The impotence of price controls: failed attempts to constrain pharmaceutical expenditures in Greece.

BACKGROUND: While the prices of pharmaceuticals are relatively low in Greece, expenditure on them is growing more rapidly than almost anywhere else in the European Union. OBJECTIVE: To describe and explain the rise in drug expenditures through decomposition of the increase into the contribution of changes in prices, in volumes and a product-mix effect. METHODS: The decomposition of the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures in Greece over the period 1991-2006 was conducted using data from the largest social insurance fund (IKA) that covers more than 50% of the population. RESULTS: Real drug spending increased by 285%, despite a 58% decrease in the relative price of pharmaceuticals. The increase in expenditure is mainly attributable to a switch to more innovative, but more expensive, pharmaceuticals, indicated by a product-mix residual of 493% in the decomposition. A rising volume of drugs also plays a role, and this is due to an increase in the number of prescriptions issued per doctor visit, rather than an increase in the number of visits or the population size. CONCLUSIONS: Rising pharmaceutical expenditures are strongly determined by physicians' prescribing behaviour, which is not subject to any monitoring and for which there are no incentives to be cost conscious.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

A Simple Access Pricing Rule to Achieve the Ramsey Outcome in Two-Way Access

In this paper, I consider a general and informationally effcient approach to determine the optimal access rule and show that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. My approach is informationally effcient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique access rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability among networks' services.

Individual vocal signatures in barn owl nestlings: does individual recognition have an adaptive role in sibling vocal competition?

To compete over limited parental resources, young animals communicate with their parents and siblings by producing honest vocal signals of need. Components of begging calls that are sensitive to food deprivation may honestly signal need, whereas other components may be associated with individual-specific attributes that do not change with time such as identity, sex, absolute age and hierarchy. In a sib-sib communication system where barn owl (Tyto alba) nestlings vocally negotiate priority access to food resources, we show that calls have individual signatures that are used by nestlings to recognize which siblings are motivated to compete, even if most vocalization features vary with hunger level. Nestlings were more identifiable when food-deprived than food-satiated, suggesting that vocal identity is emphasized when the benefit of winning a vocal contest is higher. In broods where siblings interact iteratively, we speculate that individual-specific signature permits siblings to verify that the most vocal individual in the absence of parents is the one that indeed perceived the food brought by parents. Individual recognition may also allow nestlings to associate identity with individual-specific characteristics such as position in the within-brood dominance hierarchy. Calls indeed revealed age hierarchy and to a lower extent sex and absolute age. Using a cross-fostering experimental design, we show that most acoustic features were related to the nest of origin (but not the nest of rearing), suggesting a genetic or an early developmental effect on the ontogeny of vocal signatures. To conclude, our study suggests that sibling competition has promoted the evolution of vocal behaviours that signal not only hunger level but also intrinsic individual characteristics such as identity, family, sex and age.

Report to Government Oversight Committee Regrading Soil and Water Conservation Districts Competition with Small Business, 2006

At the request of the Government Oversight Committee, the Ombudsman gathered information regarding competition by county Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCD) with small business through the sale of products and services. The goal of the Ombudsman’s review was to assist the Government Oversight Committee (Committee) in gaining an objective understanding of the issues so the Committee can ascertain whether there is a problem that requires legislation this legislative session. The Ombudsman focused on gathering specific information from four SWCD offices in central Iowa; Dallas, Greene, Guthrie and Jasper. These offices were specifically identified in documentation presented to the Government Oversight Committee by affected small business owners (contractors), Jon Judson of Diversity Farms and Dan Brouse of Iowa Restorations. However, with 100 SWCDs in Iowa,1 each with their own elected commissioners and each with different practices, priorities and fundraising activities, what the Ombudsman learned about these four counties may not be applicable to all the SWCDs in Iowa. The Ombudsman assigned the case to the Assistant Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman for Small Business, Kristie Hirschman. For reference purposes in this report, actions taken by Ms. Hirschman will be ascribed to the Ombudsman.

Formação dos preços de venda nas Empresas Importadoras de São Vicente

As decisões de preços de venda, é uma das funções com mais relevância no ambiente empresarial para os gerentes, devido o seu carácter estratégico para o sucesso das empresas. O processo de formação de preço (FP) é fundamental para as empresas, embora apresenta graus de dificuldade e de complexidade, por implicar diversos factores. A primeira etapa para a FP consiste na estimativa correcta de custos, para obtenção de preços ideais. Para além dos custos, outros factores internos e externos devem ser analisados para que as decisões possam ser tomadas de forma correcta e obter um preço competitivo. Portanto, os gerentes precisam de informações precisas para poderem tomar decisões com segurança, levando em consideração todos os aspectos relevantes para a FP. O presente trabalho tem como objectivo principal, conhecer uma politica adequada de FP, bem como, descobrir quais os factores mais relevantes considerados na formação desses preços nas empresas e ainda conhecer quais os métodos de FP utilizado pelas empresas de importação de S.Vicente para a FP. A metodologia, consistiu primeiramente numa pesquisa bibliográfica e exploratória. Para a recolha dos dados,foram aplicados questionários com perguntas fechadas múltipla escolha, aos gerentes e aos responsáveis pelos processos de EC e FP e para complementar, foi feita uma entrevista a um especialista da área. Para a análise dos dados, foram utilizadas técnicas qualitativas e quantitativas, feito através das respostas obtidas dos questionários. Os resultados obtidos da pesquisa, mostram que o método de formação de preços de venda adoptado pelas empresas de S.Vicente, é o método baseado no custo e no mercado (método misto), ou seja, o preço é definido com base nos seus custos, mas é ajustado tendo por base o preço da concorrência. The sale prices decisions; it is one of the functions with more relevance in the managerial atmosphere for the managers, due your strategic character for the success of the companies. The process of price formation (FP) it is fundamental for the companies,although it presents degrees of difficulty and of complexity, for implicating several factors. The first stage for FP consists in estimate correct costs, to obtaining ideal prices. Besides the costs, others internal and external factors should be analyzed so that decisions can be made in a correct form to obtain a competitive price. Therefore, the managers need necessary information to make safety decisions, taking in consideration all the important aspects of FP. The main objective of this present work, is to know the appropriate politics of FP, as well as, to discover which the most important factors considered in the formation of those prices to purchases and still to know which of the FP methods used by the import companies in São Vicente. The methodology consisted firstly in a bibliographical and exploratory research. To collect the data, were applied uestionnaires with closed questions, multiple choice to the managers and the responsible for the processes of ECP and EP and to complement, it was made an interview to a specialist. For the analysis of the data, qualitative techniques were used, done through to obtained answers of the questionnaires. The results of the research, show that the method of formation of sale prices adopted for São Vicente's companies, is the method based on the cost and in the market (mixed method), in other words, the price is defined with base in the costs, but it is adjusted tends for base of the competition.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

IROme, a New High-Throughput Molecular Tool for the Diagnosis of Inherited Retinal Dystrophies-A Price Comparison with Sanger Sequencing.

The molecular diagnosis of retinal dystrophies (RD) is difficult because of genetic and clinical heterogeneity. Previously, the molecular screening of genes was done one by one, sometimes in a scheme based on the frequency of sequence variants and the number of exons/length of the candidate genes. Payment for these procedures was complicated and the sequential billing of several genes created endless paperwork. We therefore evaluated the costs of generating and sequencing a hybridization-based DNA library enriched for the 64 most frequently mutated genes in RD, called IROme, and compared them to the costs of amplifying and sequencing these genes by the Sanger method. The production cost generated by the high-throughput (HT) sequencing of IROme was established at CHF 2,875.75 per case. Sanger sequencing of the same exons cost CHF 69,399.02. Turnaround time of the analysis was 3 days for IROme. For Sanger sequencing, it could only be estimated, as we never sequenced all 64 genes in one single patient. Sale cost for IROme calculated on the basis of the sale cost of one exon by Sanger sequencing is CHF 8,445.88, which corresponds to the sale price of 40 exons. In conclusion, IROme is cheaper and faster than Sanger sequencing and therefore represents a sound approach for the diagnosis of RD, both scientifically and economically. As a drop in the costs of HT sequencing is anticipated, target resequencing might become the new gold standard in the molecular diagnosis of RD.

Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Mobile termination and mobile penetration

In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition when subscription demand is elastic and each network uses non-linear prices and can applytermination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute terminationcharge, we find that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition but helps to internalize network externalities. Theformer reduces mobile penetration while the latter boosts it. We find that firms always prefer termination charge below cost for either motive while the regulator preferstermination below cost only when this boosts penetration.Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008)that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that thisapproach allows the regulator to increase penetration without distorting call volumes.

Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.