A Continuum of Traversing Lines: Youth Political Participation in Gaia Online

This qualitative research project uses a Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical framework to address the question: “How are the politically oriented social forums in Gaia Online experienced as a continuum of overlapping of lines, including molar lines, lines of flight, and molecular lines?” Although smooth lines of flight may occur in Gaia, there are always mechanisms that work to re-territorialize them as more striated molar operations. Conversely, while more striated molar lines may be evident in Gaia, there are also smooth lines of flight that attempt to deterritorialize them as smooth space. Founded in 2003, Gaia is a virtual community in which members use 3D avatars to socialize with others, create content, and play games. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have defined space with three systems: on one end is state-oriented static space, on the other end is nomadic fluid space, and situated in the middle is molecular space which contains both smooth and striating elements. While state-oriented striated space is based on routines, rules, and specifications, nomadic smooth space is flexible, always changing, and full of possibility. Some of the smoother operations that are evident in Gaia include becoming other, decentred communications, desire as resistance, and lines of flight. Some of the more striated operations include social reproduction of gender norms/expectations, capitalist mechanisms, violence and intolerance linked to categories and binaries (racism/sexism/ageism), the regulation of desire, and the organisation of bodies.

The Political Economy of St. Catharines' Illicit Taxi Trade

The global restructuring of production has led to increasingly precarious working conditions around the world. Post-industrial work is characterized by poor working conditions, low wages, a lack of social protection and political representation and little job security. Unregulated forms of work that are defined as “irregular” or “illegal”, or in some cases “criminal,” are connected to sweeping transformations within the broader regulated (formal) economy. The connection between the formal and informal sectors can more accurately be described as co-optation and, as a subordinate integration of the informal to the formal. The city of St. Catharines within Niagara, along with much of Ontario’s industrial heartland, has been hard hit by deindustrialization. The rise of this illegal service is thus viewed against the backdrop of heavy economic restructuring, as opportunities for work in the manufacturing sector have become sparse. In addition, this research also explores the paradoxical co-optation of the growing illicit taxi economy and consequences for racialized and foreign credentialed labour in the taxi industry. The overall objective of this research is to explore the illicit cab industry as not only inseparable from the formal economy, but dialectically, how it is as an integrated and productive element of the public and private transportation industry. Furthermore the research examines what this co-optation means in the context of a labour market that is split by race.

Brock Essay - The Political Culture of Ontario

An essay submitted by Sean O'Sullivan to Professor W.A. Matheson, 25 April 1977. The focus of the essay is stable government, "As one of the chief, if not the predominant, force in giving Confederation its political shape, Ontario helped bring about a central government designed to promote, and dedicated to preserve, stability. In the governing of their own province, the people of Ontario have been faithful to that same goal of stability. Perhaps that steadfast attitude says more than anything else about the political culture of Ontario."

México, aztec, spanish and republican : A historical, geographical, political...

UANL

A political history of modern Europe : from the reformation to the present day

UANL

Principles of political economy

UANL

Lessons on political economy

UANL

The elements of political economy : with some applications to questions of the day

UANL

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

Rapport de recherche

Asymmetric Smiles, Leverage Effects and Structural Parameters.

In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 1: THE ZOLLVEREIN AND RAILWAYS..

Rapport de recherche

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

Rapport de recherche

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.