Determinants of organizational form: Transaction costs and institutions in the European trucking industry

We explain why European trucking carriers are much smaller and rely more heavily on owner-operators(as opposed to employee drivers) than their US counterparts. Our analysis begins by ruling outdifferences in technology as the source of those disparities and confirms that standard hypothesesin organizational economics, which have been shown to explain the choice of organizational form inUS industry, also apply in Europe. We then argue that the preference for subcontracting oververtical integration in Europe is the result of European institutions particularly, labor regulationand tax laws that increase the costs of vertical integration.

Title IIIB Legal Assistance Program Activity Report for SFY 2006

This report is prepared from data submitted by the Title IIIB legal providers and Area Agencies on Aging.

Title IIIB Legal Assistance Activity Report for SFY 2005.

This report is prepared from data submitted by the Title IIIB providers and Area Agencies on Aging.

Réforme de la péréquation financière et de la répartition des tâches : incidences du transfert du domaine des institutions pour personnes handicapées aux cantons : [analyse comparative entre les cantons de Neuchâtel, Vaud, du Valais, de Bâle-Ville et de Bâle-Campagne]

La réforme de la péréquation financière et de la répartition des tâches entre la Confédération et les cantons (RPT) entrera en vigueur le 1er janvier 2008. Elle prévoit notamment le transfert de la responsabilité des institutions pour personnes handicapées de la Confédération aux cantons. Ce mémoire se concentre sur ce domaine particulier en décrivant de quelle manière les cantons se préparent pour assumer leurs nouvelles responsabilités et comment ils envisagent de redéfinir leurs relations avec les institutions spécialisées et les personnes handicapées. Par une analyse comparative menée dans les cantons de Neuchâtel, Vaud, Valais, Bâle-Ville et Bâle-Campagne des différences intercantonales importantes sont mise en évidence et permettent d'aborder la problématique générale de la mise en oeuvre d'une politique sociale dans un Etat fédéral.

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain

This paper studies the duration pattern of xed-term contracts and the determinantsof their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of xed-termemployment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporaryemployment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versusalternative states, and exible duration dependence. We nd that conversion rates aregenerally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure,with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain theworker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversionrates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside optionsand thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Shocks and institutions in a job matching model

This paper explains the divergent behavior of European an US unemploymentrates using a job market matching model of the labor market with aninteraction between shocks an institutions. It shows that a reduction inTF growth rates, an increase in real interest rates, and an increase intax rates leads to a permanent increase in unemployment rates when thereplacement rates or initial tax rates are high, while no increase inunemployment occurs when institutions are "employment friendly". The paperalso shows that an increase in turbulence, modelle as an increase probabilityof skill loss, is not a robust explanation for the European unemploymentpuzzle in the context of a matching model with both endogenous job creationand job estruction.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the five years ended June 30, 2007

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the five years ended June 30, 2007

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Human Services for the five years ended June 30, 2007

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Human Services for the five years ended June 30, 2007

Record keeping by Swiss physiotherapists--a national survey of knowledge regarding legal requirements.

A national survey conducted in Switzerland aimed to evaluate the knowledge of physiotherapists regarding the legal requirements for record keeping and to collect their feedback about record keeping in general. Three physiotherapists from various professional practice groups and a lawyer specialised in health law developed a questionnaire that was sent to the 7,753 members of two existing national associations of physiotherapists. The questionnaire evaluated the participants' knowledge by calculating a score of legal knowledge, which had a maximum of 30 points. We included 825 questionnaires in the analysis. The large majority (83.4%) of participants confessed an ignorance of the legal requirements concerning record keeping prior to the survey. The average score of legal compatibility was 8 points. The younger age of the physiotherapists was a significant predictor of having knowledge of the legal requirements for record keeping (p <0.001). The participants had an appreciation of the value of records, but they did not have the relevant knowledge regarding the legal requirements for keeping records. The participants blamed a lack of time and remuneration for their failure to keep records according to known requirements. All practising allied health professionals should keep up-to-date and accurate records that conform to active legal requirements and existing international guidelines. In addition to the existing legal requirements, the emergence of e-health and the electronic era will trigger major changes in patient record management by physiotherapists.