Kinship, ritual kinship and political milieus in an alpine Valley in 19th century

In my paper I will present some results about ritual kinship and political mobilization of popular groups in an alpine Valley: the Val de Bagnes, in the Swiss canton of Valais. There are two major reasons to choose the Val de Bagnes for our inquiry about social networks: the existence of sharp political and social conflicts during the 18th and the 19th century and the availability of almost systematic genealogical data between 1700 and 1900. The starting point of my research focuses on this question: what role did kinship and ritual kinship play in the political mobilization of popular groups and in the organization of competing factions? This question allows us to shed light on some other uses and meanings of ritual kinship in the local society. Was ritual kinship a significant instrument for economic cooperation? Or was it a channel for patronage or for privileged social contacts? The analysis highlights the importance of kinship and godparentage for the building of homogeneous social and political networks. If we consider transactions between individuals, the analysis of 19th century Val de Bagnes gives the impression of quite open networks. Men and women tried to diversify their relations in order to avoid strong dependency from powerful patrons. Nevertheless, when we consider the family networks, we can notice that most relations took place in a structured social space or a specific "milieu", were intense contacts enhanced trust, although political allegiances and social choices were not fully predictable on the basis of such preferential patterns. In a politically conflictual society, like 19th century Bagnes, ritual kinship interacted with kinship solidarities and ideological factors shaping dense social networks mostly based on a common political orientation. Such milieus sustained the building of political factions, which show surprising stability over time. In this sense, milieus are important factors to understand political and religious polarization in 19th century Switzerland.

La corrupción y sus raíces : El caso de Filipinas

La corrupción tiene raíces de tipo cultural, económico y político y su identificación en cada país es indispensable para luchar contra ella. Se han estudiado las principales causas descritas en la bibliografía y para cada una de ellas se han obtenido indicadores y se han clasificado los diferentes países del mundo. Se han identificado los factores en que destaca Filipinas, una excolonia española y estadounidense, y se han establecido sus raíces coloniales.

The Conservativeness of the Central Bank when Institutional Quality is Poor

We propose an extension of Alesina and Tabellini 's model (1987) to include corruption, which is understood as the presence of weak institutions collecting revenue through formal tax channels. This paper analyses how conservative should an independent central bank be when the institutional quality is poor. When there are no political distortions, we show that the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, except with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank should be as conservative as the government. Further, we obtain that the relationship between the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and the degree of corruption is affected by supply shocks. Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. JEL classi fication: D6, D73, E52, E58, E62, E63. Keywords: Central Bank Conservativeness; Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.

L'équité d'accès aux ressources en eau : fin ou moyen d'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'irrigation ? : la gestion des ressources en eau dans l'état du Gujarat (Inde) dans la perpective de la political ecology

La thèse présentée ici est le résultat d'une étroite collaboration avec une ONG indienne, AKRSP(I), intervenant dans le développement de l'irrigation au Gujarat depuis plus de 25 ans. Un SIG prototype a été mis en oeuvre et nous permet de proposer ime analyse spatiale et quantitative de l'action de cette ONG ainsi qu'une réflexion plus générale sur les leviers de mise en valeur et de gestion des ressources en eau à des fins agricoles. On peut souligner trois principaux enseignements: Les perspectives d'application des SIG au sein des ONG sont manifestes. Les exigences des bailleurs de fonds peuvent néanmoins faire obstacle à leur développement car, indi-rectement, ils favorisent la mise en oeuvre de SI voués à la justification plutôt qu'à la planification et au suivi des programmes d'actions. Ce résultat soulève la question de la pertinence de l'encadrement, des critères d'évaluation et de la conditionnalité de l'aide publique au développement. Les ONG ont un fort potentiel pour participer à la mise en valeur des ressources en eau en Inde et aider à relever le défi agro-démographique indien, en particulier dans les zones marginales où les services étatiques sont en retrait. Les stratégies d'action basées principalement sur l'application des instruments économiques et techniques doivent cependant être modifiées. Nous montrons qu'elles favorisent une inégalité d'accès aux ressources qui débouche sur une efficacité limitée des pratiques d'irrigation, sur un plan agro-technique. Ces résultats soulignent la nécessité de poursuivre une réflexion critique des discours et solutions dominants en matière de gestion des ressources en eau. Deux pistes d'amélioration sont avancées: 1. considérer l'équité d'accès comme un moyen d'optimiser la gestion de la ressource (limiter le volume d'eau par agriculteur pour encourager les choix de cultures irriguées peu consommatrices et l'adoption des technologies d'économie d'eau), 2. prêter attention à l'ordre dans lequel les différents instruments de gestion disponibles sont employés afin de les articuler dans un séquençage temporel pertinent. La Political Ecology apparait comme un cadre conceptuel très pertinent pour engager cette réflexion critique. Elle permet d'intégrer différentes échelles d'asymétries de pouvoirs à la compréhension des situations et des blocages observables localement : inégalités de capabilités et forces socio-politiques à l'échelle locale, politiques agro-industrielles (coton) et jeux d'alliances politiques des castes à l'échelle nationale, discours et conflits idéologiques ou orientations stratégiques des bailleurs de fonds à l'échelle internationale... Notre recherche empirique contribue modestement au développement de cette Political Ecology de la mise en valeur et de la gestion des ressources en eau. - The present research is based on a close collaboration with an indian NGO, AKRSP(I), which is active in the development of irrigation facilities in Gujarat for the past 25 years. We built a GIS prototype providing quantitative and spatial datas to analyse the NGO intervention and propose a general reflection about water resources development and management issues. Three main findings may be emphasized : The potential of GIS within the workings of an NGO is obvious, as an information ma-nagement tool as much as for developing analytical capacity. However, financial backers expectations may not favour a relevant development of this technology. Indirectly, they promote Information Systems built to justify rather than to plan or monitor action pro¬grammes. This raises the question of stricter framework, conditionality criters and stan¬dardised assessment indicators surrounding official development assistance. There is strong potential that NGOs can assist with the improvement of water resources in India. They can help in overcoming Indian demographic-related agricultural challenges, especially in marginal rural areas neglected by state services. However, intervention strategies mainly based on technical and economic management tools has to be adapted. We found that they lead to inequitable access and distribution of water resources what induces a low efficiency of irrigation practices from an agro-technical point of view. These results underline the need to go further in criticizing dominant ideas and guidelines regarding water resources management. We suggest two other options : 1. to consider equitable access has a tool to improve the effective use of water for agricul¬tural purposes (limiting the volume of water available per farmer would encourage them to adopt low water consumption crops and water saving technics), 2. to consider more carefully the order of use of the various management tools available and to structure them in a relevant sequence. Here, Political Ecology seems to be a relevant conceptual framework to enter into such a critical reflection, integrating different levels and scales of political asymmetries at the core of environmental issues. Indeed, the understanding of regional water situations and social stumbling blocks needs not only to consider local capabilities and socio-political inequities, but also agro-industrial policy (e.i. cotton) and caste political alliances at a national scale, as well as ideological and narrative struggles or strategical orientations of financial backers at an international level. Our empirical research modestly contributes to the development of such a Political Ecology of water resources development and management.

Do political factors matter in explaining under- and overweight outcomes in developing countries?

We construct a rich dataset covering 47 developing countries over the years 1990-2007, combining several micro and macro level data sources to explore the link between political factors and body mass index (BMI). We implement a heteroskedastic generalized ordered logit model allowing for different covariate effects across the BMI distribution and accounting for the unequal BMI dispersion by geographical area. We find that systems with democratic qualities are more likely to reduce under-weight, but increase overweight/obesity, whereas effective political competition does entail double-benefits in the form of reducing both under-weight and obesity. Our results are robust to the introduction of country fixed effects.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.