Political Sophistication and Vote Intention Switching

This article investigates the link between political sophistication and electoral volatility. Showing that there is disagreement in the literature on whether switching party preferences is related to low or high levels of political sophistication, it is then argued that the effect of sophistication on vote switching might differ depending on when switching is measured. The effect of timing on volatility is investigated by means of the Short-term panel of the 2009 German Longitudinal Election Study. Results indicate that timing indeed matters, while sophistication increases the probability of switching parties before the campaign, the effect of political sophistication becomes more negative as Election Day draws near.

Electoral Volatility, Political Sophistication, Trust and Efficacy

In this article we investigate voter volatility and analyze the causes and motives of switching vote intentions. We test two main sets of variables linked to volatility in literature; political sophistication and ‘political (dis)satisfaction’. Results show that voters with low levels of political efficacy tend to switch more often, both within a campaign and between elections. In the analysis we differentiate between campaign volatility and inter-election volatility and by doing so show that the dynamics of a campaign have a profound impact on volatility. The campaign period is when the lowly sophisticated switch their vote intention. Those with higher levels of interest in politics have switched their intention before the campaign has started. The data for this analysis are from the three wave PartiRep Belgian Election Study (2009).

Partisan Dealignment in Germany: A rejoinder to Russell Dalton

The work of Russell Dalton has undoubtedly played a seminal role in the study of the relation between political sophistication and partisan dealignment. We furthermore acknowledge the presence of a consensus on the occurrence of lower levels of partisanship in Germany. Using panel data as well as pooled cross-sectional observations, however, it is clear that generational replacement is not the sole driving force of partisan dealignment, but that period effects should also be taken into account. While on an aggregate level rising levels of political sophistication have occurred simultaneously with decreasing partisanship, individual level analysis suggests clearly that the least sophisticated are most likely to feel alienated from the party system. We close with some very specific suggestion on how to address the democratic consequences of declining levels of partisanship.

Age, Period and Cohort effects in the Decline of Party Identification in Germany

Party identification traditionally is seen as an important linkage mechanism, connecting voters to the party system. Previous analyses have suggested that the level of party identity is in decline in Germany, and in this article, we first expand previous observations with more recent data. These suggest that the erosion of party identity continues up to the present time. An age-period-cohort analysis of the panel data of the SOEP panel suggests that period effects are significantly negative. Furthermore, it can be observed that throughout the 1992-2009 observation period, education level and political interest have become more important determinants of party identity. Contrary to some of the literature, therefore, it can be shown that the loss of party identity is concentrated among groups with lower levels of political sophistication, indicating that the socio-economic profile of the group with a sense of party identification has become more distinct compared to the population as a whole. In the discussion, we investigate the theoretical and democratic consequences of this trend.

The Relation Between Civic Education and Political Attitudes and Behavior

It is generally assumed that civic education efforts will have a positive effect on the political attitudes and behaviors of adolescents and young adults. There is less agreement, however, on the most effective forms of civic education. In the present study, we distinguish between formal civic education, an open classroom climate and active learning strategies, and we explore their effect on political interest, efficacy, trust and participation. To analyze these effects, we rely on the results of a two-year panel study among late adolescents in Belgium. The results indicate that formal civic education (classroom instruction) and active learning strategies (school council membership and, to a lesser extent, group projects) are effective in shaping political attitudes and behavior. An open classroom climate, on the other hand, has an effect on political trust. We conclude that there is no reason to privilege specific forms of civic education, as each form contributes to different relevant political attitudes and behaviors.

Economic Policy Voting and Incumbency: Unemployment in Western Europe

The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.

Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions

Election forecasting models assume retrospective economic voting and clear mechanisms of accountability. Previous research indeed indicates that incumbent political parties are being held accountable for the state of the economy. In this article we develop a ‘hard case’ for the assumptions of election forecasting models. Belgium is a multiparty system with perennial coalition governments. Furthermore, Belgium has two completely segregated party systems (Dutch and French language). Since the prime minister during the period 1974-2011 has always been a Dutch language politician, French language voters could not even vote for the prime minister, so this cognitive shortcut to establish political accountability is not available. Results of an analysis for the French speaking parties (1981-2010) show that even in these conditions of opaque accountability, retrospective economic voting occurs as election results respond to indicators with regard to GDP and unemployment levels. Party membership figures can be used to model the popularity function in election forecasting.

Punishing Local Incumbents for the Local Economy

After decennia of research on economic voting, it is now established that the state of the economy affects voting behaviour. Nevertheless, this conclusion is the result of a focus on predominantly national-level economies and national-level elections. In this paper, we show that at a local level as well, mechanisms of accountability linked to the economy are at work. The local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 Belgian municipal elections, with a stronger increase of unemployment rates in their municipality significantly decreasing the probability that voters choose an incumbent party. Additionally, we observe that voters are not opportunistically voting for incumbents who lower tax rates. Instead, voters seem to be holding local incumbents accountable for local economic conditions. We hence conclude that voters care about economic outcomes, not about what specific policies are implemented to reach these outcomes.

Transfert de voix, flux électoraux et électeurs mobiles

Ruth Dassonneville et Pierre Baudewyns révèlent que, derrière les pourcentages des résultats électoraux, se cachent bien des mouvements et transferts d’électeurs. Ils se penchent sur la « volatilité nette », c’est-à-dire sur la somme des avancées et reculs des différents partis. Ils regardent également au niveau des individus (les électeurs) et observent que les électeurs et électrices votent différemment en 2014. Sur la base de ces analyses des transferts de voix, les auteurs démontrent également que, du côté wallon, on a assisté à un certain éparpillement des votes, surtout entre les partis de gauche. En Flandre, par contre, les électeurs et électrices de centre-droit ont fortement convergé vers la N-VA. Les auteurs établissent aussi un portrait précis de qui sont les électeurs stables (« stayers ») et les électeurs mobiles (« movers »).

Syria and Israel in the Middle East : an anatomy of the conflict

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Faillite de l'État et montée de l'islamisme : une interprétation de la crise algérienne

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Corporatisme et néolibéralisme au Mexique : le cas du Syndicat des téléphonistes de la République mexicaine (STRM)

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

La mesure alternative d’hostilité dans les relations de rivalité interacteur.

Le présent travail explore le phénomène de la rivalité interétatique1 et les mesures de son intensité. Chacune des définitions existantes de la rivalité fait la lumière sur l’une de ses caractéristiques. La rivalité durable met l’accent sur la compétition militarisée, la rivalité stratégique accorde une importance particulière à la perception de l’ennemi, tandis que la rivalité interétatique est axée sur les questions autour desquelles la compétition se déroule. Ces visions différentes du phénomène de la rivalité laissent leur empreinte sur son opérationnalisation et sur le choix des paramètres visant à le capter. Nous réunissons ces trois interprétations dans une seule définition de rivalité interacteur, en proposant une nouvelle classification des actions hostiles, ainsi que la mesure alternative d’hostilité fondée sur la fréquence de ces dernières. Les quatre études de cas suivantes nous ont permis d’atteindre ces objectifs : les relations de rivalité entre l’Afghanistan et le Pakistan, entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan, entre le Bélize et le Guatemala, ainsi qu’entre la Somalie et l’Éthiopie.