Os novos desafios do direito tributário: em particular, a tributação do jogo online

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito Tributário e Fiscal

A política fiscal da União Europeia: diagnóstico e desafios: o caso da Taxa sobre Transações Financeiras (TTF)

Trabalho de projeto de mestrado em Políticas Comunitárias e Cooperação Territorial

7ª Contribuição ao estudo dos Flebotomus (Diptera: Psychodidae): descrição dos machos de 24 novas espécies

The A. and his co-workers captured in trips in the hinterland of Brazil more tham 17.000 flebotomi from which 35 are new ones, 11 discribed by, him in previous papers. The A. found these insects in groups of species living in different habitats, some ones of them not yet known: ondoors, or outdoors attracted by light or animal baits, without Shannon’s trap, in great or small caves, in the jungle in tree’s holes, holes in stones, holes in the soil habited by animals like armadillos, pacas (Aguti paca), wild rats, cururú toad (Bufo sp.). He observed the life history of 13 species: Flebotomus longipalpis Lutz& Neiva, 1912, Flebotomus intermedius Lutz & Neiva, 1912, Flebotomus avellari Costa Lima, 1932, Flebotomus aragãoi costa Lima, 1932, Flebotomus lutzianus Costa Lima, 1932, Flebotomus limai fonseca, 1935, Flebotomus rickardi Costa Lima, 1936, Flebotomus dasipodogeton Castro, 1939, Flebotomus oswaldoi n. sp., Flebotomus villelai n. sp., Flebotomus triacanthus n. sp., Flebotomus longispinus n. sp. And flebotomus travassosi n. sp. He describes the male of 24 n. sp., explaining the differential diagnose of group or nearly allied species. He inclued F. rooti n. sp. And F. hirsutus n. sp. In the sub-genus Shannonomyia. The first one, very allied to F. davisi Root is different from it, for presenting in the dorsal side of the abdomen bristles and not scales and to have the median claspers longer than his inner appendage and F. hirsutus quite different from the others which show 3 spines on distal segment of the upper clasper and for being the only one who presents the bristles of inner appendage of median clasper longer than it. Only the females of F. amazonensis Root and f. chagasi Costa Lima, are known and then it is possible that they belong to one of the species of this sub-genus from whom only the male have been described. F. choti Floch & Abonnenc, captured also at Pará, F. triacanthus n. sp. F. trispinosus n. sp. And F. equatorialis n. sp. Are very related and to this group the A. proposes the same of Pressatia as sub-genus in honor to whom demonstrated the medical importance of the flebotomi, considering F. triacanthus as the type specie of this sub-genus. In this sub-genus the V papal joint is very long, longer than III + IV, the antennae with geniculated spines without posterior outgrowth. At the genitalia the basal segment of the upper clasper presents two types of bristles ou the inner face, arranged in tuft; the distal segment with 3 spines and 2 thin bristles something difficult to see one of them situated near the apical spine and the other on the base of tubercle where the median spine is articulated; the median clasper is unarmed and compressed; the inferior clasper is also unarmed and longer than de basal segment of the upper clasper; the pompeta is longer than the basal segment of the upper clasper. Following it is presented a key for the determination of the males of the four species of this sub-genus. F. micropygus n. sp., F. minasensis n. sp. e F. dandrophylus n. sp., f. shannoni, F. monticolus, F. pestanai, F. lanei and F. cayenensis constitute a group with many similars characters. F. micropygus is the only American species who present α smaller than β and for that reason and others is allied to. F. minuts and others related species, but presents two terminal spines on the distal segment of the upper clasper. F. micropygus and f. minasensis are quite different because they have very small genitalia, smaller than their heads. F. dendrophylus presents on the median clasper a naked area near the apex and for this and others characters is different from the others of the group. F. flaviscutellatus n. sp., F. oliverioi, F. intermedius and whithmani, are very allied but the first one can be very easily distinguished because it’s scutellum is light. Flebotomus barrettoi n. sp., F. coutinhoi n. sp., F. aragãoi, F. brasiliensis, F. lutzianus, F. texanus, F. pascalei, F. atroclavatus and F. tejeraae are very allied forming a natural group. The two last ones are not well known but the A. A. who have studied them described very long clipeus so long as the head and for that reason can be distinguished from all the others included the two new ones. F. coutinhoi is the only one who presents the apecis of the penis filaments twisted. F. barrettoi n. sp., can be distinguished from aragãoi, texamus and coutinhoi by the length of the penis filaments and from atrocavatus, tejeraae, lutzianus and brasiliensis by the arrangement of the spines of distal segment of the upper clasper. Flebotomus ubiquitalis n. sp., F. auraensis n. sp., F. affinis and F. microps e F. antunesi have many common characters. F. microps n. sp., can be distinguished from any one by the size of the eyes and the presence od well developed genae. This species and other new species are different from F. antunesi by the arrangement of the spines of the distal segment of the upper clasper of the latter. F. ubiquitalis n. sp. can be distinguished from others by the figure of the median clasper. F. auraensis n. sp. Can be distinguished from F. affinis n. sp. By the tuft hairs on the inner face of the basal segment and by arrangement of the spines of the sital segment of the upper clasper. Flebotomus brachipygus n. sp. Seemed to be F. rostrans, specie not well known, by the characters of the genitalia but can not be identified to her by the clypeus size and the palpi’s characters. Flebotomus costalimai, n. sp., f. tupynambai n. sp., and f. castroi Barreto & Coutinho, 1941, are very allied species and the A. proposes to included them the new sub-genus Castromyia, in honor to Dr. G. M. de Oliveira Castro, appointing like typespecies F. castroi with the V joint longer than III + IV; antennae with geniculated spines without posterior prolongation. Genitalia: the basal segment of the upper clasper with a tuft of hairs and the distal segment with 4 spines, one of them at the apex and near it a thin and straight bristle difficult to see; the median clasper with one spinous hair isolated...

An alternative way to model merit good arguments

Besley (1988) uses a scaling approach to model merit good arguments in commodity tax policy. In this paper, I question this approach on the grounds that it produces 'wrong' recommendations--taxation (subsidisation) of merit (demerit) goods--whenever the demand for the (de)merit good is inelastic. I propose an alternative approach that does not suffer from this deficiency, and derive the ensuing first and second best tax rules, as well as the marginal cost expressions to perform tax reform analysis.

Una estimación del coste marginal en bienestar del sistema impositivo en España

Actual tax systems do not follow the normative recommendations of yhe theory of optimal taxation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the informational difficulties of knowing or estimating all relevant elasticities and parameters. Secondly, the political complexities that would arise if a new tax implementation would depart too much from current systems that are perceived as somewhat egalitarians. Hence an ex-novo overhaul of the tax system might just be non-viable. In contrast, a small marginal tax reform could be politically more palatable to accept and economically more simple to implement. The goal of this paper is to evaluate, as a step previous to any tax reform, the marginal welfare cost of the current tax system in Spain. We do this by using a computational general equilibrium model calibrated to a point-in-time micro database. The simulations results show that the Spanish tax system gives rise to a considerable marginal excess burden. Its order of magnitude is of about 0.50 money units for each additional money unit collected through taxes.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

Economic impacts of alternative water policy scenarios in the Spanish production system: an input-output analysis

The objective of this paper is to analyse the economic impacts of alternative water policies implemented in the Spanish production system. The methodology uses two versions of the input-output price model: a competitive formulation and a mark-up formulation. The input-output framework evaluates the impact of water policy measures on production prices, consumption prices, intermediate water demand and private welfare. Our results show that a tax on the water used by sectors considerably reduces the intermediate water demand, and increases the production and consumption prices. On the other hand, according to Jevons' paradox, an improvement in technical efficiency, which leads to a reduction in the water requirements of all sectors and an increase in water production, increases the amount of water consumed. The combination of a tax on water and improved technical efficiency takes the pressure off prices and significantly reduces intermediate water demand. JEL Classification: C67 ; D57 ; Q25. Keywords: Production prices; Consumption prices; Water uses; Water policy; Water taxation.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Calibration of CES functions for real-world multisectoral modeling

We show how to calibrate CES production and utility functions when indirect taxation affecting inputs and consumption is present. These calibrated functions can then be used in computable general equilibrium models. Taxation modifies the standard calibration procedures since any taxed good has two associated prices and a choice of reference value units has to be made. We also provide an example of computer code to solve the calibration of CES utilities under two alternate normalizations. To our knowledge, this paper fills a methodological gap in the CGE literature.

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.

Fiscal insurance and debt management in OECD economies

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

Multinational Firms’ Heterogeneity in Tax Responsiveness: the Role of Transfer Pricing

In this paper we show that the ability of multinational firms to manipulate transfer prices affects the tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment (FDI). We offer a model of international capital allocation where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to manipulate transfer prices. Perhaps paradoxically, we show that the ability to shift profits can make parent companies' investment more sensitive to host-country tax rates, as long as investors expect fisscal authorities to use price and profit detection methods. We then offer a comprehensive empirical study to test our predictions in the case of Japanese FDI. We exploit the finding that the unobservable ability to manipulate transfer prices is correlated with whole ownership of a±liates and R&D expenditure. Based on country, parent firm and sector characteristics, we estimate an investment equation on a sample of 3614 Japanese affiliates in 49 emerging countries. We obtain a greater semi-elasticity of investment to the statutory tax rate in a±liates that are wholly-owned and that have R&D intensive parents. We interpret these results as indirect evidence that abusive transfer pricing is one of the determinants of FDI activity.

Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure

This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes. Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in preelectoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on selfemployed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.

On Public Inefficiencies in a Mixed Duopoly

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of a change in the public firms objective function in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of a shift from welfare- to profit-maximizing behaviour of the public firm on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the game with observable delay proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Differently from previous work that assumed the timing of competition, we show that, absent efficiency gains, instructing the public firm to play as a private one never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains result from the shift in public firm's objective, an inefficient public firm that maximizes welfare may be preferred.

Does Ricardian Equivalence Hold When Expectations are not Rational?

This paper considers the Ricardian Equivalence proposition when expectations are not rational and are instead formed using adaptive learning rules. We show that Ricardian Equivalence continues to hold provided suitable additional conditions on learning dynamics are satisfied. However, new cases of failure can also emerge under learning. In particular, for Ricardian Equivalence to obtain, agents’ expectations must not depend on government’s financial variables under deficit financing.