Influence of male nutritional conditions on the performance and alimentary selection of wild females of Anastrepha obliqua (Macquart)(Diptera, Tephritidae)

Influence of male nutritional conditions on the performance and alimentary selection of wild females of Anastrepha obliqua (Macquart) (Diptera, Tephritidae). The behavior of A. obliqua females is regulated by endogenous and exogenous factors and among these the presence of males. Experiments were carried out to investigate whether the presence of males and their nutritional condition may affect the behavior of self-selection feeding and the performance of A. obliqua females. Females were sorted in groups containing yeast-deprived females and males, and non-yeast-deprived females and males. The females were maintained apart from the males by a transparent plastic screen. Several yeast and sucrose combinations were offered to the females in a single diet block or in separate blocks. Ingestion, egg production, longevity and diet efficiency were determined. The non-yeast-deprived males positively influenced the females performance when the latter were fed with yeast and sucrose in distinct diet blocks. Performance was better in the groups without males and with yeast-deprived males where the females could not select the nutrient proportions (yeast and sucrose in a single diet block).

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Comparative genomics of chemosensory protein genes reveals rapid evolution and positive selection in ant-specific duplicates.

Gene duplications can have a major role in adaptation, and gene families underlying chemosensation are particularly interesting due to their essential role in chemical recognition of mates, predators and food resources. Social insects add yet another dimension to the study of chemosensory genomics, as the key components of their social life rely on chemical communication. Still, chemosensory gene families are little studied in social insects. Here we annotated chemosensory protein (CSP) genes from seven ant genomes and studied their evolution. The number of functional CSP genes ranges from 11 to 21 depending on species, and the estimated rates of gene birth and death indicate high turnover of genes. Ant CSP genes include seven conservative orthologous groups present in all the ants, and a group of genes that has expanded independently in different ant lineages. Interestingly, the expanded group of genes has a differing mode of evolution from the orthologous groups. The expanded group shows rapid evolution as indicated by a high dN/dS (nonsynonymous to synonymous changes) ratio, several sites under positive selection and many pseudogenes, whereas the genes in the seven orthologous groups evolve slowly under purifying selection and include only one pseudogene. These results show that adaptive changes have played a role in ant CSP evolution. The expanded group of ant-specific genes is phylogenetically close to a conservative orthologous group CSP7, which includes genes known to be involved in ant nestmate recognition, raising an interesting possibility that the expanded CSPs function in ant chemical communication.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Improved estimation of the covariance matrix of stock returns with an application to portofolio selection

This paper proposes to estimate the covariance matrix of stock returnsby an optimally weighted average of two existing estimators: the samplecovariance matrix and single-index covariance matrix. This method isgenerally known as shrinkage, and it is standard in decision theory andin empirical Bayesian statistics. Our shrinkage estimator can be seenas a way to account for extra-market covariance without having to specifyan arbitrary multi-factor structure. For NYSE and AMEX stock returns from1972 to 1995, it can be used to select portfolios with significantly lowerout-of-sample variance than a set of existing estimators, includingmulti-factor models.

Selection of artificial hosts for oviposition by wild Anastrepha obliqua (Macquart) (Diptera, Tephritidae): influence of adult food and effect of experience

Several factors influence the selection of oviposition substrates by insects. The aim of the present work was to find answers to the following questions related to the oviposition behavior of Anastrepha obliqua. Can carbohydrates (glucose or sucrose) present in the adult diet have influence on the female preference for an oviposition substrate with similar composition? Can the previous experience with a host containing one of mentioned carbohydrates interfere in further selection of oviposition substrates? The results showed that the kind of carbohydrate present in the adult diet did not affect the female preference for an artificial oviposition substrate, neither when it was presented by itself nor in combination with brewer's yeast. The effect of experience in the oviposition behavior was observed when there was a previous contact with artificial oviposition substrates containing yeast and sucrose. The data are discussed in terms of the behavioral plasticity presented by this species in relation to feeding and oviposition behaviors.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

Long-run selection and the work ethic

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

KIT mutations and dose selection for imatinib in patients with advanced gastrointestinal stromal tumours.

A recent randomized EORTC phase III trial, comparing two doses of imatinib in patients with advanced gastrointestinal stromal tumours (GISTs), reported dose dependency for progression-free survival. The current analysis of that study aimed to assess if tumour mutational status correlates with clinical response to imatinib. Pre-treatment samples of GISTs from 377 patients enrolled in phase III study were analyzed for mutations of KIT or PDGFRA by combination of D-HPLC and direct sequencing of tumour genomic DNA. Mutation types were correlated with patients' survival data. The presence of exon 9-activating mutations in KIT was the strongest adverse prognostic factor for response to imatinib, increasing the relative risk of progression by 171% (P<0.0001) and the relative risk of death by 190% (P<0.0001) when compared with KIT exon 11 mutants. Similarly, the relative risk of progression was increased by 108% (P<0.0001) and the relative risk of death by 76% (P=0.028) in patients without detectable KIT or PDGFRA mutations. In patients whose tumours expressed an exon 9 KIT oncoprotein, treatment with the high-dose regimen resulted in a significantly superior progression-free survival (P=0.0013), with a reduction of the relative risk of 61%. We conclude that tumour genotype is of major prognostic significance for progression-free survival and overall survival in patients treated with imatinib for advanced GISTs. Our findings suggest the need for differential treatment of patients with GISTs, with KIT exon 9 mutant patients benefiting the most from the 800 mg daily dose of the drug.