Nota sôbre a dosagem iodométrica da vitamina C nos frutos cítricos

Ascorbic acid was determined in pure aquous solutions and in citrus fruit juices by iodometric, dichlorophenolindophenol and iodate methods. More constant values were obtained with iodate and Tillmans methods. Iodate is preferable owing to the stability of solution and the simplicity of the method. In the analysis of citrus juices the iodate method proposed by Ballentine is very accurate and suitable for routine work (Table I and II). Recovery experiments recorded in Table III show that the results are reproducible. The averages obtained for some fruits are shown in Table IV. Lemon: 45,4 to 67,3; orange: 28,0 to 60,8; lima: 25,2 to 38,2 and mandarine: 32,0 to 59,3. Values expressed in mg per 100 cc. of juice.

Linear stochastic differential algebraic equations with constant coefficients

We consider linear stochastic differential-algebraic equations with constant coefficients and additive white noise. Due to the nature of this class of equations, the solution must be defined as a generalised process (in the sense of Dawson and Fernique). We provide sufficient conditions for the law of the variables of the solution process to be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.

Stability and asymptotic analysis of a fluid-particle interaction model

We are interested in coupled microscopic/macroscopic models describing the evolution of particles dispersed in a fluid. The system consists in a Vlasov-Fokker-Planck equation to describe the microscopic motion of the particles coupled to the Euler equations for a compressible fluid. We investigate dissipative quantities, equilibria and their stability properties and the role of external forces. We also study some asymptotic problems, their equilibria and stability and the derivation of macroscopic two-phase models.

On dictatorship, economic development and stability

This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes' stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictatorships. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

A proposal for a new specification for a conditionally heteroskedastic variance model: the Quadratic Moving-Average Conditional Heteroskedasticity and an application to the D. Mark-U.S. dollar Exchange Rate

Ever since the appearance of the ARCH model [Engle(1982a)], an impressive array of variance specifications belonging to the same class of models has emerged [i.e. Bollerslev's (1986) GARCH; Nelson's (1990) EGARCH]. This recent domain has achieved very successful developments. Nevertheless, several empirical studies seem to show that the performance of such models is not always appropriate [Boulier(1992)]. In this paper we propose a new specification: the Quadratic Moving Average Conditional heteroskedasticity model. Its statistical properties, such as the kurtosis and the symmetry, as well as two estimators (Method of Moments and Maximum Likelihood) are studied. Two statistical tests are presented, the first one tests for homoskedasticity and the second one, discriminates between ARCH and QMACH specification. A Monte Carlo study is presented in order to illustrate some of the theoretical results. An empirical study is undertaken for the DM-US exchange rate.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

On the stability of cooperation structures

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.

Reduction, Linearization and stability of relative equilibria for mechanical systems on riemannian manifolds

Consider a Riemannian manifold equipped with an infinitesimal isometry. For this setup, a unified treatment is provided, solely in the language of Riemannian geometry, of techniques in reduction, linearization, and stability of relative equilibria. In particular, for mechanical control systems, an explicit characterization is given for the manner in which reduction by an infinitesimal isometry, and linearization along a controlled trajectory "commute." As part of the development, relationships are derived between the Jacobi equation of geodesic variation and concepts from reduction theory, such as the curvature of the mechanical connection and the effective potential. As an application of our techniques, fiber and base stability of relative equilibria are studied. The paper also serves as a tutorial of Riemannian geometric methods applicable in the intersection of mechanics and control theory.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Stability of periodic solutions obtained via the averaging method for nonsmooth Lipschitz system

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

On the stability of periodic orbits in Rn

We consider an autonomous differential system in Rn with a periodic orbit and we give a new method for computing the characteristic multipliers associated to it. Our method works when the periodic orbit is given by the transversal intersection of n ¡ 1 codimension one hypersurfaces and is an alternative to the use of the first order variational equations. We apply it to study the stability of the periodic orbits in several examples, including a periodic solution found by Steklov studying the rigid body dynamics.

Notch1 and T-cell development: insights from conditional knockout mice.

Notch proteins influence cell-fate decisions in many developmental systems. Gain-of-function studies have suggested a crucial role for Notch1 signaling at several stages during lymphocyte development, including the B/T, alphabeta/gammadelta and CD4/CD8 lineage choices. Here, we critically re-evaluate these conclusions in the light of recent studies that describe inducible and tissue-specific targeting of the Notch1 gene.