A quase-estagnação brasileira e sua explicação novo-desenvolvimentista

The Brazilian economy is quasi-stagnant since 1980, with exception of the short 2006-2010 boom, caused by the high prices of the commodities. Up to 1994, the causes were the major financial crisis of the 1980s and the ensuing high inertial inflation. Since these two causes were overcome, the Brazilian economy should have resumed growth, but didn’t. According to new developmental macroeconomics, the new fact that explains this low growth is the 1990-91 trade liberalization, which had as non-predicted consequence the suspension of the neutralization of the Dutch disease. This fact made the Brazilian manufacturing industry to have since then a competitive disadvantage of 20 to 25%, which is causing premature deindustrialization and quasi-stagnation. There is a solution for this stalemate today, but liberal as well as developmental Brazilian economists are not being able to consider the new macroeconomic models that justify it

Sovereignty, exchange rate and the Euro crisis

This paper presents an interpretation of the European crisis based on the balance of payments imbalances within the Eurozone and highlighting the role of the “internal” real exchange rates as a primary cause of the crisis. It explores the structural contradictions that turn the Euro into a “foreign currency” for each individual Eurozone country. These contradictions imply the inability of national central banks to monetize the public and private debts, which makes the Euro crisis a sovereign crisis similar to those typical of emerging countries, but whose solution presents additional obstacles.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

Developmental class coalitions: historical experiences and prospects

Este artigo discute o conceito de coalizões de classe como uma alternativa parcial à luta de classes na compreensão das sociedades capitalistas; define duas coalizões de classes básicas - a desenvolvimentista e a liberal; apresenta brevemente três coalizões de classe desenvolvimentistas paradigmáticas - a mercantilista, a bismarckiana, e a social-democrata (ou dos anos dourados do capitalismo); e usa esse arcabouço teórico para entender o capitalismo contemporâneo nos anos pós neoliberais - os anos que se seguem a crise financeira global de 2008

A poupança externa no desenvolvimentismo clássico e no novo desenvolvimentismo

Esta dissertação discute a crítica do Novo Desenvolvimentismo ao Desenvolvimentismo Clás-sico em relação ao crescimento com poupança externa. Por meio da análise de trabalhos dos principais autores do Desenvolvimentismo Clássico que são considerados os pioneiros da Teo-ria do Desenvolvimento Econômico, identificou-se que de forma geral seus autores têm posição favorável ao financiamento do desenvolvimento por recursos externos para sanar os problemas de carência de poupança e restrição externa dos países subdesenvolvidos, colocando, porém, condicionalidades para o uso desses recursos. Já a Teoria Novo Desenvolvimentista apresenta uma crítica contra intuitiva a essa estratégia por meio da construção de um modelo teórico no qual demonstra que ter o desenvolvimento financiado com poupança externa, na verdade, é uma armadilha que é sustentada por alto patamar de juros e traz a apreciação da moeda nacional, reduz o acesso dos empresários nacionais ao mercado externo e interno, traz semi-estagnação econômica e crises cíclicas de Balanço de Pagamentos, o que torna a economia nacional instável financeiramente. Esse modelo é corroborado por evidências em diversos trabalhos que testaram algumas das hipóteses da Teoria Novo Desenvolvimentista. Por fim, a Teoria Novo Desenvolvimentista pode ser considerada uma nova teoria que embora se baseie no Desenvolvimentismo Clássico consegue mostrar as causas e consequências dessa estratégia de crescimento com poupança externa, incorporando em sua teoria o que para o Desenvolvimentismo Clássico não era teoricamente explicado ou era visto como panaceia para o desenvolvimento, algo inevitável. Por fim, a Macroeconomia Desenvolvimentista conclui e propõe que o desenvolvimento econômico é financiado por recursos nacionais, que o capital se faz em casa.

After the demise of neoliberalism but not of conservatism, a third developmentalism?

Neoliberalism and developmentalism are the two alternative forms of economic and political organization of capitalism. Since the 2008 global financial crisis we see the demise of neoliberalism in rich countries, as state intervention and regulation increased, opening room for a third historical developmentalism (the first was mercantilism, the second, Fordism). Not only because of major market failures, not only because the market is definitely unable to assure financial stability and full employment, an active macroeconomic policy is being required. Modern economies are divided into a competitive and a non-competitive sector; for the coordination of the competitive sector the market is irreplaceable and regulation as well as strategic industrial policy will be pragmatically adopted following the subsidiarity principle, whereas for the non-competitive sector, state coordination and some state ownership are usually more efficient. Besides, the fact that capitalist economies are increasingly diversified and complex is an argument against the two extremes – against statism as well as neoliberalism – in so far that they require market coordination combined with increased regulation. But the third developmentalism probably will not be progressive as was the second, because the social-democratic political parties are disoriented. They won the battle for the welfare state, which neoliberalism was unable to dismantle, but the competition of low wage developing countries and immigration continue to offer arguments to conservative political parties that defend the reduction of the cost of labor contracts or the or precarization of labor.

Reflecting on new developmentalism and classical developmentalism

This paper, first, distinguishes new developmentalism, a new theoretical system that is being created, from really existing developmentalism – a form of organizing capitalism. Second, it distinguishes new developmentalism from its antecedents, Development Economics or classical developmentalism and Keynesian Macroeconomics. Third, it discusses the false opposition that some economists have adopted between new developmentalism and social-developmentalism, which the author understands as a form of really existing developmentalism; as theory, it is just a version of classical developmentalism with a bias toward immediate consumption. Finally, it makes a summary of new developmentalism – of its main political economy, economic theory and economic policy claims

Brazil’s 35 years-old quasi-stagnation: facts and theory

Brazil is growing around 1% per capita a year from 1981; this means for a country that is supposed to catch up, quasi-stagnation. Four historical new facts explain why growth was so low after the Real Plan: the reduction of public savings, and three facts that reduce private investments: the end of the unlimited supply of labor, a very high interest rate, and the 1990 dismantling of the mechanism that neutralized the Dutch disease, which represented a major competitive disadvantage for the manufacturing industry. New-developmental theory offers an explanation and two solutions for the problem, but does not underestimate the political economy problems involved

Estado, estado-nação e formas de intermediação social

This paper, first, situates the nation-state historically, as a product of the capitalist revolution. Second, it distinguishes the state (the law system and the organization that guarantees it) from the nation-state or country (the territorial political unit formed by a nation, a state and a territory). Third, it defines nation, civil society and class coalitions, understanding that they are forms of society politically organized, which role is to act as intermediary between society and the state. Fourth, it uses these concepts plus the ones of relative autonomy and of anteriority to understand the ever changing relation between the state and society, where in early moments the state or its elites assumed the lead, and later, as democratization takes place, the protagonist role changed gradually to the people. The paper emphasizes the class coalitions, and argues that behind the two basic forms or economic and political organization of capitalism – developmentalism and economic liberalism – there are the correspondent class coalitions

Democracy and growth in pre-industrial countries

This paper distinguishes three types of countries (rich, middle-income, and pre-industrial) and focus on the latter, which, in contrast to the other two, didn’t complete their industrial and capitalist revolutions. Can pre-industrial countries be governed well and embody the principles of consolidated democracies? Today these countries are under pressure from the imperial West to eschew institutions and developmental strategies that, in the past, allowed rich and middle-income countries to industrialize. At the same time, they are pressured by these same Western parties (and by its own people) to be democratic, even though their societies are not mature enough to fulfill that. In fact, no country completed its industrial and capitalist revolution within the framework of even a minimal democracy, suggesting that such demands are unfair. Added to this, pre-industrial countries are extremely difficult to govern because they usually don’t have a strong nation and capable states. This double pressure to renounce development strategies that have worked for the West while being required to become a democracy represents a major obstacle to their development.

Why the ‘Rest’ doesn’t need foreign finance

The Rest will be able to catch up and grow faster than the West only if it goes against a “received truth”, namely that capital-rich countries should transfer their capital to capital-poor countries. This intuitive truth is the mantra that the West cites to justify its occupation of the markets of developing countries with its finance and its multinationals. Classical Developmentalism successfully criticized the unequal exchange involved in trade liberalization, but it didn’t succeed in criticizing foreign finance. This task has been recently achieved by New Developmentalism and its developmental macroeconomics, which shows that countries will invest and grow more if they don’t run current account deficits, even when these deficits are financed by foreign direct investment

Modelos de estado desenvolvimentista

O estado desenvolvimentista está situado entre o estado liberal e o estatismo. Todas as revoluções industriais foram realizadas no quadro de estados desenvolvimentistas, que assumiram várias formas ou modelos, conforme o desenvolvimento fosse original ou retardatário, central ou periférico, o primeiro desenvolvimentismo no país ou o segundo. Terminada a revolução industrial e depois que a economia se torna diversificada, complexa e competitiva, o mercado pode coordenar com vantagem os setores competitivos. Mas o estado tende e deve continuar desenvolvimentista, porque cabe a ele coordenar o setor não-competitivo, realizar uma política macroeconômica ativa incluindo uma política cambial, promover a diminuição das desigualdades econômicas, e proteger o meio ambiente – todas atividades que o mercado não tem condições de realizar.

A reconstrução da indústria brasileira: a conexão entre o regime macroeconômico e a política industrial

Este artigo, de cunho eminentemente analítico, mostra que no âmbito da política macroeconômica, é necessária consistência entre as políticas monetária, fiscal, cambial e salarial para viabilizar taxas de juros reais médias inferiores às taxas de retorno médias sobre o capital, taxas de câmbio reais competitivas (em torno da taxa de “equilíbrio industrial”) e taxas de salários que evoluam de acordo com o crescimento da produtividade, condições para que se assegure o crescimento econômico sobre bases sustentáveis. Já com respeito à política industrial, é preciso perseguir estratégias de diversificação produtiva, notadamente no setor manufatureiro e nos segmentos tradable do setor de serviços, mediante a identificação de prioridades estratégicas tanto nas cadeias produtivas, segmentos e setores próximos à base de vantagem comparativa preexistente, como naqueles mais próximos à fronteira tecnológica internacional. Embora os argumentos analíticos favoreçam a estratégia de diversificação produtiva, esta não deve ser confundida com semi-autarquia, o que significa que as cadeias e setores que não sejam foco da política industrial devem ter alíquotas de importação zero ou próximas de zero.

Reforma gerencial 20+20 : os 20 anos da reforma Bresser e os desafios para o futuro

Los ciudadanos hoy en día están más y mejor informados y son mucho más exigentes en cuanto al funcionamiento de las instituciones públicas, tienen expectativas más altas de sus gobiernos y demandan la provisión de servicios de calidad de manera transparente, efectiva y oportuna. Por esta razón, uno de los mayores desafíos que enfrentan los gobiernos de la región es la falta de confianza de los ciudadanos en las instituciones públicas. Es por eso que la gestión pública efectiva representa una necesidad imperativa para abordar el desafío mencionado. En este contexto, el concepto de gobierno abierto llega en buena hora para atender estas demandas ciudadanas. Con el objetivo de profundizar la democracia en las Américas, la OEA, a través de distintos programas, promueve los principios de gobierno abierto para que las instituciones públicas de la región sean cada vez más transparentes, efectivas y cuenten con mecanismos de participación ciudadana.