Hôtel-Dieu de París: reformas materiales, estructurales y funcionales entre los siglos XII y XVIII

El presente estudio tiene como objetivo conocer y divulgar la historia del Hôtel-Dieu de París entre los siglos XII y XVIII, periodo de tiempo en el que se llevaron a cabo grandes obras en sus instalaciones, se cambió el sistema de administración y se desarrolló una estructura funcional de las Hermanas Agustinas con la aparición de supervisoras y especialistas en diferentes áreas. La metodología usada para este estudio es de investigación cualitativo-descriptiva que se inicia con una búsqueda bibliográfica y continúa con el análisis hermenéutico de los documentos encontrados. Las conclusiones de este estudio versan sobre la problemática del paso de la gestión de la asistencia sanitaria caritativo-religiosa a la gestión laica de la misma con la pérdida del cariz altruista; del desarrollo de súper-estructuras físicas para la atención sanitaria y de las jerarquías organizativas y funcionales de esas súper-estructuras, todo esto en el amplio contexto temporal de seis siglos.

Chinatown, San Francisco, California 1885 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Official map of Chinatown in San Francisco, prepared under the supervision of the special committee of the board of supervisors, July 1885, W.B. Farwell, John E. Kunkler, E.B. Pond. It was engraved & printed by Bosqui Eng. & Print Co. in 1885. Scale [1:480]. This image consists of images of a two sheet source map that have been stitched together using image editing software to create one image. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the California Zone III State Plane Coordinate System NAD83 (in Feet) (Fipszone 0403). All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This cadastral map shows features such as roads, buildings with street addresses and types of businesses, and more. Buildings colored to show: general Chinese occupancy, Chinese gambling houses, Chinese prostitution, Chinese opium resorts, Chinese Joss houses, and White prostitution. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from The Harvard Map Collection as part of the Imaging the Urban Environment project. Maps selected for this project represent major urban areas and cities of the world, at various time periods. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features at a large scale. The selection represents a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates, scales, and purposes.

Assessing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: passing the point of no return for Europe's banking union. Egmont Paper No. 58, June 2013

From the Executive Summary. Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises have become increasingly interconnected. In order to break the negative feedback loop between the two, the EU has decided to create a common supervisory framework for the banking sector: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM will involve a supervisory system including both the national supervisors and the European Central Bank (ECB). By endowing the ECB with supervisory authority over a major part of the European banking sector, the SSM’s creation will result in a shake-up of the way in which the European financial sector is being supervised. Under the right circumstances, this could be a major step forward in addressing Europe’s interconnected crises.

The Revision of the Insurance Mediation Rules at EU Level and its Impact on Consumer Protection

The European Commission has put forward a new proposal for a directive on insurance mediation which should provide for significant changes in practices of selling insurance products and guarantee enhanced level of consumer protection. This proposal accompanies other regulatory initiatives in the insurance sector, all of them pursuing three main objectives: firstly, a strengthened insurance supervision with convergent supervisory standards at EU level; secondly, a better risk management of insurance companies; and thirdly a greater protection of policyholders. All these initiatives contribute to the EU programme on consumer protection and herald a new approach to EU insurance regulation and supervision. However, while the new supervisory rules are a direct response to the financial crisis and shortcomings of crossborder cooperation between national supervisors, the plans for the revision of insurance mediation rules were conceived much earlier due to scandals with mis-selling of insurance products in the United States and some EU Member States. This article will focus entirely on the Commission’s initiative in the consumer mediation area and the aspects of insurance supervision and risk management will be dealt with in separate articles.

LMX à distance : analyse qualitative et développement d’une échelle de mesure

Notre recherche a pour objectif général de proposer l’adaptation du concept de la relation d’échange superviseur-subordonné (leader-member exchange ou LMX) à la nouvelle réalité du travail à distance. Il s’agit d’étudier la relation d’échange qui se développe entre le superviseur et le subordonné travaillant à distance. Plus précisément, nous visons à définir et à développer une échelle de mesure valide et fiable du concept du LMX à distance. Jusqu’à présent, aucune définition de cette relation d’échange superviseur-subordonné n'a été proposée et aucune échelle de mesure n'a été développée. Dans l’étude que nous proposons, la notion de la distance n’est pas considérée comme un élément contextuel, mais plutôt un élément indissociable du concept lui-même, contrairement à certaines études qui ont examiné la distance comme modérateur de la relation entre le LMX et ses résultantes (Bligh et Riggio, 2012; Brunelle, 2013). À cet effet, cette étude constitue la première sur le sujet. Étant donné l'importance du LMX à distance pour les travailleurs à distance et dont le nombre atteindrait plus de 50 % d’ici 2020 (ITIF, CAS et CoreNet Global), il est primordial de comprendre et d'analyser la relation d’échange superviseur-subordonné à distance afin de mieux comprendre sa nature et son processus de développement, ce qui permettra aux parties de la dyade superviseur-subordonné de mieux s’adapter à cette nouvelle réalité de travail et de développer des relations d’échanges de qualité. Cette recherche aidera les superviseurs travaillant à distance à mieux gérer leur potentiel humain. Pour cerner ce sujet de recherche, nous avons fait une revue approfondie de la littérature traitant du LMX traditionnel et de la notion de distance, et ce, afin de pouvoir proposer une définition du concept du LMX à distance. En outre, nous avons fait appel aux recommandations de la littérature portant sur la psychométrie et nous avons réalisé une étude exploratoire de nature qualitative pour développer son échelle de mesure. Nous avons donc effectué des entrevues individuelles semi-dirigées auprès de trente professeurs d’une université canadienne. Ces entrevues ont été analysées avec le logiciel qualitatif spécialisé Nvivo et ont permis de présenter une première échelle de mesure du LMX à distance composée de sept dimensions et de 27 indicateurs. En somme, nous avons tenu à acquérir une meilleure compréhension de ce phénomène qui est très répandu dans les organisations modernes et à offrir une plateforme théorique et pratique que les chercheurs pourront utiliser pour enrichir leurs connaissances sur le concept du LMX à distance. Enfin, notre étude permettra aux superviseurs et aux subordonnés de comprendre l'importance de développer et de maintenir des relations de qualité conduisant à des résultats organisationnels et personnels positifs.

Supervisory transparency in the European banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/01, 3 January 2004

Bank supervisors should provide publicly accessible, timely and consistent data on the banks under their jurisdiction. Such transparency increases democratic accountability and leads to greater market efficiency. There is greater supervisory transparency in the United States compared to the member states of the European Union. The US supervisors publish data quarterly and update fairly detailed information on bank balance sheets within a week. By contrast, based on an attempt to locate similar data in every EU country, in only 11 member states is this data at least partially available from supervisors, and in no member state is the level of transparency as high as in the US. Current and planned European Union requirements on bank transparency are either insufficient or could be easily sidestepped by supervisors. A banking union in Europe needs to include requirements for greater supervisory transparency.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism: A Sound First Step in Europe’s Banking Union? Egmont European Affairs Paper, March 2013

The financial and economic crisis has hit Europe in its core. While the crisis may not have originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy framework. Both public finances and the banking sector have been heavily affected. For a long time, the EU failed to take into account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the two. Negative evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its downward spiral. In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the eurozone finally decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign debt crises. Faced with soaring public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they decided to allow for the direct European recapitalisation of banks when the Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange, supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by means of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, or SSM in the EU jargon, is a first step in the broader revision of policies towards banks in Europe. The eventual goal is the creation of a Banking Union, which is to carry out effective surveillance and – if needed – crisis management of the banking sector. The SSM is to rely on national supervisors and the ECB, with the ECB having final authority on the matter. The involvement of the latter made it clear that the SSM would be centred on the eurozone – while it is to remain open to other Member States willing to join. Due to the ongoing problems and the link between the creation of the SSM and the recapitalisation of banks, the SSM became one of the key legislative priorities of the EU. In December 2012, Member States reached an agreement on the design of the SSM. After discussions with the European Parliament (which were still ongoing at the time of writing), the process towards making the SSM operational can be initiated. The goal is to have the SSM fully up and running in the first half of 2014. The decisions that were taken in June 2012 are likely to have had a bigger impact than the eurozone’s Heads of State and Government could have realised at the time for two important reasons. On the one hand, creating the SSM necessitates a full Banking Union and therefore shared risk. On the other hand, the decisions improved the ECB’s perception of the willingness of governments to take far-reaching measures. This undoubtedly played a significant role in the creation of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the ECB, which has led to a substantial easing of the crisis in the short-term. 1 These short-term gains should now be matched with a stable long-term framework for bank supervision and crisis management. The agreement on the SSM should be the first step in the direction of this goal. This paper provides an analysis of the SSM and its role in the creation of a Banking Union. The paper starts with a reminder of why the EU decided to put in place the SSM (§1) and the state of play of the ongoing negotiations on the SSM (§2). Subsequently, the supervisory responsibilities of the SSM are detailed, including its scope and the division of labour between the national supervisors and the ECB (§3). The internal functioning of the SSM (§4) and its relation to the other supervisors are discussed afterwards (§5). As mentioned earlier, the SSM is part of a wider move towards a Banking Union. Therefore, this paper sheds light on the other building blocks of this ambitious project (§6). The transition towards the Banking Union is important and will prove to be a bumpy ride. Before formulating a number of conclusions, this Working Paper therefore provides an overview of the planned road ahead (§7).

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

Bail-in Provisions in State Aid and Resolution Procedures: Are they consistent with systemic stability? CEPS Policy Brief No. 318, 21 May 2014

This CEPS Policy Brief examines the provisions for bail-in in the European Union – that is, the principle whereby any public measure to recapitalise a bank with insufficient prudential capital must be preceded by a write-down or conversion into equity of creditors’ claims – in state aid policies and in the new resolution framework for failing banks, with two aims: i) to assess whether and how they are coordinated and ii) more importantly, whether they address satisfactorily the question of systemic stability that may arise when investors fear that creditors’ claims are likely to be bailed-in in a bank crisis. The issue is especially relevant in the present context, as the comprehensive assessment exercise underway for EU banks falling under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank may lead supervisors to require substantial capital injections simultaneously for many of the banks involved, possibly shaking investors’ confidence across EU banking markets. The authors conclude that the two sets of rules are, broadly speaking, mutually consistent and that they already contain sufficient safeguards to address systemic stability concerns. However, the balance of the elements underpinning the European Commission’s decisions in individual cases may not be clear to bank creditors and potential investors in financial markets. The impression of unneeded rigidity on this very sensitive issue has been heightened by official statements over-emphasising that each case will be assessed individually under competition rules, thus feeding the concern that the systemic dimension of the issue may have been underestimated. Therefore, further clarification by the Commission may be needed on how the various criteria will be applied during the ongoing transition to banking union – perhaps through a new communication completing the state aid framework for banks in view of the adoption of the new resolution rules.

Executives as Agents: Expatriate managers in subsidiaries of multinational banks. ACES Working Papers, June 2012

Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As such, they create a need for host-country executives’ superior knowledge of local markets and staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.

The Great Financial Plumbing: From Northern Rock to Banking Union. CEPS Paperback, 19 October 2015

The financial and economic crises have led to an enormous plumbing exercise, involving a fundamental re-design of the global and European regulatory and supervisory system. This book systematically assesses the big items on the G-20 and EU agendas and the effectiveness with which they have been implemented in the EU. Its publication coincides with the demand by European Commissioner Jonathan Hill, in the context of the Capital Markets Union, for a 'comprehensive review' of the impact and coherence of EU legislation in the area of financial services. Karel Lannoo argues in the book that much has been done by European policy-makers to make the financial system safer and to prevent banking crises of the magnitude that erupted in 2008 and 2011, but that the new framework puts an enormous burden on banks and supervisors to implement and enforce it correctly. With the huge amount of secondary or 'level-2' legislation in place, this process has spiralled out of control, and as member states always find new ways of ‘gold-plating’ EU rules, the EU always finds further reasons to achieve a 'single rulebook'. This process has to be brought to a halt, and mutual recognition, a basic single-market principle, reinforced. The new framework also brings huge advantages, which should offer benefits to all parties. Banking Union is a huge step forward, which introduces 'one-stop shopping' for banks in the eurozone, another basic single market principle, and a true single supervisor. The clarity of the new resolution framework should, if correctly applied, trigger early intervention and bring an end to forbearance, thereby enforcing market discipline in the banking sector. It should also avoid reliance on taxpayers' money to bail-out banks in trouble, which totalled 14% of EU GDP during the crisis.

Financial regulatory transparency: new data and implications for EU policy. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/20, December 2015

International financial institutions have promoted financial regulatory transparency, or the publication by supervisors of financial industry data. Financial regulatory transparency enhances market stability and increases democratic legitimacy. • We introduce a new index of financial regulatory data transparency: the FRT Index. It measures how countries report to international financial institutions basic macroprudential data about their financial systems.The Index covers 68 high-income and emerging-market economies over 22 years (1990-2011). • We find a number of striking trends over this period. European Union members are generally more opaque than other high-income countries.This finding is especially relevant given efforts to create an EU capital markets union. • Globally, financial regulatory data transparency has increased. However, there is considerable variation. Some countries have become significantlymore transparent, while others have become much more opaque. Reporting tends to decline during financial crises. • We propose that the EU institutions take on a greater role in coordinating and possibly enforcing reporting of bank and non-bank institution data. Similar to the United States, a reporting requirement should be part of any EU general deposit insurance scheme.

Financial risks and opportunities in the time of climate change. Bruegel Policy Brief ISSUE 2016/02 APRIL 2016

Real economic imbalances can lead to financial crisis. The current unsustainable use of our environment is such an imbalance. Financial shocks can be triggered by either intensified environmental policies, cleantech breakthroughs (both resulting in the stranding of unsustainable assets), or the economic costs of crossing ecological boundaries (eg floods and droughts due to climate change). Financial supervisors and risk managers have so far paid little attention to this ecological dimension, allowing systemic financial imbalances resulting from ecological pressures to build up. Inattention also leads to missed economic and financial opportunities from the sustainability transition.

LMX à distance : analyse qualitative et développement d’une échelle de mesure

Notre recherche a pour objectif général de proposer l’adaptation du concept de la relation d’échange superviseur-subordonné (leader-member exchange ou LMX) à la nouvelle réalité du travail à distance. Il s’agit d’étudier la relation d’échange qui se développe entre le superviseur et le subordonné travaillant à distance. Plus précisément, nous visons à définir et à développer une échelle de mesure valide et fiable du concept du LMX à distance. Jusqu’à présent, aucune définition de cette relation d’échange superviseur-subordonné n'a été proposée et aucune échelle de mesure n'a été développée. Dans l’étude que nous proposons, la notion de la distance n’est pas considérée comme un élément contextuel, mais plutôt un élément indissociable du concept lui-même, contrairement à certaines études qui ont examiné la distance comme modérateur de la relation entre le LMX et ses résultantes (Bligh et Riggio, 2012; Brunelle, 2013). À cet effet, cette étude constitue la première sur le sujet. Étant donné l'importance du LMX à distance pour les travailleurs à distance et dont le nombre atteindrait plus de 50 % d’ici 2020 (ITIF, CAS et CoreNet Global), il est primordial de comprendre et d'analyser la relation d’échange superviseur-subordonné à distance afin de mieux comprendre sa nature et son processus de développement, ce qui permettra aux parties de la dyade superviseur-subordonné de mieux s’adapter à cette nouvelle réalité de travail et de développer des relations d’échanges de qualité. Cette recherche aidera les superviseurs travaillant à distance à mieux gérer leur potentiel humain. Pour cerner ce sujet de recherche, nous avons fait une revue approfondie de la littérature traitant du LMX traditionnel et de la notion de distance, et ce, afin de pouvoir proposer une définition du concept du LMX à distance. En outre, nous avons fait appel aux recommandations de la littérature portant sur la psychométrie et nous avons réalisé une étude exploratoire de nature qualitative pour développer son échelle de mesure. Nous avons donc effectué des entrevues individuelles semi-dirigées auprès de trente professeurs d’une université canadienne. Ces entrevues ont été analysées avec le logiciel qualitatif spécialisé Nvivo et ont permis de présenter une première échelle de mesure du LMX à distance composée de sept dimensions et de 27 indicateurs. En somme, nous avons tenu à acquérir une meilleure compréhension de ce phénomène qui est très répandu dans les organisations modernes et à offrir une plateforme théorique et pratique que les chercheurs pourront utiliser pour enrichir leurs connaissances sur le concept du LMX à distance. Enfin, notre étude permettra aux superviseurs et aux subordonnés de comprendre l'importance de développer et de maintenir des relations de qualité conduisant à des résultats organisationnels et personnels positifs.

Proceedings.

Cover of 1905 Proceedings bears the inscription, Rt. Rev. Bishop Charles J. Colton.