Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Essays in optimal resource allocation under uncertainty with capacity constraints

This thesis brings together four papers on optimal resource allocation under uncertainty with capacity constraints. The first is an extension of the Arrow-Debreu contingent claim model to a good subject to supply uncertainty for which delivery capacity has to be chosen before the uncertainty is resolved. The second compares an ex-ante contingent claims market to a dynamic market in which capacity is chosen ex-ante and output and consumption decisions are made ex-post. The third extends the analysis to a storable good subject to random supply. Finally, the fourth examines optimal allocation of water under an appropriative rights system.

The occurrence of two new plankton diatom populations in the English Lake District: Aulacoseira islandica

Samples of planktonic algae from major lakes in the English Lake District have been investigated over many years as part of a long-term monitoring programme set up by the Freshwater Biological Association and continued by the Institute For Ecology. Some lakes have been sampled regularly for long periods, others less frequently or only occasionally. Windermere north and south basins, and the neighbouring lakes Blelham Tarn and Esthwaite Water, have been under observation, mostly on a weekly basis, since the programme began in 1945. During this time diatoms have played a significant role in the population dynamics of these lakes.

The ionic composition of surface waters in the English Lake District, related to bedrock geology, with some singular facts and speculation on the existence of mineral-rich groundwaters

This article is based on a survey of tarns conducted mainly in the summers of 1983 to 1985, plus a survey made in the winter of 1985, in which streams were sampled on the wide variety of rock-types occurring on the fringes of the Lake District. Differences in composition of major ions and their concentrations in the surface waters of Cumbria reflect the complex geological structure of the region. At altitudes above 300 m, on Borrowdale Volcanics and Skiddaw Slates, surface waters are derived from atmospheric precipitation, with additional inputs of some ions - especially calcium and bicarbonate - from catchment rocks and soils. In some of the low-lying large lakes on the fringes of the central fells, water composition is also dominated by inputs from upper catchments; examples are Wastwater, Ullswater and Haweswater. However in other lakes there is evidence (Derwentwater and Bassenthwaite Lake) of inputs from saline groundwater.

Some statistical aspects of the long-term gill net monitoring programme for pike Esox lucius in Windermere (English Lake District)

For more than 55 years, data have been collected on the population of pike Esox lucius in Windermere, first by the Freshwater Biological Association (FBA) and, since 1989, by the Institute of Freshwater Ecology (IFE) of the NERC Centre for Ecology and Hydrology. The aim of this article is to explore some methodological and statistical issues associated with the precision of pike gill net catches and catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) data, further to those examined by Bagenal (1972) and especially in the light of the current deployment within the Windermere long-term sampling programme. Specifically, consideration is given to the precision of catch estimates from gill netting, including the effects of sampling different locations, the effectiveness of sampling for distinguishing between years, and the effects of changing fishing effort.

The ecology of Bassenthwaite Lake (English Lake District)

Bassenthwaite Lake is, in many ways, different from the other major lakes in the English Lake District: it is the most northerly, the shallowest, has the largest catchment and the shortest mean retention time. There is also considerable temporal variation in lake level. This article summarises the limnological features of Bassenthwaite Lake, the catchment and physical characteristics before describing the water chemistry, phytoplankton, macrophytes, zooplankton, invertebrates, fish, mammal and invertebrate population. The authors then describe the ecological pressures faced by Bassenthwaite Lake such as nutrients, sediments and introduced species.

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory

This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.

In the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.

The second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.

The third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.

Three essays on economics and information shocks

A person living in an industrialized society has almost no choice but to receive information daily with negative implications for himself or others. His attention will often be drawn to the ups and downs of economic indicators or the alleged misdeeds of leaders and organizations. Reacting to new information is central to economics, but economics typically ignores the affective aspect of the response, for example, of stress or anger. These essays present the results of considering how the affective aspect of the response can influence economic outcomes.

The first chapter presents an experiment in which individuals were presented with information about various non-profit organizations and allowed to take actions that rewarded or punished those organizations. When social interaction was introduced into this environment an asymmetry between rewarding and punishing appeared. The net effects of punishment became greater and more variable, whereas the effects of reward were unchanged. The individuals were more strongly influenced by negative social information and used that information to target unpopular organizations. These behaviors contributed to an increase in inequality among the outcomes of the organizations.

The second and third chapters present empirical studies of reactions to negative information about local economic conditions. Economic factors are among the most prevalent stressors, and stress is known to have numerous negative effects on health. These chapters document localized, transient effects of the announcement of information about large-scale job losses. News of mass layoffs and shut downs of large military bases are found to decrease birth weights and gestational ages among babies born in the affected regions. The effect magnitudes are close to those estimated in similar studies of disasters.

The phytoplankton of an enriched, soft-water lakel subject to intermittent hydraulic flushing (Grasmere, English Lake District)

This paper describes some characteristic features of the phytoplankton of Grasmere, one of the smaller of the principal lakes of the English Lake District, and attempts to relate these to distinctive physical and chemical properties of the lake. Quantitative data presented herein are derived from 5-m vertical column samples, collected with a flexible polyethylene hose close to the deepest point of Grasmere, generally at intervals of 14 days ( 7 days from 1972 to 1978, inclusive). The study concludes that although Grasmere has been subject to increased phosphorus-loading and has quickly developed many features associated with eutrophication, the composition of its plankton has retained the characteristics of a mesotrophic, soft-water lake: a vernal diatom maximum, generally dominated by Asterionella, is followed by summer growths of nanoplanktonic species, of various colonial Chlorophyceae, before a substantial return to Asterionella-dominance in the autumn.