Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

This note elaborates on a recent article by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor(1992) who contend that fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatiblewithfree competition in the banking sector, in the presence of adverseselection.We show here that at soon as one introduces a real economic motivationfromprivate banks to manage the deposits from the public, then fairly priceddeposit insurance becomes possible. However, we also show that sucha fairlypriced insurance is never desirable, precisely because of adverseselection.We compute the characteristics of the optimal premium schedule, whichtradesoff between the cost of adverse selection and the cost of ``unfaircompetition ''.

Stroke initial severity and outcome relative to insurance status in a universal health care system in Switzerland.

BACKGROUND:  Socioeconomic status is thought to have a significant influence on stroke incidence, risk factors and outcome. Its influence on acute stroke severity, stroke mechanisms, and acute recanalisation treatment is less known. METHODS:  Over a 4-year period, all ischaemic stroke patients admitted within 24 h were entered prospectively in a stroke registry. Data included insurance status, demographics, risk factors, time to hospital arrival, initial stroke severity (NIHSS), etiology, use of acute treatments, short-term outcome (modified Rankin Scale, mRS). Private insured patients (PI) were compared with basic insured patients (BI). RESULTS:  Of 1062 consecutive acute ischaemic stroke patients, 203 had PI and 859 had BI. They were 585 men and 477 women. Both populations were similar in age, cardiovascular risk factors and preventive medications. The onset to admission time, thrombolysis rate, and stroke etiology according to TOAST classification were not different between PI and BI. Mean NIHSS at admission was significantly higher for BI. Good outcome (mRS ≤ 2) at 7 days and 3 months was more frequent in PI than in BI. CONCLUSION:  We found better outcome and lesser stroke severity on admission in patients with higher socioeconomic status in an acute stroke population. The reason for milder strokes in patients with better socioeconomic status in a universal health care system needs to be explained.

Getting Ready to Retire: Health Insurance Issues, December 2006

Before making the decision to retire, understand the health insurance options available to you (and your spouse if you are married). Which questions you need to ask depends on: • how old you are. • how old your spouse is. • whether you or your spouse is eligible for Medicare. • whether you or your spouse will continue to be employed. • how many employees the employer has.

Events That Guarantee Your Right To Buy Medicare Supplement Insurance, March 2007

You have a six-month open enrollment period when you are enrolled in Medicare Part B for the first time at age 65 or older. The six-month period begins the date your Medicare Part B begins. During your open enrollment period: • You cannot be turned down for any plan (A-L) being sold in Iowa. • You cannot be charged a higher premium based on your health. • You will not have a waiting period before benefits are paid for pre-existing health conditions IF you had previous health insurance coverage, AND you apply within 63 days of the end of previous health insurance, AND you were covered for at least 6 months under that health plan.

Medicare and Other Insurance for People with Disabilities, March 2007

When you are entitled to Social Security disability benefits for 24 months, you are eligible for Medicare beginning the 25th month. An exception applies if you have been diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) also known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease. If you have ALS, Medicare begins the first month you are entitled to Social Security disability benefits.

COBRA: Continuation of Employer Group Health Insurance, March 2007

COBRA stands for Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act *COBRA is not insurance; it is the law, since 1985. COBRA allows employees and their dependents to continue employer group health insurance for several months when that insurance would usually end. *Insurance plans under COBRA are private health plans, not plans sold by the government. *The U.S. Departments of Labor and Treasury enforce COBRA.

The role of title insurance under recording and registration

This article outlines a transaction cost theory of title insurance andanalyses the role it plays in countries with recording and registrationof land titles. Title insurance indemnifies real estate right holdersfor losses caused by pre-existing title defects that are unknown whenthe policy is issued. It emerged to complement the errors and omissions insurance of professionals examining title quality. Poor organizationof public records led title insurers in the USA to integrate titleexamination and settlement services. Their residual claimant statusmotivates insurers to screen, cure and avoid title defects. Firmsintroducing title insurance abroad produce little information on titlequality, however. Their policies are instead issued on a casualty basis,complementing and enforcing the professional liability of conveyancers.Future development in markets with land registration is uncertainbecause of adverse selection, competitive reactions from establishedconveyancers and the ability of larger banks to self-insure title risks.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Demand for private health insurance: Is there a quality gap?

Quality of care is qualified as a main determinant of the demand forvoluntary private health insurance (PHI) in National Health Systems(NHS). This paper provides new evidence on the influence of the qualitygap between public and private health insurance and other demanddeterminants in the demand for PHI in Catalonia. The demand for PHI ismodelled as a demand for health care quality. Unlike previous studies, the database employed allows for the development of a link between thetheoretical and the empirical model dealing with unobserved heterogeneityand endogeneity issues. Results suggest that a rise in PHI qualityenhances an equivalent influence in the demand for PHI as an equalreduction of NHS quality. Income and price elasticity estimates areconsistent with the observed feature that PHI appears to be a luxurygood and individuals tend to be relatively insensible to tax relief'sand monetary co-payments in insurance contracts.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?

COBRA: Continuation of Employer Group Health Insurance, 2007

Medicare Deductible, co-insurance and premiuns form, and rescription drugs plans.

Mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies

This article analyzes how mandatory accounting disclosure is grounded on differentrationales for private and public companies. It also explores technological changes, such ascomputerised databases and the Internet, which have recently made disclosure of companyaccounts by small companies potentially less costly and more valuable, thanks to electronicfiling and universal online access to credit information systems. These recent developmentsfavour policies that would expand the scope of mandatory publication for small companies incountries where it is voluntary. They also encourage policies to reduce the costs and enhancethe value of disclosure through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems.Survey and registry evidence on how the information in the accounts is valued and used bycompanies is consistent with these claims about the evolution of the tradeoff of costs andbenefits that should guide policy in this area.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2007

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.