Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 10 1908

Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 14 1912

Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 21-22 1919-1920

Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 12 1910

Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 20 1918

Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 16 1914

Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 15 1913

Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington.

v. 13 1911

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

On the institution of the moral subject: on the commander and the commanded in Nietzsche's discussion of law

The article discusses how Nietzsche understands the institution of law and morals in distinction to Kant and the Christian tradition. It argues that Nietzsche to a large extent is inspired by the paradigm-shift toward a evolutionary biological thinking introduced by several of his peers in the late 19th century, among else F. A. Lange, who sees this shift as a sobering scientific-materialistic alternative to Kant. In Nietzsche, the Kantian moral imperative is replaced with a notion of a morality emerging thanks to historical, or pre-historical, civilizational processes, imposed on a feebleminded human without any inherent rational dispositions to obey Law. It is also a process, which rather than universalizing the human, splits it in a duality where one part obeys old immediate self-interests and another part obeys new 'commands,' having been shouted 'into the ear' by a so-called 'commander.' The compliance with law takes two radically different forms in Nietzsche: servile and mediocre individuals need to be exposed to discipline and punishment in order to adopt Law; while so-called 'sovereign' individuals are able to impose law upon themselves. The figure of the 'sovereign' has consequently been an issue for vigorous debate in especially the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Nietzsche research, since his apparent 'respect for law' and 'sense of duty' reiterate typical Kantian qualities. Relating to these discussions, I suggest that Nietzsche's 'sovereign' (in one context) is identical his 'commander' (in other contexts). When the 'sovereign' as such imposes law upon himself and others, his act is conventional and arbitrary (like language in Saussure), and is rather irrational than rational as in Kant. His will is not a good will, nor a rational will with a vision of human autonomy. His command of himself and others is a performative, thus without truth-value (like illocutionary speech-acts in Austin and Searle).

Letter from George W. Campbell, esq., late Secretary of the Treasury, to the Chairman of the Committee appointed to inquire into the causes and particulars of the invasion of the City of Washington, and the neighboring town of Alexandria, in the month of August last. --

Laid before the House by the Chairman of the said Committee, and ordered to be printed January 2, 1815.

Letter from George W. Campbell the Chairman of the Committee appointed to inquire into the causes and particulars of the invasion of the City of Washington

Full Title: Letter from George W. Campbell, esq., late Secretary of the Treasury, to the Chairman of the Committee appointed to inquire into the causes and particulars of the invasion of the City of Washington, and the neighboring town of Alexandria, in the month of August last Laid before the House by the Chairman of the said Committee, and ordered to be printed January 2, 1815. 13th Congress, 3rd Session. House. Doc. 38. Printed by Roger C. Weightman