Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Beyond Smith's rule: An optimal dynamic index, rule for single machine stochastic scheduling with convex holding costs

Most research on single machine scheduling has assumedthe linearity of job holding costs, which is arguablynot appropriate in some applications. This motivates ourstudy of a model for scheduling $n$ classes of stochasticjobs on a single machine, with the objective of minimizingthe total expected holding cost (discounted or undiscounted). We allow general holding cost rates that are separable,nondecreasing and convex on the number of jobs in eachclass. We formulate the problem as a linear program overa certain greedoid polytope, and establish that it issolved optimally by a dynamic (priority) index rule,whichextends the classical Smith's rule (1956) for the linearcase. Unlike Smith's indices, defined for each class, ournew indices are defined for each extended class, consistingof a class and a number of jobs in that class, and yieldan optimal dynamic index rule: work at each time on a jobwhose current extended class has larger index. We furthershow that the indices possess a decomposition property,as they are computed separately for each class, andinterpret them in economic terms as marginal expected cost rate reductions per unit of expected processing time.We establish the results by deploying a methodology recentlyintroduced by us [J. Niño-Mora (1999). "Restless bandits,partial conservation laws, and indexability. "Forthcomingin Advances in Applied Probability Vol. 33 No. 1, 2001],based on the satisfaction by performance measures of partialconservation laws (PCL) (which extend the generalizedconservation laws of Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996)):PCL provide a polyhedral framework for establishing theoptimality of index policies with special structure inscheduling problems under admissible objectives, which weapply to the model of concern.

Determinants of organizational form: Transaction costs and institutions in the European trucking industry

We explain why European trucking carriers are much smaller and rely more heavily on owner-operators(as opposed to employee drivers) than their US counterparts. Our analysis begins by ruling outdifferences in technology as the source of those disparities and confirms that standard hypothesesin organizational economics, which have been shown to explain the choice of organizational form inUS industry, also apply in Europe. We then argue that the preference for subcontracting oververtical integration in Europe is the result of European institutions particularly, labor regulationand tax laws that increase the costs of vertical integration.

On the term structure of Interbank interest rates: Jump-diffusion processes and option pricing

In this paper we study the dynamic behavior of the term structureof Interbank interest rates and the pricing of options on interest ratesensitive securities. We posit a generalized single factor model withjumps to take into account external influences in the market. Daily datais used to test for jump effects. Qualitative examination of the linkagebetween Monetary Authorities' interventions and jumps are studied. Pricingresults suggests a systematic underpricing in bonds and call options ifthe jumps component is not included. However, the pricing of put optionson bonds presents indeterminacies.

Solving non-linear stochastic models by parameterizing expectations: An application to asset pricing with production

A new algorithm called the parameterized expectations approach(PEA) for solving dynamic stochastic models under rational expectationsis developed and its advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Thisalgorithm can, in principle, approximate the true equilibrium arbitrarilywell. Also, this algorithm works from the Euler equations, so that theequilibrium does not have to be cast in the form of a planner's problem.Monte--Carlo integration and the absence of grids on the state variables,cause the computation costs not to go up exponentially when the numberof state variables or the exogenous shocks in the economy increase. \\As an application we analyze an asset pricing model with endogenousproduction. We analyze its implications for time dependence of volatilityof stock returns and the term structure of interest rates. We argue thatthis model can generate hump--shaped term structures.

Option pricing under stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rate in the Spanish case

Among the underlying assumptions of the Black-Scholes option pricingmodel, those of a fixed volatility of the underlying asset and of aconstantshort-term riskless interest rate, cause the largest empirical biases. Onlyrecently has attention been paid to the simultaneous effects of thestochasticnature of both variables on the pricing of options. This paper has tried toestimate the effects of a stochastic volatility and a stochastic interestrate inthe Spanish option market. A discrete approach was used. Symmetricand asymmetricGARCH models were tried. The presence of in-the-mean and seasonalityeffectswas allowed. The stochastic processes of the MIBOR90, a Spanishshort-terminterest rate, from March 19, 1990 to May 31, 1994 and of the volatilityofthe returns of the most important Spanish stock index (IBEX-35) fromOctober1, 1987 to January 20, 1994, were estimated. These estimators wereused onpricing Call options on the stock index, from November 30, 1993 to May30, 1994.Hull-White and Amin-Ng pricing formulas were used. These prices werecomparedwith actual prices and with those derived from the Black-Scholesformula,trying to detect the biases reported previously in the literature. Whereasthe conditional variance of the MIBOR90 interest rate seemed to be freeofARCH effects, an asymmetric GARCH with in-the-mean and seasonalityeffectsand some evidence of persistence in variance (IEGARCH(1,2)-M-S) wasfoundto be the model that best represent the behavior of the stochasticvolatilityof the IBEX-35 stock returns. All the biases reported previously in theliterature were found. All the formulas overpriced the options inNear-the-Moneycase and underpriced the options otherwise. Furthermore, in most optiontrading, Black-Scholes overpriced the options and, because of thetime-to-maturityeffect, implied volatility computed from the Black-Scholes formula,underestimatedthe actual volatility.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Adoption of financial technologies: Implications for money demand and monetary policy

In this paper we argue that inventory models are probably not usefulmodels of household money demand because the majority of households does nothold any interest bearing assets. The relevant decision for most people is notthe fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form, but whether to holdany of such assets at all. The implications of this realization are interesting and important. We find that(a) the elasticity of money demand is very small when the interest rate is small,(b) the probability that a household holds any amount of interest bearing assetsis positively related to the level of financial assets, and (c) the cost ofadopting financial technologies is positively related to age and negatively relatedto the level of education. Unlike the traditional methods of money demand estimation, our methodology allowsfor the estimation of the interest--elasticity at low values of the nominalinterest rate. The finding that the elasticity is very small for interest ratesbelow 5 percent suggests that the welfare costs of inflation are small. At interest rates of 6 percent, the elasticity is close to 0.5. We find thatroughly one half of this elasticity can be attributed to the Baumol--Tobin orintensive margin and half of it can be attributed to the new adopters or extensivemargin. The intensive margin is less important at lower interest rates and moreimportant at higher interest rates.