The Implications of Forager Behaviour for Social Organisation in a Socially Polymorphic Carpenter Bee (Xylocopa virginica)

In social Hymenoptera, the division of labour is a major step in the evolution of sociality. Bees, which express many different kinds of sociality, can be classified according to how individuals share or do not share foraging and reproductive activities (Michener, 1974). The large carpenter bee, Xylocopa virginica, lives in populations with both solitary and social nests. In social nests, reproduction is controlled by the dominant female, who does all of her own foraging and egg-laying, while the subordinates guard the nest only. This study examined foraging behaviour as a way to classify the social hierarchy. Individual females were marked, measured and intensely observed for the foraging season. It was found that a large number of subordinates forage and likely obtain more reproductive fitness than previously thought. The dominance hierarchy is very likely a social queue, in which bees take turns foraging and egg-laying.

Letter from Gordon Pringle Dallas of Edinburgh inquiring about the reputation of Jarvis, Conklin and Co.

Letter from Gordon Pringle Dallas of Edinburgh inquiring about the reputation of Jarvis, Conklin and Co. The letter is addressed to S.D. Woodruff, Sept. 4, 1884.

The physician himself and things that concern his reputation and succes

UANL

L'organisation de la connaissance

UANL

"Les visites guidées à l’heure de la bibliothèque virtuelle ou le nouveau défi de la formation à l’information" et "Les principales approches d'organisation et d'accès aux ressources électroniques sur le Web"

Communications présentées conjointement au 32e congrès de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec (CBPQ).

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.