Self-rated oral health and associated factors in Brazilian elders

Objective: Self-rating provides a simple direct way of capturing perceptions of health. The objective of this study was to estimate the prevalence and associated factors of poor self-rated oral health among elders. Methods: National data from a cross-sectional population-based study with a multistage random sample of 4786 Brazilian older adults (aged 65-74) in 250 towns were analysed. Data collection included oral examinations (WHO 1997) and struct-ured interviews at elderly households. The outcome was measured by a single five-point-response-scale question dichotomized into `poor` (fair/poor/very poor) and `good` (good/very good) self-rated oral health. Data analyses used Poisson regression models stratified by sex. Results: The prevalence of poor self-rated oral health was 46.6% (95% CI: 45.2-48%) in the whole sample, 50.3% (48-52.5) in men and 44.2% (42.4-46) in women. Higher prevalence ratios (PR) were found in elders reporting unfavourable dental appearance (PR = 2.31; 95% CI: 2.02-2.65), poor chewing ability (PR = 1.64; CI: 1.48-1.8) and dental pain (PR = 1.44; CI: 1.04-1.23) in adjusted analysis. Poor self-perception was also associated with being men, black, unfavourable socioeconomic circumstances, unfavourable clinical oral health and with not using or needing a dental prosthesis. Conclusion: Assessment and understanding of self-rated oral health should take into account social factors, subjective and clinical oral symptoms.

Dodd Frank act and the Brazilian capital market: extraterritorial effects of regulation to the over-the-counter derivatives market

This paper aims to describe the chief alterations proposed by the Dodd Frank Act to the American over-the-counter derivatives market and, at the same time, understand the extraterritorial reach of this law compared to the regulatory framework of the Brazilian derivative market. In order to do so, I will study the extraterritorial effects of the law, particularly in reference to the international nature of Title II of the Dodd Frank, which deals with the over-the-counter derivatives, in order to evaluate its reach to foreign markets, especially the Brazilian market.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Environmental regulation, technology adoption and structural transformation: evidence from Brazilian sugarcane industry

We estimate the effects of the adoption of mechanized agriculture led by a new environmental regulation on structural change of local labor markets within a large emerging country, Brazil. In 2002, the state of S\~{a}o Paulo passed a law outlying the timeline to end sugarcane pre-harvest burning in the state. The environmental law led to the fast adoption of mechanized harvest. We investigate if the labor intensity of sugarcane production decreases; and, if so, if it leads to structural changes in the labor market. We use satellite data containing the type of sugarcane harvesting -- manual or mechanic harvest -- paired with official labor market data.%, also geomorphometric data base for our instrumental variable correction. We find suggestive evidence that mechanization of the field led to an increase in utilization of formal workers and a reduction in formal labor intensity in the sugarcane sector. This is partially compensated by an increase in the share of workers in other agricultural crops and in the construction and services sector. Although we find a reduction in employment in the manufacturing sector, the demand generated by the new agro-industries affected positively the all sectors via an increase in workers' wage.

Dip financing of financially distressed companies in Brazil – the conditions provided by the brazilian bankruptcy law act as real incentives for dip lenders as in chapter 11 of the American bankruptcy code?

O objeto deste trabalho é a compreensão do financiamento de empresas em crise, mais especificamente, o financiamento concedido após o pedido de recuperação judicial, como forma de permitir que a empresa saia da situação de crise e retorne à condição de normalidade. Para tanto, nos apropriando do termo cunhado pela doutrina norte-americana, para fazer referência ao aporte de recursos em empresas em dificuldade, utilizaremos o termo DIP financing ou financiamento DIP. Para uma compreensão adequada do objeto, é necessário que entendamos a origem do DIP financing nos Estados Unidos e como é a regulação norte-americana sobre a matéria atualmente. O segundo passo será avaliar a possibilidade de aplicação da mesma estrutura de aporte de recursos no Brasil. Ao estudarmos a origem desse mecanismo nos Estados Unidos, veremos os problemas que surgiram ao longo dos anos e como foram superados jurisprudencialmente e doutrinariamente para que o financiamento DIP se consolidasse como uma das formas de aporte de capital em empresas em crise, culminando no desenvolvimento de uma verdadeira indústria de crédito às empresas em dificuldade. Uma análise dos problemas enfrentados pelo sistema falimentar americano nos levará a hipótese de que, a menos que sejam afirmados mecanismos que assegurem a quem concede o financiamento após o pedido de recuperação judicial, uma super prioridade no recebimento após a recuperação judicial, será possível o desenvolvimento de um mercado de DIP financing no Brasil.

Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.

A note on Brazilian financial regulation and governance

The question posed by Theme 4 of this workshop is indeed a very broad one and would demand a thorough research on the topics involved. I am afraid I did not have the proper time to think it over and I would not be able to provide a wide ranging answer to this question. Thus, I will be selective and I will present the following issues that need to be addressed to support Brazilian development: i) competition among banks; ii) high rate of interest on liquidity; iii) approval by the Congress of a Complementary Law to regulate the financial sector as required by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution; iv) exploitation of workers through the governance of the Job Time Guarantee Fund (FGTS) and iv) state-owned versus government owned enterprises.

The International Physical Activity Questionnaire-long form overestimates self-reported physical activity of Brazilian adults

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Interaction between total-etch and self-etch adhesives and conventional and self-adhesive resin cements

The aim of this study was to compare the bond strength to enamel between resin cements combined with total-etch and self-etch adhesive systems and a self-adhesive cement. Eighty bovine incisors had their buccal surface ground flat exposing a plane area in the enamel. Eighty Artglass resin cylinders measuring 3 mm in diameter and 4 mm in height were fabricated. The teeth were divided into eight groups of 10 teeth each and the resin cylinders were cemented with different adhesive systems and resin cements; G1: RelyX Unicem (self-adhesive cement); G2: H 3PO 4 + Single Bond + RelyX ARC; G3: AdheSE + Variolink II; G4: H 3PO 4 + Excite + Variolink II; G5: Xeno III + Enforce; G6: H 3PO 4 + Prime&Bond NT + Enforce; G7: Biatite Primers 1 and 2 + Bistite II DC; G8: H 3PO 4 + Bistite Primers 1 and 2 + Bistite II DC. After application of the adhesives, the cylinders were cemented according to manufacturer instructions. The specimens were submitted to 2000 thermal cycles at a temperature ranging from 5±5°C to 55±5°C, and shear bond strength was then tested at a variety of 1 mm/min. The data were analyzed by ANOVA and the Tukey's test (á=5%), obtaining a p value of 0.00. The following mean (±standard deviation) bond strength values were observed for each group: G1: 5.14(±0.99)a; G3: 16.23(±4.69)b; G7: 17.82(±3.66)b; G5: 18.48(±2.88)bc; G8: 20.15(±4.12)bc; G4: 22.85(±3.08)cd; G2: 24.96(±2.89)d; G6: 26.07(±1.69)d. Groups followed by the same letters did not differ significantly. For most of the resin cements tested, the application of adhesive systems using acid etching resulted in a higher bond strength when compared to the self-etch adhesive systems and to the self-adhesive cement.