875 resultados para Behavioral economics
Resumo:
Determining what influences mood is important for theories of emotion and research onsubjective well-being. We consider three sets of factors: activities in which people areengaged; individual differences; and incidental variables that capture when mood ismeasured, e.g., time-of-day. These three factors were investigated simultaneously in a studyinvolving 168 part-time students who each responded 30 times in an experience samplingstudy conducted over 10 working days. Respondents assessed mood on a simple bipolarscale from 1 (very negative) to 10 (very positive). Activities had significant effects but,with the possible exception of variability in the expression of mood, no systematicindividual differences were detected. Diurnal effects, similar to those already reported inthe literature, were found as was an overall Friday effect. However, these effects weresmall. Lastly, the weather had little or no influence. We conclude that simple measures ofoverall mood are not greatly affected by incidental variables.
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We test whether risk attitudes change when losses instead of gains areinvolved. The study of gain-loss asymmetries has been largely confinedto reflected choices, where all the money amounts of a positiveprospect are multiplied by minus one. We define the decomposition reflection = translation + probability switch, and experimentally findboth a translation effect (risk attraction becomes more frequent whengains are translated into losses) and a probability switch effect (riskattraction becomes more frequent when the probability of the best outcomedecreases). Surprisingly, the switch effect is somewhat stronger than thetranslation effect, negating a conventional reflection effect when onestarts with choices between gains with a low probability of the bestoutcome. We conclude by arguing that, while both the translation effectand the switch effect contradict the expected utility hypothesis, thetranslation effect implies a deeper violation of standard preference theory.
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This paper investigates whether information about fairness types canbe useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency.An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened usinga dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participantsinto two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, witha dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reducesdispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargainingefficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial forthese differences and also strongly affects the relative bargainingsuccess of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.
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In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrastexperimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed tocombinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by thosewhose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greateroptimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that highlevels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although weobserved excess entry (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not beattributed to overconfidence.
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Whereas much literature exists on choice overload, little is known about effects of numbers of alternatives in donation decisions. How do these affect both the size and distribution of donations? We hypothesize that donations are affected by the reputation of recipients and increase with their number, albeit at a decreasing rate. Allocations to recipients reflect different concepts of fairness equity and equality. Both may be employed but, since they differ in cognitive and emotional costs, numbers of recipients are important. Using a cognitive (emotional) argument, distributions become more uniform (skewed) as numbers increase. In a survey, respondents indicated how they would donate lottery winnings of 50 Euros. Results indicated that more was donated to NGO s that respondents knew better. Second, total donations increased with the number of recipients albeit at a decreasing rate. Third, distributions of donations became more skewed as numbers increased. We comment on theoretical and practical implications.
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Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We perfomed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. andCanada feel that layoffs are fair.Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companiesshould not punish employees for their efforts), rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also considered a justification for layoffs.Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly.Respondents in Silicon Valley were not more accepting of layoffsthan were those in Canada on average, although the justificationsconsidered valid differed slightly.
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We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game inthe presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past effortchoices and benefits from a higher minimum effort of the others. Sanctions introduced in thesecond round by the experimenter lead to more optimistic beliefs and higher efforts. This isnot true when sanctions have been imposed by the principal. The possibility that the choiceof a sanction is a signal of low effort levels causes players who chose high effort in the firstround to be less optimistic.
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This chapter, originally written as a consequence of the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001, provides an elementary, everyday introduction tothe concepts of risk and insurance. Conceptually, risk has two dimensions:a potential loss, and the chance of that loss being realized. People can,however, transfer risk to insurance companies against the payment ofso-called premiums. In practice, however, one needs accurate assessmentsof both losses and probabilities to judge whether premiums are appropriate.For many risks, this poses little problem (e.g., life insurance); however,it is difficult to assess risks of many other kinds of events such as actsof terrorism. It is emphasized, that through evolution and learning, peopleare able to handle many of the common risks that they face in life. Butwhen people lack experience (e.g., new technologies, threats of terrorism),risk can only be assessed through imagination. Not surprisingly, insurancecompanies demand high prices when risks are poorly understood. In particular,the cost of insurance against possible acts of terrorism soared afterSeptember 11. How should people approach risk after the events of that day?Clearly, the world needs to protect itself from the acts of terrorists andother disturbed individuals. However, it is also important to address the root causes of such antisocial movements. It is, therefore, suggested thatprograms addressed at combatting ignorance, prejudice, and socialinequalities may be more effective premiums for reducing the risk ofterrosrtism than has been recognized to date.
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The potential for "replacement cells" to restore function in Parkinson's disease has been widely reported over the past 3 decades, rejuvenating the central nervous system rather than just relieving symptoms. Most such experiments have used fetal or embryonic sources that may induce immunological rejection and generate ethical concerns. Autologous sources, in which the cells to be implanted are derived from recipients' own cells after reprogramming to stem cells, direct genetic modifications, or epigenetic modifications in culture, could eliminate many of these problems. In a previous study on autologous brain cell transplantation, we demonstrated that adult monkey brain cells, obtained from cortical biopsies and kept in culture for 7 weeks, exhibited potential as a method of brain repair after low doses of 1-methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydropyridine (MPTP) caused dopaminergic cell death. The present study exposed monkeys to higher MPTP doses to produce significant parkinsonism and behavioral impairments. Cerebral cortical cells were biopsied from the animals, held in culture for 7 weeks to create an autologous neural cell "ecosystem" and reimplanted bilaterally into the striatum of the same six donor monkeys. These cells expressed neuroectodermal and progenitor markers such as nestin, doublecortin, GFAP, neurofilament, and vimentin. Five to six months after reimplantation, histological analysis with the dye PKH67 and unbiased stereology showed that reimplanted cells survived, migrated bilaterally throughout the striatum, and seemed to exert a neurorestorative effect. More tyrosine hydroxylase-immunoreactive neurons and significant behavioral improvement followed reimplantation of cultured autologous neural cells as a result of unknown trophic factors released by the grafts. J. Comp. Neurol. 522:2729-2740, 2014. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Resumo:
We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people chooseto punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender's intention,as is suggested by the literature on deception and proceduralsatisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charnessand Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender's perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.
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In many insect societies, workers can manipulate the reproductive output of their colony by killing kin of lesser value to them. For instance, workers of the mound-building For mica exsecta eliminate male brood in colonies headed by a single-mated queen. By combining an inclusive fitness model and empirical data, we investigated the selective causes underlying these fratricides. Our model examines until which threshold stage in male brood development do the workers benefit from eliminating males to rear extra females instead. We then determined the minimal developmental stage reached by male larvae before elimination in F. exsecta field colonies. Surprisingly, many male larvae were kept until they were close to pupation, and only then eliminated. According to our model, part of the eliminated males were so large that workers would not benefit from replacing them with new females. Moreover, males were eliminated late in the season, so that new females could no longer be initiated, because matings take place synchronously during a short period. Together, these results indicate that workers did not replace male brood with new females, but rather reduced total brood size during late larval development. Male destruction was probably triggered by resource limitation, and the timing of brood elimination suggests that males may have been fed to females when these start to grow exponentially during the final larval stage. Hence, the evolution of fratricides in ants is best explained by a combination of ecological, demographic and genetic parameters.
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This work proposes an original contribution to the understanding of shermen spatial behavior, based on the behavioral ecology and movement ecology paradigms. Through the analysis of Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data, we characterized the spatial behavior of Peruvian anchovy shermen at di erent scales: (1) the behavioral modes within shing trips (i.e., searching, shing and cruising); (2) the behavioral patterns among shing trips; (3) the behavioral patterns by shing season conditioned by ecosystem scenarios; and (4) the computation of maps of anchovy presence proxy from the spatial patterns of behavioral mode positions. At the rst scale considered, we compared several Markovian (hidden Markov and semi-Markov models) and discriminative models (random forests, support vector machines and arti cial neural networks) for inferring the behavioral modes associated with VMS tracks. The models were trained under a supervised setting and validated using tracks for which behavioral modes were known (from on-board observers records). Hidden semi-Markov models performed better, and were retained for inferring the behavioral modes on the entire VMS dataset. At the second scale considered, each shing trip was characterized by several features, including the time spent within each behavioral mode. Using a clustering analysis, shing trip patterns were classi ed into groups associated to management zones, eet segments and skippers' personalities. At the third scale considered, we analyzed how ecological conditions shaped shermen behavior. By means of co-inertia analyses, we found signi cant associations between shermen, anchovy and environmental spatial dynamics, and shermen behavioral responses were characterized according to contrasted environmental scenarios. At the fourth scale considered, we investigated whether the spatial behavior of shermen re ected to some extent the spatial distribution of anchovy. Finally, this work provides a wider view of shermen behavior: shermen are not only economic agents, but they are also foragers, constrained by ecosystem variability. To conclude, we discuss how these ndings may be of importance for sheries management, collective behavior analyses and end-to-end models.
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Doctoral dissertation, University of Tampere