Psychometric characteristics of the Spanish version of instruments to measure neck pain disability

Background: The NDI, COM and NPQ are evaluation instruments for disability due to NP. There was no Spanish version of NDI or COM for which psychometric characteristics were known. The objectives of this study were to translate and culturally adapt the Spanish version of the Neck Disability Index Questionnaire (NDI), and the Core Outcome Measure (COM), to validate its use in Spanish speaking patients with non-specific neck pain (NP), and to compare their psychometric characteristics with those of the Spanish version of the Northwick Pain Questionnaire (NPQ).Methods: Translation/re-translation of the English versions of the NDI and the COM was done blindly and independently by a multidisciplinary team. The study was done in 9 primary care Centers and 12 specialty services from 9 regions in Spain, with 221 acute, subacute and chronic patients who visited their physician for NP: 54 in the pilot phase and 167 in the validation phase. Neck pain (VAS), referred pain (VAS), disability (NDI, COM and NPQ), catastrophizing (CSQ) and quality of life (SF-12) were measured on their first visit and 14 days later. Patients' self-assessment was used as the external criterion for pain and disability. In the pilot phase, patients' understanding of each item in the NDI and COM was assessed, and on day 1 test-retest reliability was estimated by giving a second NDI and COM in which the name of the questionnaires and the order of the items had been changed.Results: Comprehensibility of NDI and COM were good. Minutes needed to fill out the questionnaires [median, (P25, P75)]: NDI. 4 (2.2, 10.0), COM: 2.1 (1.0, 4.9). Reliability: [ICC, (95%CI)]: NDI: 0.88 (0.80, 0.93). COM: 0.85 (0.75,0.91). Sensitivity to change: Effect size for patients having worsened, not changed and improved between days 1 and 15, according to the external criterion for disability: NDI: -0.24, 0.15, 0.66; NPQ: -0.14, 0.06, 0.67; COM: 0.05, 0.19, 0.92. Validity: Results of NDI, NPQ and COM were consistent with the external criterion for disability, whereas only those from NDI were consistent with the one for pain. Correlations with VAS, CSQ and SF-12 were similar for NDI and NPQ (absolute values between 0.36 and 0.50 on day 1, between 0.38 and 0.70 on day 15), and slightly lower for COM (between 0.36 and 0.48 on day 1, and between 0.33 and 0.61 on day 15). Correlation between NDI and NPQ: r = 0.84 on day 1, r = 0.91 on day 15. Correlation between COM and NPQ: r = 0.63 on day 1, r = 0.71 on day 15.Conclusion: Although most psychometric characteristics of NDI, NPQ and COM are similar, those from the latter one are worse and its use may lead to patients' evolution seeming more positive than it actually is. NDI seems to be the best instrument for measuring NP-related disability, since its results are the most consistent with patient's assessment of their own clinical status and evolution. It takes two more minutes to answer the NDI than to answer the COM, but it can be reliably filled out by the patient without assistance.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Do PES Improve the Governance of Forest Restoration?

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are praised as innovative policy instruments and they influence the governance of forest restoration efforts in two major ways. The first is the establishment of multi-stakeholder agencies as intermediary bodies between funders and planters to manage the funds and to distribute incentives to planters. The second implication is that specific contracts assign objectives to land users in the form of conditions for payments that are believed to increase the chances for sustained impacts on the ground. These implications are important in the assessment of the potential of PES to operate as new and effective funding schemes for forest restoration. They are analyzed by looking at two prominent payments for watershed service programs in Indonesia-Cidanau (Banten province in Java) and West Lombok (Eastern Indonesia)-with combined economic and political science approaches. We derive lessons for the governance of funding efforts (e.g., multi-stakeholder agencies are not a guarantee of success; mixed results are obtained from a reliance on mandatory funding with ad hoc regulations, as opposed to voluntary contributions by the service beneficiary) and for the governance of financial expenditure (e.g., absolute need for evaluation procedures for the internal governance of farmer groups). Furthermore, we observe that these governance features provide no guarantee that restoration plots with the highest relevance for ecosystem services are targeted by the PES

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Political economy of municipal water service privatization in Spain: a duration model analysis

This empirical work applies a duration model to the study of factors determining privatization of local water services. I assess how factors determining privatization decision evolve as time goes by. A sample of 133 Spanish municipalities during the six terms of office taken place during the 1980-2002 period is analyzed. A dynamic neighboring effect is hypothesized and successfully tested. In a first stage, private water supply firms may try to expand to regions where there is no service privatized, in order to spread over this region after having being installed thanks to its scale advantages. Other factors influencing privatization decision evolve during the two decades under study, from the priority to fix old infrastructures to the concern about service efficiency. Some complementary results regarding political and budgetary factors are also obtained

Reading films through political classics : genres of politics in popular cultures

Abstract: Readin films through political classics