A nicked duplex decamer DNA with a PEG6 tether

A dumbbell double-stranded DNA decamer tethered with a hexaethylene glycol linker moiety (DDSDPEG), with a nick in the centre of one strand, has been synthesised. The standard NMR methods, E.COSY, TOCSY, NOESY and HMQC, were used to measure 1H, 31P and T1 spectral parameters. Molecular modelling using rMD-simulated annealing was used to compute the structure. Scalar couplings and dipolar contacts show that the molecule adopts a right-handed B-DNA helix in 38 mM phosphate buffer at pH 7. Its high melting temperature confirms the good base stacking and stability of the duplex. This is partly attributed to the presence of the PEG6 linker at both ends of the duplex that restricts the dynamics of the stem pentamers and thus stabilises the oligonucleotide. The inspection of the global parameters shows that the linker does not distort the B-DNA geometry. The computed structure suggests that the presence of the nick is not disturbing the overall tertiary structure, base pair geometry or duplex base pairing to a substantial extent. The nick has, however, a noticeable impact on the local geometry at the nick site, indicated clearly by NMR analysis and reflected in the conformational parameters of the computed structure. The 1H spectra also show much sharper resonances in the presence of K+ indicating that conformational heterogeneity of DDSDPEG is reduced in the presence of potassium as compared to sodium or caesium ions. At the same time the 1H resonances have longer T1 times. This parameter is suggested as a sensitive gauge of stabilisation.

New insights on the direct activation of isotropic petroleum pitch by alkaline hydroxides

The paper provides interesting evidences that a low softening point isotropic petroleum pitch can be used as a good carbon precursor for the preparation of activated carbons. The activation is carried out by KOH and/or NaOH and the resulting activated carbons present well developed porosity. Such hydroxide activations can be done directly on the pristine petroleum pitch (P) or on the pitch that has been submitted to an air stabilisation followed by a N2 heat treatment (TAN). In general, KOH activation produces better results than NaOH, both in terms of porosity and yield, the results obtained for the activation of TAN being impressive because of the good porosity developments and high yields reached. The different treatments carried out over the petroleum pitch precursor clearly show that they significantly influence the extent of microporosity development. This is due to different changes occurring in the porous structure of the precursor as a function of the treatment carried out. The efficiency of the activation process increases as the mesophase content of the precursor decreases, as well as the mesophase formation during the activation process is avoided.

You'd better bet on the ETS. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/02, April 2013

The issue: The European Union's emissions trading system (ETS), introduced in 2005, is the centerpiece of EU decarbonisation efforts and the biggest emissions trading scheme in the world. After a peak in May 2008, the price of ETS carbon allowances started to collapse, and industry, civil society and policymakers began to think about how to ‘repair the ETS’. However, the ETS is an effective and efficient tool to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, and although prices have not been stable, it has evolved to cover more sectors and greenhouse gases, and to become more robust and less distorting. Prices are depressed because of an interplay of fundamental factors and a lack of confidence in the system. Policy challenge The ETS must be stabilised by reinforcing the credibility of the system so that the use of existing low-carbon alternatives (for example burning gas instead of coal) is incentivised and investment in low-carbon assets is ensured. Further-more, failure to reinvigorate the ETS might compromise the cost-effective synchronisation of European decarbonisation efforts across sectors and countries. To restore credibility and to ensure long-term commitment to the ETS, the European Investment Bank should auction guarantees on the future emission allowance price.This will reduce the risk for low-carbon investments and enable stabilisation of the ETS until a compromise is found on structural measures to reinforce it in order to achieve the EU's long-term decarbonisation targets.

Subsidiarity between Law and Economics. Research Papers in Law, 1/2005

From the Introduction. The present contribution is an attempt to raise awareness between the 'trenches' by juxtaposing the two approaches to subsidiarity. Subsequently, I shall set out why, in economics, subsidiarity is embraced as a key principle in the design and working of the Union and how a functional subsidiarity test can be derived from this thinking. Throughout the paper, a range of illustrations and examples is provided in an attempt to show the practical applicability of a subsidiarity test. This does not mean, of course, that the application of the test can automatically "solve" all debates on whether subsidiarity is (not) violated. What it does mean, however, is that a careful methodology can be a significant help to e.g. national parliaments and the Brussels circuit, in particular, to discourage careless politicisation as much as possible and to render assessments of subsidiarity comparable throughout the Union. The latter virtue should be of interest to national parliaments in cooperating, within just six weeks, about a common stance in the case of a suspected violation of the principle. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a flavour of very different approaches and appreciation of the subsidiarity principle in European law and in the economics of multi-tier government. Section 3 elaborates on the economics of multi-tier government as a special instance of cost / benefit analysis of (de)centralisation in the three public economic functions of any government system. This culminates in a five-steps subsidiarity test and a brief discussion about its proper and improper application. Section 4 applies the test in a non-technical fashion to a range of issues of the "efficiency function" (i.e. allocation and markets) of the EU. After showing that the functional logic of subsidiarity may require liberalisation to be accompanied by various degrees of centralisation, a number of fairly detailed illustrations of how to deal with subsidiarity in the EU is provided. One illustration is about how the subsidiarity logic is misused by protagonists (labour in the internal market). A slightly different but frequently encountered aspect consists in the refusal to recognize that the EU (that is, some form of centralisation) offers a better solution than 25 national ones. A third range of issues, where the functional logic of subsidiarity could be useful, emerges when the boundaries of national competences are shifting due to more intense cross-border flows and developments. Other subsections are devoted to Union public goods and to the question whether the subsidiarity test might trace instances of EU decentralisation: a partial or complete shift of a policy or regulation to Member States. The paper refrains from an analysis of the application of the subsidiarity test to the other two public functions, namely, equity and macro-economic stabilisation.2 Section 5 argues that the use of a well-developed methodology of a functional subsidiarity test would be most useful for the national parliaments and even more so for their cooperation in case of a suspected violation of subsidiarity. Section 6 concludes.

Rôles de la protéine tyrosine phosphatase DEP-1 dans l'angiogenèse, la perméabilité vasculaire et la progression tumorale

L’angiogenèse et l’augmentation de la perméabilité vasculaire sont des éléments clés pour la croissance et la progression tumorale. Par conséquent, de nombreux efforts sont déployés à comprendre les mécanismes moléculaires impliqués dans la formation et le remodelage des vaisseaux sanguins de manière à identifier de nouvelles cibles thérapeutiques potentielles. De cette optique, les travaux de cette thèse se sont concentrés sur la protéine tyrosine phosphatase DEP-1, initialement identifiée comme un régulateur négatif de la prolifération et de la phosphorylation du VEGFR2 lorsque fortement exprimée dans les cellules endothéliales. Toutefois, en utilisant une approche d’ARNi, il a été démontré que via sa capacité à déphosphoryler la tyrosine inhibitrice de Src (Y529), DEP-1 était également un régulateur positif de l’activation de Src dans les cellules endothéliales stimulées au VEGF. Puisque Src joue un rôle central dans la promotion de l’angiogenèse et la perméabilité vasculaire, nous avons en plus démontré que DEP-1 était un promoteur de ces fonctions in vitro et que la tyrosine phosphorylation de sa queue C-terminale, permettant l’interaction et l’activation de Src, était requise. Les travaux de recherche présentés dans cette thèse démontrent dans un premier temps à partir d’une souris Dep1 KO, dont le développement ne présente aucun phénotype apparent, que la perte de l’expression de DEP-1 se traduit en une inhibition de l’activation de Src et de l’un de ses substrats, la VE-Cadherine, en réponse au VEGF chez la souris adulte. Nos résultats démontrent donc, pour la première fois, le rôle primordial de DEP-1 dans l’induction de la perméabilité vasculaire et de la formation de capillaires in vivo. Conséquemment, la croissance tumorale et la formation de métastases aux poumons sont réduites due à une inhibition de leur vascularisation ce qui se traduit par une diminution de la prolifération et une augmentation de l’apoptose des cellules cancéreuses. De façon intéressante, l’expression élevée de DEP-1 dans les vaisseaux sanguins tumoraux de patientes atteintes du cancer du sein corrèle avec une vascularisation accrue de la tumeur. En plus du rôle de DEP-1 dans la réponse angiogénqiue à l’âge adulte, nos travaux ont également démontré le rôle important de DEP-1 lors de la vascularisation de la rétine, un modèle in vivo d’angiogenèse développementale. Dans ce contexte, DEP-1 inhibe la prolifération des cellules endothéliales et limite leur bourgeonnement et la complexification du réseau vasculaire rétinien en permettant l’expression adéquate du Dll4, un régulateur crucial de l’organisation de la vascularisation développementale. Cette expression du Dll4 découlerait de la stabilisation de la β-caténine par l’inactivation de la GSK3β, un régulateur important de la dégradation de la β-caténine, en réponse au VEGF selon la voie de signalisation VEGFR2-Src-PI3K-Akt-GSK3β. Ainsi, ces travaux identifient DEP-1 comme un régulateur important de l’organisation vasculaire rétinienne. Les rôles positifs de DEP-1 dans les cellules endothéliales découlent principalement de sa capacité à lier et activer la kinase Src. En plus de contribuer à la réponse angiogénique, Src est également un oncogène bien caractérisé notamment pour sa contribution au programme invasif des cellules cancéreuses mammaires. Les travaux de cette thèse illustrent que DEP-1 est préférentiellement exprimée dans les cellules cancéreuses mammaires invasives et qu’il régule l’activation de Src, de voies de signalisation invasives et, par le fait même, de l’invasivité de ces cellules in vitro et in vivo. De façon intéressante, ces observations corrèlent avec des données cliniques où l’expression modérée de DEP-1 est associée à un mauvais pronostic de survie et de rechute. Ces résultats démontrent donc, pour la première fois, le rôle positif de DEP-1 dans l’activation de Src au niveau des cellules endothéliales et des cellules cancéreuses mammaires ce qui permet la régulation du bourgeonnement endothélial, de la perméabilité vasculaire, de l’angiogenèse normale et pathologique en plus de l’invasion tumorale.

L'effet des enrochements sur l'utilisation de l'espace par les communautés de poissons dans les Basses-Terres du Saint-Laurent

Ce mémoire a été effectué dans le cadre d'une étude pour le Ministère des Transports.

The Case for EU Police Mission Ukraine. CEPS Commentary, 14 May 2014

The EU appears to be out of its depth as a geopolitical actor trying to deal with the crisis in Ukraine. In this new CEPS Commentary, Steven Blockmans and Daniel Gros argue that the EU should concentrate on what really matters now: namely, preventing any further escalation of the conflict by sending a substantial stabilisation force to the areas that have so far remained relatively calm.

Benefits and drawbacks of European Unemployment Insurance. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/06, September 2014

The issue: Unemployment in Europe has increased to high levels and economic growth has remained subdued. A debate on additional policy instruments to address the situation is therefore warranted. Fiscal stabilisation mechanisms have not provided adequate fiscal stabilisation during the crisis in some countries nor in the euro area as a whole. Different preferences and historical developments mean that national labour markets are differently organised, which sometimes hinders the efficient working of the monetary union. European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) has been proposed as a measure to contribute to fiscal policy management and improve labour markets. | Read more at Bruegel http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/847-benefits-and-drawbacks-of-european-unemployment-insurance/

An Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area: A simulation exercise of two options. CEPS Special Report No. 98/December 2014

This study offers an in-depth economic analysis of the two main proposals for the creation of a European unemployment insurance scheme. One proposes the creation of a harmonised European unemployment benefit scheme that would apply automatically to every eligible unemployed person. The alternative, termed ‘reinsurance’ here, would transfer funds to national unemployment insurance schemes to finance benefits from the centre to the periphery when unemployment is measurably higher than normal. The rationale behind these proposals is to set up an EU-level shock absorber to overcome coordination failures and the crisis-budget constraints of individual countries. The authors consider the possible trade-offs and challenges of, for example, the definition of the trigger, the fiscal rule and the harmonisation of national benefits. They conclude that while both options are viable, ‘reinsurance’ offers a stronger stabilisation effect for the same amount of European distribution.

Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15

The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provided for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; however, as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up. As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s economic policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt. The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Regions promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the interests of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however, these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover, the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect public support for the ruling group. Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.

Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible. OSW Commentary No. 63, 2011-10-14

When Slovakia’s parliament rejected the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) reform on 11 October it undermined Slovakia’s reputation as a credible partner within the EU. Moreover, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova combined the vote on the strengthening of the EFSF – a key anti-crisis mechanism in the Eurozone – with a vote of confidence for her cabinet. This eventually led to the collapse of the government. Before Slovakia’s decision, the strengthening of the EFSF had been endorsed by the national parliaments of all the eurozone countries. Slovakia, which had opted to be the last one to carry out the ratification procedure, adopted the EFSF reform only in a re-vote on 13 October, due to the support of the opposition left-wing party. However, problems with ratification have cast a shadow over the achievements of Slovakia which as one of the freshest members of the eurozone had been actively seeking to influence the creation of EU mechanisms for dealing with the debt crisis. For the past eighteen months the Slovak government, formed by conservative and liberal parties, has consistently called for the controlled bankruptcy of Greece, a tightening of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and for the private sector’s participation in financing the rescue packages for indebted states. It was in part down to Slovakia that these proposals, previously regarded as extreme, were introduced into the mainstream EU debate. The constructive position presented by Slovakia’s diplomacy in recent months has brought Bratislava tangible results, such as the reduction of its contribution to the permanent anti-crisis fund, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). Thus Slovakia, which adopted the single currency on 1 January 2009, has become an informal spokesman for the new, poorer members of the eurozone.

Kazakhstan: the regional success story; Tajikistan: a trial period; Uzbekistan: the major source of instability in Central Asia? OSW Study 15/2004

Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan can boast economic development like no other country in Central Asia. In contrast to other countries of the region, which have rich natural resources, Kazakhstan has managed to use its economic potential in a way that yields concrete benefits now and, at the same time, creates prospects for further sustainable economic growth. Tajikistan: Tajikistan in its present state has been built on the civil war experiences and provisions of the peace accords signed in 1997. These have had a great impact on the present form of the state, its political scene and power mechanisms. President Emomali Rakhmonov is the central figure in the state. The political system, which he has cocreated, is based on - unique in this region - political pluralism (the existence of the Islamic party), decentralisation (far-going independence of the regions and relatively limited potential of the central structures) and compromise as the basic way of resolving conflicts. Such a system has so far guaranteed stabilisation and normalisation of the country. Uzbekistan: With its geographic location, potential, ambitions and political priorities, Uzbekistan could play a leading role in Central Asia. The international community has perceived the country as the pillar of stability in the region. This perception was further reinforced after 11th September 2001 and was certainly among the factors that inspired the United States to start closer political and military cooperation with Tashkent. The administration in Washington had expected that closer contacts might galvanise political, economic and social change in Uzbekistan, thus reinforcing positive trends in other countries of the region as well. But the relations between Washington and Tashkent are in crisis (which the United States will certainly try to overcome), and we have seen rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia and China.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

Russia in Crisis: Year One. OSW Report, January 2010

Economic conditions which had favoured Russia’s development suddenly changed in mid-2008. The Russian economy was hit, on the one hand, by a drastic slump in oil prices (which fell from nearly US$150 to US$50 between July 2008 and January 2009), and on the other by the outflow of investors (a net of US$130 billion of capital left Russia in the fourth quarter of 2008). Within several months, the financial crisis became an economic crisis affecting the entire economy. The financial reserves accumulated in times of prosperity (more than US$162 billion in the stabilisation funds and nearly US$598 billion in the currency and gold reserve) alleviated the negative impact of the crisis, although this failed to prevent the deep declines in macroeconomic indicators. Russia is one of the states most severely affected by the crisis. In the first half of 2009, its GDP fell by 10.4% compared to the same period in the previous year, while industrial production dropped by nearly 15%, and a decrease in investments of over 18% was reported. The poor economic performance has strongly affected the Russian budget, which reported a deficit for the first time in ten years in 2009. During the first year of the crisis (August 2008 – September 2009), Russia’s financial reserves were seriously reduced as a result of the government’s anti-crisis policy and interventions from the central bank: the reserve fund decreased by nearly 45% to US$76 billion, and the central bank’s reserves shrunk by nearly US$200 billion to US$409 billion. Meanwhile, however, the money in the National Welfare Fund, which had been intended almost entirely to subsidise the Pensions Fund between 2010 and 2015, rose almost three-fold (to US$90 billion). According to government forecasts, the money from the reserve fund is also supposed to be spent fully in 2010. The financial crisis has triggered a dynamic outflow of capital from the Russian market. So-called speculative capital was the first to demonstrate the lack of confidence in the Russian market. In the first half of 2009, the growth rate of long-term investments also decreased noticeably, although no spectacular withdrawal of direct investments from Russia has been observed. The economic crisis has also halted the foreign expansion of Russian private capital, while state-owned capital strengthened its position as an investor. Russia’s raw materials companies continue to be the main category of foreign investors; however, new technologies are gaining prominence as the second main direction of Russian investments.

Testing for Subsidiarity. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 13/2006

In the EU circuit (especially the European Parliament, the Council and Coreper) as well as in national parliaments of the EU Member States, one observes a powerful tendency to regard 'subsidiarity' as a 'political' issue. Moreover, subsidiarity is frequently seen as a one-way street : powers going 'back to' Member States. Both interpretations are at least partly flawed and less than helpful when looking for practical ways to deal with subsidiarity at both EU and Member states' levels. The present paper shows that subsidiarity as a principle is profoundly 'functional' in nature and, hence, is and must be a two-way principle. A functional subsidiarity test is developed and its application is illustrated for a range of policy issues in the internal market in its widest sense, for equity and for macro-economic stabilisation questions in European integration. Misapplications of 'subsidiarity' are also demonstrated. For a good understanding, subsidiarity being a functional, two-way principle neither means that elected politicians should not have the final (political!) say (for which they are accountable), nor that subsidiarity tests, even if properly conducted, cannot and will not be politicised once the results enter the policy debate. Such politicisation forms a natural run-up to the decision-making by those elected for it. But the quality and reasoning of the test as well as structuring the information in a logical sequence ( in accordance with the current protocol and with the one in the constitutional treaty) is likely to be directly helpful for decisionmakers, confronted with complicated and often specialised proposals. EU debates and decision-making is therefore best served by separating the functional subsidiarity test (prepared by independent professionals) from the final political decision itself. If the test were accepted Union-wide, it would also assist national parliaments in conducting comparable tests in a relatively short period, as the basis for possible joint action (as suggested by the constitutional treaty). The core of the paper explains how the test is formulated and applied. A functional approach to subsidiarity in the framework of European representative democracy seeks to find the optimal assignment of regulatory or policy competences to the various tiers of government. In the final analysis, this is about structures facilitating the highest possible welfare in the Union, in the fundamental sense that preferences and needs are best satisfied. What is required for such an analysis is no less than a systematic cost/benefit framework to assess the (de)merits of (de)centralisation in the EU.