Explaining transactions in time banks in economic crisis

This article studies the services exchanged in a particular Spanish time bank. Using data from users and transactions, we analyse the users’ profile as well as the determinants of providing and receiving different services. Our results show that the representative user is a Spanish female, not married, middle aged, highly educated and unemployed. We also find differences in the personal characteristics driving the supply and demand of services.

spotlight europe #2012/07 — Dezember 2012: Die Union gegen die Banken = The Union against the banks

No abstract.

eu spotlight 2012/07, December 2012: At long last, the EU takes on its banks

The agreement on establishing a common banking authority is paving the way for a banking union. The decision was reached by the finance ministers only hours before last December’s EU summit. After making headway on sovereign debt by deciding on a fiscal union one year beforehand in December 2011, the EU is by now also addressing the banking crisis and we know at least who is going to supervise who and what.

What's wrong with Europe's banks? CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2013

In offering his diagnosis of Europe’s ailing banking sector, Daniel Gros finds that it is undercapitalised, too large and populated by too many players without a viable long-term business model. In his view, it is the combination of the last two factors that is the most worrying and he warns that any major problem could overburden public budgets, making the sector, with total liabilities over 250% of GDP, possibly “too big to be saved”.

Fiscal policy, banks and the financial crisis. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 234, October 2012

This paper studies the effectiveness of Euro Area (EA) fiscal policy, during the recent financial crisis, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. A key dimension of policy in the crisis was massive government support for banks—that dimension has so far received little attention in the macroeconomics literature. We use the estimated model to analyze the effects of bank asset losses, of government support for banks, and other fiscal stimulus measures, in the EA. Our results suggest that support for banks had a stabilizing effect on EA output, consumption and investment. Increased government purchases helped to stabilize output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government spending explain half of the rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the onset of the crisis.

Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/16, 29 November 2013

As the basis for a European regime for resolving failing and failed banks, the European Commission has proposed the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and a regulation establishing a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF). There is a debate about which parts of the proposed SRM-SBRF to add to the BRRD. The BRRD sets out a resolution toolkit that can be used by national resolution authorities. The SRM would involve European institutions more at the expense of national resolution authorities. This change could affect resolution outcomes. Domestic resolution authorities might be more generous than supranational authorities in providing assistance to banks. A supranational approach might be more effective in minimising costs for taxpayers. But regardless of the final design, more attention is needed to ensure that resolution authorities are politically independent from governments. When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts.

Strong governments, weak banks. CEPS Policy Brief No. 305, 25 November 2013

Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. The authors explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. Recommendations More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks. The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed the large banks to continue living dangerously, with insufficient capital.