Traité d'anatomie humaine. Tome 1,Fascicule 1 / par MM. A. Charpy,... A. Nicolas,... A Prenant,... [et al.] ; publié sous la direction de Paul Poirier

Comprend : Les lymphatiques... Étude spéciale des lymphatiques des différentes parties du corps ; Système nerveux... Nerfs crâniens ; Les organes des sens. Le tégument externe et ses dérivés ; Oreille interne...

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

The Growth and Direction of the Biodiesel Industry in the United States, 2007

The biodiesel industry in the United States has realized significant growth over the past decade through large increases in annual production and production capacity and a transition from smaller batch plants to larger-scale continuous producers. The larger, continuous-flow plants provide operating cost advantages over the smaller batch plants through their ability to capture co-products and reuse certain components in the production process. This paper uses a simple capital budgeting model developed by the authors along with production data supplied by industry sources to estimate production costs, return-on-investment levels, and break-even conditions for two common plant sizes (30 and 60 million gallon annual capacities) over a range of biodiesel and feedstock price levels. The analysis shows that the larger plant realizes returns to scale in both labor and capital costs, enabling the larger plant to pay up to $0.015 more per pound for the feedstock to achieve equivalent return levels as the smaller plant under the same conditions. The paper contributes to the growing literature on the biodiesel industry by using the most current conversion rates for the production technology and current price levels to estimate biodiesel production costs and potential plant performance, providing a useful follow-up to previous studies.

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Risk reduction practices in men who have sex with men in Switzerland: serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation.

The aim of this study was to identify predictors of intentional use of the HIV risk reduction practices of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation during unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) with casual partners. A cross-sectional survey pertaining to the Swiss HIV behavioral surveillance system, using an anonymous self-administered questionnaire, was conducted in 2007 in a self-selected sample of men having sex with other men (MSM). Analysis was restricted to participants with UAI with casual partner(s) (N = 410). Logistic regression was used to estimate factors associated with intentional use of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation. In the previous 12 months, 71% of participants reported having UAI with a casual partner of different or unknown HIV-status. Of these, 47% reported practicing withdrawal, 38% serosorting, and 25% strategic positioning. In the 319 participants with known HIV-status, serosorting was associated with frequent Internet use to find partners (OR = 2.32), STI (OR = 2.07), and HIV testing in the past 12 months (OR = 1.81). Strategic positioning was associated with HIV-status (OR = 0.13) and having UAI with a partner of different or unknown HIV-status (OR = 3.57). Withdrawal was more frequently practiced by HIV-negative participants or participants reporting high numbers of sexual partners (OR = 2.48) and having UAI with a partner of unknown or different serostatus (OR = 2.08). Risk reduction practices are widely used by MSM, each practice having its own specificities. Further research is needed to determine the contextual factors surrounding harm reduction practices, particularly the strategic or opportunistic nature of their use.

Instructions du ministre de l'éducation nationale relatives à l'application des arrêtés du 30 août 1937 et du 11 avril 1938 fixant les programmes de l'enseignement du second degré. Fascicule 1 / Direction générale de l'instruction publique, des beaux arts et des antiquités, au Maroc

Collection : Collection d'instructions et de manuels pédagogiques

Instructions du ministre de l'éducation nationale relatives à l'application des arrêtés du 30 août 1937 et du 11 avril 1938 fixant les programmes de l'enseignement du second degré. Fascicule 2 / Direction générale de l'instruction publique, des beaux arts et des antiquités, au Maroc

Collection : Collection d'instructions et de manuels pédagogiques

Instructions du ministre de l'éducation nationale relatives à l'application des arrêtés du 30 août 1937 et du 11 avril 1938 fixant les programmes de l'enseignement du second degré. Fascicule 3 / Direction générale de l'instruction publique, des beaux arts et des antiquités, au Maroc

Collection : Collection d'instructions et de manuels pédagogiques

Improving Transition Outcomes: State Transition Plan: Iowa's Youth Development Strategic Plan 2007-2010 developed by the Iowa Collaboration for Youth Development team

Iowa's youth development plan for fulfilling Iowa's Promise.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.