The continued salience of religious voting in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain

Conventional wisdom on party systems in advanced industrial democracies holds that modern electorates are dealigned and that social cleavages no longer structure party politics. Recent work on class cleavages has challenged this stylized fact. The analysis performed here extends this criticism to the religious-secular cleavage. Using path analysis and comparing the current electorates of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain with the early 1960s, this paper demonstrates that the religious-secular cleavage remains or has become a significant predictor of conservative vote choice. While the effects of the religious-secular cleavage on vote choice have become largely indirect, the total of the direct and indirect effects is substantial and equivalent to the effects of class and status.

Electronic voting in the French legislative elections of 2012

This chapter presents an analysis of the unprecedented use of electronic voting by expatriates during the French 2012 legislative elections, when they elected their own representatives (referred to here as ‘deputies’), to the National Assembly in Paris for the first time, in 11 newly created overseas constituencies.
The study is presented within the broader perspective of electronic voting in France more generally, and in the historical context of extra-territorial voting by French expatriates. The authors discuss the main issues and controversies that arose during the 2012 elections, and in a final section analyse the results. The authors conclude by drawing attention to recent developments in electronic voting in France since the 2012 elections, which suggest that although there was much criticism expressed by experts of electronic voting as to the security and transparency of the system used, the official discourse that acclaimed the experience as a success, appears to have convinced its target audience.

Emotions and voting in EU referendums

There is an emerging scholarship on the emotional bases of political opinion and behaviour and, in particular, the contrasting implications of two distinct negative emotions - anger and anxiety. I apply the insights in this literature to the previously unresearched realm of the emotional bases of voting in EU referendums. I hypothesise that anxious voters rely on substantive EU issues and angry voters rely on second-order factors relating to domestic politics (partisanship and satisfaction with government). Focusing on the case of Irish voting in the Fiscal Compact referendum, and using data from a representative sample of voters, I find support for the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of the emotional conditionality of EU referendum voting. 

Potentially Voting across the Divide in Deeply Divided Places: Ethnic Catch-All Voting in Consociational Northern Ireland

I elaborate a model of cross-bloc party support in deeply divided places. The model expects that the variation in the level of electoral support that citizens in Community A have for parties in Community B is a function of citizens' evaluations of the relative ability of parties in Community B to represent the interests of all communities. This 'ethnic catch-all' model of cross-bloc party support is tested in the context of consociational Northern Ireland, using data from a representative survey conducted directly after the 2010 Westminster general election. The findings are asymmetric: the model explains Protestant support for nationalist parties but not Catholic support for unionist parties. The findings, and their implications, are discussed.

Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and Governance

Book Review: Emerson, Peter, Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and
Governance (2nd edn), Springer, London, 2012,

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.