So far apart and yet so close: Should the ECB care about inflation differentials? Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2014/10 September 2014

Inflation rates can differ across regions of monetary unions. We show that in the euro area, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, inflation rates have been substantially and persistently different in different regions. Differences were particularly substantial in the euro area. Inflation differences can reflect normal adjustment processes such as price convergence or the Balassa-Samuelson effect, or can reflect the different cyclical position of regions. But they can also be the result of economic distortions resulting from segmented markets or unsustainable demand and credit developments fueled by low real interest rates. In normal times, the European Central Bank cannot influence such developments with its single interest rate instrument. However, unconventional policy measures can have different effects on different countries depending on the chosen instrument, and should be used to reduce fragmentation and ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy. The new macro prudential policy tools are unlikely to be practical in addressing inflation divergences. It is crucial to keep the average inflation rate close to two percent so that inflation differentials are possible without deflation in some parts of the euro area, which in turn might endanger area-wide financial stability and price stability.

Developing an underlying inflation gauge for China. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/11, 9 October 2014

This paper develops a new underlying inflation gauge (UIG) for China which differentiates between trend and noise, is available daily and uses a broad set of variables that potentially influence inflation. Its construction follows the works at other major central banks, adopts the methodology of a dynamic factor model that extracts the lower frequency components as developed by Forni et al (2000) and draws on the experience of the People’s Bank of China in modelling inflation.

Inflation and Unemployment In EMU and the United States. ACES Working Papers No. 10, 2008

The original purpose of this paper was to see why the Phillips Curve numbers seem to be so much worse for the EMU countries than the United States since EMU was began operation in 1990. The problem is that there is no evidence of a Phillips curve relationship in EMU or in the United States during this seventeen year period. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, it just is not there. In about half the years unemployment and inflation moved in the opposite direction, as Phillips would predict, but in other half of the years they moved in the same direction. This may be a matter of time lags, with unemployment lagging inflation, but it seems clear that the Phillips curve is a poor tool for explaining these year to year outcomes in Europe or the United States.

Determinants of Growth and Inflation in Southern Mediterranean Countries. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 10/March 2012

Despite significant economic reforms in many Southern Mediterranean EU neighbour countries, their growth performance has on average been subdued. This study analyses the differences in growth performance and macroeconomic stability across Mediterranean countries, to draw lessons for the future. The main findings are that Southern Mediterranean countries should benefit from closer ties with the EU that result in higher levels of trade and FDI inflows, once the turbulence of the ‘Arab Spring’ is resolved, and from the development of financial markets and infrastructure. They will also benefit in keeping inflation under control, which will depend in great part on their ability to maintain fiscal discipline and sustainable current accounts. One of the main challenges for the region will be to implement structural reforms that can help them absorb a large pool of unemployed without creating upward risks to inflation.

It’s not just Russia: Currency crisis in the Commonwealth of independent states. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/01, February 2015

The currency crisis that started in Russia and Ukraine during 2014 has spread to neighbouring countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The collapse of the Russian ruble, expected recession in Russia, the stronger US dollar and lower commodity prices have negatively affected the entire region, with the consequence that the European Union's entire eastern neighbourhood faces serious economic, social and political challenges because of weaker currencies, higher inflation, decreasing export revenues and labour remittances, net capital outflows and stagnating or declining GDP. •The crisis requires a proper policy response from CIS governments, the International Monetary Fund and the EU. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbass requires rapid resolution, as the first step to return Russia to the mainstream of global economic and political cooperation. Beyond that, both Russia and Ukraine need deep structural and institutional reforms. The EU should deepen economic ties with those CIS countries that are interested in a closer relationship with Europe. The IMF should provide additional assistance to those CIS countries that have become victims of a new regional contagion, while preparing for the possibility of more emerging-market crises arising from slower growth, the stronger dollar and lower commodity prices.

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

How Much am I Expected to Pay for my Parents‘ Firm? An Institutional Logics Perspective on Family Discounts

Recent evidence suggests that successors do not simply inherit their parents’ firm, but have to pay a certain price. Building on institutional logics literature, we explore successors’ family discount expectations, defined as the rebate expected from parents in comparison to nonfamily buyers when assuming control of the firm. We find that family cohesion increases discount expectations, while successors’ fear of failure and family equity stake in the firm decrease discount expectations. Higher education in business or economics weakens These effects. On average, in our study comprised of 16 countries, successors expect a 57% family discount.

What will inflation and devaluation mean to you?

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