Upregulation of acid-sensing ion channel ASIC1a in spinal dorsal horn neurons contributes to inflammatory pain hypersensitivity

Development of chronic pain involves alterations in peripheral nociceptors as well as elevated neuronal activity in multiple regions of the CNS. Previous pharmacological and behavioral studies suggest that peripheral acid-sensing ion channels (ASICs) cont

Uncertainty increases pain: evidence for a novel mechanism of pain modulation involving the periaqueductal gray.

Predictions about sensory input exert a dominant effect on what we perceive, and this is particularly true for the experience of pain. However, it remains unclear what component of prediction, from an information-theoretic perspective, controls this effect. We used a vicarious pain observation paradigm to study how the underlying statistics of predictive information modulate experience. Subjects observed judgments that a group of people made to a painful thermal stimulus, before receiving the same stimulus themselves. We show that the mean observed rating exerted a strong assimilative effect on subjective pain. In addition, we show that observed uncertainty had a specific and potent hyperalgesic effect. Using computational functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that this effect correlated with activity in the periaqueductal gray. Our results provide evidence for a novel form of cognitive hyperalgesia relating to perceptual uncertainty, induced here by vicarious observation, with control mediated by the brainstem pain modulatory system.

Prices need no preferences: social trends determine decisions in experimental markets for pain relief.

OBJECTIVE: A standard view in health economics is that, although there is no market that determines the "prices" for health states, people can nonetheless associate health states with monetary values (or other scales, such as quality adjusted life year [QALYs] and disability adjusted life year [DALYs]). Such valuations can be used to shape health policy, and a major research challenge is to elicit such values from people; creating experimental "markets" for health states is a theoretically attractive way to address this. We explore the possibility that this framework may be fundamentally flawed-because there may not be any stable values to be revealed. Instead, perhaps people construct ad hoc values, influenced by contextual factors, such as the observed decisions of others. METHOD: The participants bid to buy relief from equally painful electrical shocks to the leg and arm in an experimental health market based on an interactive second-price auction. Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions where the bids by "others" were manipulated to follow increasing or decreasing price trends for one, but not the other, pain. After the auction, a preference test asked the participants to choose which pain they prefer to experience for a longer duration. RESULTS: Players remained indifferent between the two pain-types throughout the auction. However, their bids were differentially attracted toward what others bid for each pain, with overbidding during decreasing prices and underbidding during increasing prices. CONCLUSION: Health preferences are dissociated from market prices, which are strongly referenced to others' choices. This suggests that the price of health care in a free-market has the capacity to become critically detached from people's underlying preferences.

Pain relativity in motor control.

Motivational theories of pain highlight its role in people's choices of actions that avoid bodily damage. By contrast, little is known regarding how pain influences action implementation. To explore this less-understood area, we conducted a study in which participants had to rapidly point to a target area to win money while avoiding an overlapping penalty area that would cause pain in their contralateral hand. We found that pain intensity and target-penalty proximity repelled participants' movement away from pain and that motor execution was influenced not by absolute pain magnitudes but by relative pain differences. Our results indicate that the magnitude and probability of pain have a precise role in guiding motor control and that representations of pain that guide action are, at least in part, relative rather than absolute. Additionally, our study shows that the implicit monetary valuation of pain, like many explicit valuations (e.g., patients' use of rating scales in medical contexts), is unstable, a finding that has implications for pain treatment in clinical contexts.

The price of pain and the value of suffering.

Estimating the financial value of pain informs issues as diverse as the market price of analgesics, the cost-effectiveness of clinical treatments, compensation for injury, and the response to public hazards. Such valuations are assumed to reflect a stable trade-off between relief of discomfort and money. Here, using an auction-based health-market experiment, we show that the price people pay for relief of pain is strongly determined by the local context of the market, that is, by recent intensities of pain or immediately disposable income (but not overall wealth). The absence of a stable valuation metric suggests that the dynamic behavior of health markets is not predictable from the static behavior of individuals. We conclude that the results follow the dynamics of habit-formation models of economic theory, and thus, this study provides the first scientific basis for this type of preference modeling.

Confidence in beliefs about pain predicts expectancy effects on pain perception and anticipatory processing in right anterior insula.

Psychological factors play a major role in exacerbating chronic pain. Effective self-management of pain is often hindered by inaccurate beliefs about the nature of pain which lead to a high degree of emotional reactivity. Probabilistic models of perception state that greater confidence (certainty) in beliefs increases their influence on perception and behavior. In this study, we treat confidence as a metacognitive process dissociable from the content of belief. We hypothesized that confidence is associated with anticipatory activation of areas of the pain matrix involved with top-down modulation of pain. Healthy volunteers rated their beliefs about the emotional distress that experimental pain would cause, and separately rated their level of confidence in this belief. Confidence predicted the influence of anticipation cues on experienced pain. We measured brain activity during anticipation of pain using high-density EEG and used electromagnetic tomography to determine neural substrates of this effect. Confidence correlated with activity in right anterior insula, posterior midcingulate and inferior parietal cortices during the anticipation of pain. Activity in the right anterior insula predicted a greater influence of anticipation cues on pain perception, whereas activity in right inferior parietal cortex predicted a decreased influence of anticipatory cues. The results support probabilistic models of pain perception and suggest that confidence in beliefs is an important determinant of expectancy effects on pain perception.

Modulation of pain ratings by expectation and uncertainty: Behavioral characteristics and anticipatory neural correlates.

Expectations about the magnitude of impending pain exert a substantial effect on subsequent perception. However, the neural mechanisms that underlie the predictive processes that modulate pain are poorly understood. In a combined behavioral and high-density electrophysiological study we measured anticipatory neural responses to heat stimuli to determine how predictions of pain intensity, and certainty about those predictions, modulate brain activity and subjective pain ratings. Prior to receiving randomized laser heat stimuli at different intensities (low, medium or high) subjects (n=15) viewed cues that either accurately informed them of forthcoming intensity (certain expectation) or not (uncertain expectation). Pain ratings were biased towards prior expectations of either high or low intensity. Anticipatory neural responses increased with expectations of painful vs. non-painful heat intensity, suggesting the presence of neural responses that represent predicted heat stimulus intensity. These anticipatory responses also correlated with the amplitude of the Laser-Evoked Potential (LEP) response to painful stimuli when the intensity was predictable. Source analysis (LORETA) revealed that uncertainty about expected heat intensity involves an anticipatory cortical network commonly associated with attention (left dorsolateral prefrontal, posterior cingulate and bilateral inferior parietal cortices). Relative certainty, however, involves cortical areas previously associated with semantic and prospective memory (left inferior frontal and inferior temporal cortex, and right anterior prefrontal cortex). This suggests that biasing of pain reports and LEPs by expectation involves temporally precise activity in specific cortical networks.

Opponent appetitive-aversive neural processes underlie predictive learning of pain relief.

Termination of a painful or unpleasant event can be rewarding. However, whether the brain treats relief in a similar way as it treats natural reward is unclear, and the neural processes that underlie its representation as a motivational goal remain poorly understood. We used fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to investigate how humans learn to generate expectations of pain relief. Using a pavlovian conditioning procedure, we show that subjects experiencing prolonged experimentally induced pain can be conditioned to predict pain relief. This proceeds in a manner consistent with contemporary reward-learning theory (average reward/loss reinforcement learning), reflected by neural activity in the amygdala and midbrain. Furthermore, these reward-like learning signals are mirrored by opposite aversion-like signals in lateral orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex. This dual coding has parallels to 'opponent process' theories in psychology and promotes a formal account of prediction and expectation during pain.

Modulation of pain processing in hyperalgesia by cognitive demand.

The relationship between pain and cognitive function is of theoretical and clinical interest, exemplified by observations that attention-demanding activities reduce pain in chronically afflicted patients. Previous studies have concentrated on phasic pain, which bears little correspondence to clinical pain conditions. Indeed, phasic pain is often associated with differential or opposing effects to tonic pain in behavioral, lesion, and pharmacological studies. To address how cognitive engagement interacts with tonic pain, we assessed the influence of an attention-demanding cognitive task on pain-evoked neural responses in an experimental model of chronic pain, the capsaicin-induced heat hyperalgesia model. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we show that activity in the orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortices, insula, and cerebellum correlates with the intensity of tonic pain. This pain-related activity in medial prefrontal cortex and cerebellum was modulated by the demand level of the cognitive task. Our findings highlight a role for these structures in the integration of motivational and cognitive functions associated with a physiological state of injury. Within the limitations of an experimental model of pain, we suggest that the findings are relevant to understanding both the neurobiology and pathophysiology of chronic pain and its amelioration by cognitive strategies.

Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain.

Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one--present in the same room--was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain. Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain matrix." We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.

Dread and the disvalue of future pain.

Standard theories of decision-making involving delayed outcomes predict that people should defer a punishment, whilst advancing a reward. In some cases, such as pain, people seem to prefer to expedite punishment, implying that its anticipation carries a cost, often conceptualized as 'dread'. Despite empirical support for the existence of dread, whether and how it depends on prospective delay is unknown. Furthermore, it is unclear whether dread represents a stable component of value, or is modulated by biases such as framing effects. Here, we examine choices made between different numbers of painful shocks to be delivered faithfully at different time points up to 15 minutes in the future, as well as choices between hypothetical painful dental appointments at time points of up to approximately eight months in the future, to test alternative models for how future pain is disvalued. We show that future pain initially becomes increasingly aversive with increasing delay, but does so at a decreasing rate. This is consistent with a value model in which moment-by-moment dread increases up to the time of expected pain, such that dread becomes equivalent to the discounted expectation of pain. For a minority of individuals pain has maximum negative value at intermediate delay, suggesting that the dread function may itself be prospectively discounted in time. Framing an outcome as relief reduces the overall preference to expedite pain, which can be parameterized by reducing the rate of the dread-discounting function. Our data support an account of disvaluation for primary punishments such as pain, which differs fundamentally from existing models applied to financial punishments, in which dread exerts a powerful but time-dependent influence over choice.