomenological approach and interviewing three groups of professionals: social workers (n = 10), nurses (n = 10) and physicians (n = 8). All the participants worked in the same department (the General Internal Medicine department of a university affiliated hospital). Although the participants agreed on a core meaning of PCP as identifying, understanding and answering patients' needs, they used many dimensions to define PCP. Overall, the participants expressed value for PCP as a philosophy of care, but there was the sense of a hierarchy of patient-centeredness across the professions, in which both social work and nursing regarded themselves as more patient-centered than others. On their side, physicians seemed inclined to accept their lower position in this hierarchy. Gieryn's concept of boundary work is employed to help illuminate the nature of PCP within an interprofessional context.

A model for the evolution of reinforcement learning in fluctuating games

Many species are able to learn to associate behaviours with rewards as this gives fitness advantages in changing environments. Social interactions between population members may, however, require more cognitive abilities than simple trial-and-error learning, in particular the capacity to make accurate hypotheses about the material payoff consequences of alternative action combinations. It is unclear in this context whether natural selection necessarily favours individuals to use information about payoffs associated with nontried actions (hypothetical payoffs), as opposed to simple reinforcement of realized payoff. Here, we develop an evolutionary model in which individuals are genetically determined to use either trial-and-error learning or learning based on hypothetical reinforcements, and ask what is the evolutionarily stable learning rule under pairwise symmetric two-action stochastic repeated games played over the individual's lifetime. We analyse through stochastic approximation theory and simulations the learning dynamics on the behavioural timescale, and derive conditions where trial-and-error learning outcompetes hypothetical reinforcement learning on the evolutionary timescale. This occurs in particular under repeated cooperative interactions with the same partner. By contrast, we find that hypothetical reinforcement learners tend to be favoured under random interactions, but stable polymorphisms can also obtain where trial-and-error learners are maintained at a low frequency. We conclude that specific game structures can select for trial-and-error learning even in the absence of costs of cognition, which illustrates that cost-free increased cognition can be counterselected under social interactions.