Incomplete Distal Renal Tubular Acidosis from a Heterozygous Mutation of the V-ATPase B1 Subunit

Congenital distal renal tubular acidosis (dRTA) from mutations of the B1 subunit of the V-ATPase is considered an autosomal recessive disease. We analyzed a dRTA kindred with a truncation-mutation of B1 (p.Phe468fsX487) previously shown to have failure of assembly into the V1 domain of the V-ATPase. All heterozygous carriers in this kindred have normal plasma bicarbonate concentrations, thus evaded the diagnosis of RTA. However, inappropriately high urine pH, hypocitraturia, and hypercalciuria are present either individually or in combination in the heterozygotes at baseline. Two of the heterozygotes studied also have inappropriate urinary acidification with acute ammonium chloride loading and impaired urine-blood pCO2 gradient during bicarbonaturia indicating presence of H+ gradient and flux defects. In normal human renal papillae, wild type B1 is located primarily on the plasma membrane but papilla from one of the heterozygote who had kidney stones had renal tissue secured from surgery showed B1 in both plasma membrane as well as a diffuse intracellular staining. Titrating increasing amounts of the mutant B1 subunit did not exhibit negative dominance over the expression, cellular distribution, or H+-pump activity of the wild type B1 in mammalian HEK293 cells and in V-ATPase-deficient S. cerevisiae. This is the first demonstration of renal acidification defects and nephrolithiasis in heterozygous carriers of mutant B1 subunit; which cannot be attributable to negative dominance. We propose that heterozygosity may lead to mild real acidification defects due to haploinsufficiency. B1 heterozygosity should be considered in patients with calcium nephrolithiasis and urinary abnormalities such as alkalinuria or hypocitraturia.

Predictors of satisfaction with treatment decision, decision-making preferences, and main treatment goals in patients with advanced cancer

Purpose This study investigated satisfaction with treatment decision (SWTD), decision-making preferences (DMP), and main treatment goals, as well as evaluated factors that predict SWTD, in patients receiving palliative cancer treatment at a Swiss oncology network. Patients and methods Patients receiving a new line of palliative treatment completed a questionnaire 4–6 weeks after the treatment decision. Patient questionnaires were used to collect data on sociodemographics, SWTD (primary outcome measure), main treatment goal, DMP, health locus of control (HLoC), and several quality of life (QoL) domains. Predictors of SWTD (6 = worst; 30 = best) were evaluated by uni- and multivariate regression models. Results Of 480 participating patients in eight hospitals and two private practices, 445 completed all questions regarding the primary outcome measure. Forty-five percent of patients preferred shared, while 44 % preferred doctor-directed, decision-making. Median duration of consultation was 30 (range: 10–200) minutes. Overall, 73 % of patients reported high SWTD (≥24 points). In the univariate analyses, global and physical QoL, performance status, treatment goal, HLoC, prognosis, and duration of consultation were significant predictors of SWTD. In the multivariate analysis, the only significant predictor of SWTD was duration of consultation (p = 0.01). Most patients indicated hope for improvement (46 %), followed by hope for longer life (26 %) and better quality of life (23 %), as their main treatment goal. Conclusion Our results indicate that high SWTD can be achieved in most patients with a 30-min consultation. Determining the patient’s main treatment goal and DMP adds important information that should be considered before discussing a new line of palliative treatment.

A Neural Trait Approach to Exploring Individual Differences in Social Preferences

Research demonstrates that social preferences are characterized by significant individual differences. An important question, often overlooked, is from where do these individual differences originate? And what are the processes that underlie such differences? In this paper, we outline the neural trait approach to uncovering sources of individual differences in social preferences, particularly as evidenced in economic games. We focus on two primary methods—resting-state electroencephalography and structural magnetic resonance imaging—used by researchers to quantify task-independent, brain-based characteristics that are stable over time. We review research that has employed these methods to investigate social preferences with an emphasis on a key psychological process in social decision-making; namely, self-control. We then highlight future opportunities for the neural trait approach in cutting-edge decision-making research. Finally, we explore the debate about self-control in social decision-making and the potential role neural trait research could play in this issue.

Giving According to Preferences: Decision-Making in the Group Dictator Game

We study the decision process in a group dictator game in which three subjects can distribute an initial endowment between themselves and a group of recipients. The experiment consists of two stages; first, individuals play a standard dictator game. Second, individuals are randomly matched into groups of three and communicate via instant messaging regarding the decision in the group dictator game. In contrast to former studies our results show that group decisions do not differ from individual decisions in the dictator game. Furthermore, the analysis of the chat history reveals that players make proposals according to their preferences as revealed in the single dictator game and that these proposals in groups drive the final allocation.

Neural correlates of anticipation risk reflect risk preferences

Individual risk preferences have a large influence on decisions, such as financial investments, career and health choices, or gambling. Decision making under risk has been studied both behaviorally and on a neural level. It remains unclear, however, how risk attitudes are encoded and integrated with choice. Here, we investigate how risk preferences are reflected in neural regions known to process risk. We collected functional magnetic resonance images of 56 human subjects during a gambling task (Preuschoff et al., 2006). Subjects were grouped into risk averters and risk seekers according to the risk preferences they revealed in a separate lottery task. We found that during the anticipation of high-risk gambles, risk averters show stronger responses in ventral striatum and anterior insula compared to risk seekers. In addition, risk prediction error signals in anterior insula, inferior frontal gyrus, and anterior cingulate indicate that risk averters do not dissociate properly between gambles that are more or less risky than expected. We suggest this may result in a general overestimation of prospective risk and lead to risk avoidance behavior. This is the first study to show that behavioral risk preferences are reflected in the passive evaluation of risky situations. The results have implications on public policies in the financial and health domain.

Comparison of noninferiority margins reported in protocols and publications showed incomplete and inconsistent reporting.

OBJECTIVES To compare noninferiority margins defined in study protocols and trial registry records with margins reported in subsequent publications. STUDY DESIGN AND SETTING Comparison of protocols of noninferiority trials submitted 2001 to 2005 to ethics committees in Switzerland and The Netherlands with corresponding publications and registry records. We searched MEDLINE via PubMed, the Cochrane Controlled Trials Register (Cochrane Library issue 01/2012), and Google Scholar in September 2013 to identify published reports, and the International Clinical Trials Registry Platform of the World Health Organization in March 2013 to identify registry records. Two readers recorded the noninferiority margin and other data using a standardized data-abstraction form. RESULTS The margin was identical in study protocol and publication in 43 (80%) of 54 pairs of study protocols and articles. In the remaining pairs, reporting was inconsistent (five pairs, 9%), or the noninferiority margin was either not reported in the publication (five pairs, 9%) or not defined in the study protocol (one pair). The confidence interval or the exact P-value required to judge whether the result was compatible with noninferior, inferior, or superior efficacy was reported in 43 (80%) publications. Complete and consistent reporting of both noninferiority margin and confidence interval (or exact P-value) was present in 39 (72%) protocol-publication pairs. Twenty-nine trials (54%) were registered in trial registries, but only one registry record included the noninferiority margin. CONCLUSION The reporting of noninferiority margins was incomplete and inconsistent with study protocols in a substantial proportion of published trials, and margins were rarely reported in trial registries.

Using Factorial Surveys and Stated Choice Experiments to Investigate Discriminatory Attitudes and Preferences

Empirical research on discriminatory attitudes and behaviour grapples with the social undesirability of its object. In many studies using regular survey methods, estimates are biased, and the social context of discrimination is not taken into account. Several methods have been developed, especially to deal with the first problem. In this regard, the estimation of the ‘true value’ of discriminatory attitudes is at the centre of interest. However, methodological contributions focusing on the social context of attitude communication and discriminatory behaviour, as well as the correlation between both, are rare. We present two experimental methods which address those issues: factorial surveys and stated choice experiments. In a first study, the usefulness of factorial surveys is demonstrated with data on German anti-Semitism (N=279). We show that the rate of approval with anti-Semitic statements increases if (a) respondents are told that the majority of fellows agree with such statements, (b) the term “Jews” is replaced by the term “Israelis”, and (c) reference to the Holocaust is made. Apart from the main effects of these experimental factors, significant interaction effects regarding the political attitudes and social status of respondents are observed. In a second study, a stated choice experiment on the purchase of olive oil and tomatoes was conducted in Germany (N=440). We find that respondents prefer Italian and Dutch products (control treatment) compared to Israeli and Palestinian ones (discrimination treatments). There are no significant differences between preferences for a so called ‘Peace product’ (which is produced jointly by Israelis and Palestinians) and products from Italy as well as the Netherlands. Yet, taking discriminatory attitudes (anti-Semitic and anti-Arabic attitudes) into account, a strong correlation between those attitudes and stated behaviour (purchase of Israeli, Palestinian and jointly produced products) can be found. This adds support to the hypothesis that discriminatory attitudes hold behavioural consequences.

People, protected areas and ecosystem services: a qualitative and quantitative analysis of local people's perception and preferences in Côte d'Ivoire

The long-term integrity of protected areas (PAs), and hence the maintenance of related ecosystem services (ES), are dependent on the support of local people. In the present study, local people's perceptions of ecosystem services from PAs and factors that govern local preferences for PAs are assessed. Fourteen study villages were randomly selected from three different protected forest areas and one control site along the southern coast of Côte d'Ivoire. Data was collected through a mixed-method approach, including qualitative semi-structured interviews and a household survey based on hypothetical choice scenarios. Local people's perceptions of ecosystem service provision was decrypted through qualitative content analysis, while the relation between people's preferences and potential factors that affect preferences were analyzed through multinomial models. This study shows that rural villagers do perceive a number of different ecosystem services as benefits from PAs in Côte d'Ivoire. The results based on quantitative data also suggest that local preferences for PAs and related ecosystem services are driven by PAs' management rules, age, and people's dependence on natural resources.

Estimating Intra-Party Preferences: Comparing Speeches to Votes

Well-established methods exist for measuring party positions, but reliable means for estimating intra-party preferences remain underdeveloped. While most efforts focus on estimating the ideal points of individual legislators based on inductive scaling of roll call votes, this data suffers from two problems: selection bias due to unrecorded votes and strong party discipline, which tends to make voting a strategic rather than a sincere indication of preferences. By contrast, legislative speeches are relatively unconstrained, as party leaders are less likely to punish MPs for speaking freely as long as they vote with the party line. Yet, the differences between roll call estimations and text scalings remain essentially unexplored, despite the growing application of statistical analysis of textual data to measure policy preferences. Our paper addresses this lacuna by exploiting a rich feature of the Swiss legislature: on most bills, legislators both vote and speak many times. Using this data, we compare text-based scaling of ideal points to vote-based scaling from a crucial piece of energy legislation. Our findings confirm that text scalings reveal larger intra-party differences than roll calls. Using regression models, we further explain the differences between roll call and text scalings by attributing differences to constituency-level preferences for energy policy.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Cultural Legacies and Political Preferences: The Failure of Separatism in the Swiss Jura

The study of secession generally stresses the causal influence of cultural identities, political preferences, or ecological factors. Whereas these different views are often considered to be mutually exclusive, this paper proposes a two-stage model in which they are complementary. We posit that cultural identities matter for explaining secessionism, but not because of primordial attachments. Rather, religious and linguistic groups matter because their members are imbued with cultural legacies that lead to distinct political preferences – in this case preferences over welfare statism. Further, ecological constraints such as geography and topography affect social interaction with like-minded individuals. On the basis of both these political preferences and ecological constraints, individuals then make rational choices about the desirability of secession. Instrumental considerations are therefore crucial in explaining the decision to secede, but not in a conventional pocketbook manner. To examine this theory, we analyze the 2013 referendum on the secession of the Jura Bernois region from the Canton of Berne in Switzerland, using municipal level census and referendum data. The results lend support to the theory and suggest one way in which the politics of identity, based on factors like language and religion, can be fused with the politics of interest (preferences for more or less state intervention into the polity and economy) to better understand group behavior.