Ethnic Diversity, Social Trust and the Moderating Role of Integration Policy

Increasing ethnic diversity and whether or not it impacts on trust are highly debated topics. Numerous studies report a negative relationship between diversity and trust, particularly in the US. A growing body of follow-up studies examined the extent to which these findings can be transferred to Europe, but the results remain inconclusive. Moving beyond the discussion of the mere existence or absence of diversity effects on trust, this study is concerned with the moderation of this relationship: It addresses the neglected role of subnational integration policies influencing diversity’s impact on trust. Empirical tests not only indicate that integration policies moderate the relationship, but also suggest that the influence of policies varies substantively according to the specific policy aspect under consideration.

Exceptional or just well connected? Political entrepreneurs and brokers in policy making

Policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs are assumed to have a decisive impact on policy outcomes. Their access to social and political resources is contingent on their influence on other agents. In social network analysis (SNA), entrepreneurs are often closely associated with brokers, because both are agents presumed to benefit from bridging structural holes; for example, gaining advantage through occupying a strategic position in relational space. Our aim here is twofold. First, to conceptually and operationally differentiate policy brokers from policy entrepreneurs premised on assumptions in the policy-process literature; and second, via SNA, to use the output of core algorithms in a cross-sectional analysis of political brokerage and political entrepreneurship. We attempt to simplify the use of graph algebra in answering questions relevant to policy analysis by placing each algorithm within its theoretical context. In the methodology employed, we first identify actors and graph their relations of influence within a specific policy event; then we select the most central actors; and compare their rank in a series of statistics that capture different aspects of their network advantage. We examine betweenness centrality, positive and negative Bonacich power, Burt’s effective size and constraint and honest brokerage as paradigmatic. We employ two case studies to demonstrate the advantages and limitations of each algorithm for differentiating between brokers and entrepreneurs: one on Swiss climate policy and one on EU competition and transport policy.

Dealing with bad guys: actor- and process-level determinants of the “devil shift” in policy making

Policy actors tend to misinterpret and distrust opponents in policy processes. This phenomenon, known as the “devil shift”, consists of the following two dimensions: actors perceive opponents as more powerful and as more evil than they really are. Analysing nine policy processes in Switzerland, this article highlights the drivers of the devil shift at two levels. On the actor level, interest groups, political parties and powerful actors suffer more from the devil shift than state actors and powerless actors. On the process level, the devil shift is stronger in policy processes dealing with socio-economic issues as compared with other issues. Finally, and in line with previous studies, there is less empirical evidence of the power dimension of the devil shift phenomenon than of its evilness dimension.

Structural and Institutional Determinants of Influence Reputation: A Comparison of Collaborative and Adversarial Policy Networks in Decision Making and Implementation

The central assumption in the literature on collaborative networks and policy networks is that political outcomes are affected by a variety of state and nonstate actors. Some of these actors are more powerful than others and can therefore have a considerable effect on decision making. In this article, we seek to provide a structural and institutional explanation for these power differentials in policy networks and support the explanation with empirical evidence. We use a dyadic measure of influence reputation as a proxy for power, and posit that influence reputation over the political outcome is related to vertical integration into the political system by means of formal decision-making authority, and to horizontal integration by means of being well embedded into the policy network. Hence, we argue that actors are perceived as influential because of two complementary factors: (a) their institutional roles and (b) their structural positions in the policy network. Based on temporal and cross-sectional exponential random graph models, we compare five cases about climate, telecommunications, flood prevention, and toxic chemicals politics in Switzerland and Germany. The five networks cover national and local networks at different stages of the policy cycle. The results confirm that institutional and structural drivers seem to have a crucial impact on how an actor is perceived in decision making and implementation and, therefore, their ability to significantly shape outputs and service delivery.

Loyal to the Game? Strategic Policy Representation in Mixed Electoral Systems

In Germany's compensatory mixed electoral system, alternative electoral routes lead into parliament. We study the relationship between candidates' electoral situations across both tiers and policy representation, fully accounting for candidate, party and district preferences in a multi-actor constellation and the exact electoral incentives for candidates to represent either the party or the district. The results (2009 Bundestag election data) yield evidence of an interactive effect of closeness of the district race and list safety on candidates' positioning between their party and constituency.

Coalition Structures and Policy Change in a Consensus Democracy

This paper studies the relation between coalition structures in policy processes and policy change. While different factors such as policy images, learning processes, external events, or venue shopping are important to explain policy change, coalition structures within policy processes are often neglected. However, policy change happens as a result of negotiations and coordination among coalitions within policy processes. The paper analyzes how conflict, collaboration, and power relations among coalitions of actors influence policy change in an institutional context of a consensus democracy. Empirically, I rely on a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to conduct a cross-sector comparison of the 11 most important policy processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. Coalition structures with low conflict and strong collaboration among coalitions as well as structures with dominant coalitions and weak collaboration both facilitate major policy change. Competing coalitions that are separated by strong conflict but still collaborate strongly produce policy outputs that are close to the status quo.

Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison

Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

A high-resolution map of direct and indirect connectivity of erosion risk areas to surface waters in Switzerland: A risk assessment tool for planning and policy-making

Off-site effects of soil erosion are becoming increasingly important, particularly the pollution of surface waters. In order to develop environmentally efficient and cost effective mitigation options it is essential to identify areas that bear both a high erosion risk and high connectivity to surface waters. This paper introduces a simple risk assessment tool that allows the delineation of potential critical source areas (CSA) of sediment input into surface waters concerning the agricultural areas of Switzerland. The basis are the erosion risk map with a 2 m resolution (ERM2) and the drainage network, which is extended by drained roads, farm tracks, and slope depressions. The probability of hydrological and sedimentological connectivity is assessed by combining soil erosion risk and extended drainage network with flow distance calculation. A GIS-environment with multiple-flow accumulation algorithms is used for routing runoff generation and flow pathways. The result is a high resolution connectivity map of the agricultural area of Switzerland (888,050 ha). Fifty-five percent of the computed agricultural area is potentially connected with surface waters, 45% is not connected. Surprisingly, the larger part of 34% (62% of the connected area) is indirectly connected with surface waters through drained roads, and only 21% are directly connected. The reason is the topographic complexity and patchiness of the landscape due to a dense road and drainage network. A total of 24% of the connected area and 13% of the computed agricultural area, respectively, are rated with a high connectivity probability. On these CSA an adapted land use is recommended, supported by vegetated buffer strips preventing sediment load. Even areas that are far away from open water bodies can be indirectly connected and need to be included in planning of mitigation measures. Thus, the connectivity map presented is an important decision-making tool for policy-makers and extension services. The map is published on the web and thus available for application.