First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics

We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary PolicyCommittee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasingconfidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal theirhawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns orpleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The papersuggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explainingdynamics in experts' policy choices.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Notes for a new guide to Keynes (I): Wages, aggregate demand, and employment

I revisit the General Theory's discussion of the role of wages inemployment determination through the lens of the New Keynesianmodel. The analysis points to the key role played by the monetarypolicy rule in shaping the link between wages and employment, andin determining the welfare impact of enhanced wage flexibility. I showthat the latter is not always welfare improving.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Estimating overidentified, nonrecursive, time-varying coefficients structural VARs

This paper provides a method to estimate time varying coefficients structuralVARs which are non-recursive and potentially overidentified. The procedureallows for linear and non-linear restrictions on the parameters, maintainsthe multi-move structure of standard algorithms and can be used toestimate structural models with different identification restrictions. We studythe transmission of monetary policy shocks and compare the results with thoseobtained with traditional methods.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

The economics of anti-parasite defences in animal societies

RESUME : De nombreuses espèces animales vivent en groupe. Du simple grégarisme aux colonies hautement intégrées de fourmis, la vie sociale a atteint des degrés divers de complexité. Les nombreuses interactions entre membres d'une société favorisent la transmission de parasites. Cela représente un coût potentiel de la vie sociale. Cette thèse s'intéresse aux défenses permettant de réduire le coût du parasitisme dans les colonies de fourmis ainsi qu'à la manière dont le parasitisme a pu façonner certains aspects de ces sociétés. Les colonies de fourmis des bois (Forimica paralugubris) contiennent de grandes quantités de résine de conifères. Cette résine réduit la densité microbienne dans le nid et augmente la survie des ouvrières lors d'infections parasitaires. Dans cette thèse, nous montrons, d'une part, que les ouvrières collectent activement la résine et que ce comportement est plutôt préventif que curatif et, d'autre part, que la résine permet aux ouvrières une utilisation moindre de leurs défenses immunitaires. Ces résultats permettent de conclure que ce comportement réduit l'exposition au parasitisme et qu'il a une fonction adaptative. L'émergence d'un tel comportement de médication chez une espèce d'insectes sociaux illustre le fait que la socialité, bien yue provoquant une exposition accrue au parasitisme, permet également l'émergence de mécanismes sociaux de défense. II a été suggéré que la présence de plusieurs reines au sein d'un même nid (polygynie) améliore la résistance aux parasites en augmentant la diversité génétique au sein de la colonie. En accord avec cette hypothèse, nous montrons qu'une augmentation de la diversité génétique au sein de groupes expérimentaux de Formica selysi améliore leur survie lors d'une infection parasitaire. Cependant, nous suggérons également que sur le terrain, d'autres facteurs corrélés à la polygynie ont des effets antagoniques sur la résistance. Nous montrons par exemple que les ouvrières polygynes semblent avoir une capacité moindre à monter une réponse immunitaire. Certains aspects de la reproduction des fourmis ont pu également être façonnés par le parasitisme. L'accouplement n'a lieu que lors d'une courte période au début de la vie adulte, généralement à l'extérieur de la colonie. Les reines stockent ensuite le sperme et l'utilisent parcimonieusement au cours de leur vie alors que les males meurent rapidement. Nous montrons que les défenses immunitaires des reines de fourmis des bois (F. paralugubris) sont fortement affectées par l'accouplement. Ces modulations immunitaires sont probablement liées à une augmentation de l'exposition au parasitisme lors de l'accouplement ainsi qu'à des blessures copulatoires. I1 semble donc que l'accouplement soit accompagné de coûts immunitaires pour les reines. Dans son ensemble, cette thèse illustre la diversité des mécanismes de défenses contre les parasites dans les sociétés de fourmis. La vie sociale, en offrant un nouveau niveau d'interaction, permet en effet l'émergence d'adaptations originales. Cela explique probablement le grand succès écologique des espèces sociales. SUMMARY : Sociality is widespread among animals and has reached variable degrees of complexity, from loose social Groups to highly integrated ant colonies. The many interactions between members of a social group promote the spread of parasites, but social life also permits the evolution of original defence mechanisms. This thesis sheds light on how ant colonies defend themselves against parasites, and on how parasitism shapes certain aspects of these societies. Wood ants nests (Formica paralugubris) contain large amounts of conifer resin which reduces the microbial density in ant nests and enhances the survival of ants challenged by some pathogens. We show that resin is actively collected by workers and that resin collection is rather a prophylactic than a curative behaviour. Moreover, we suggest that resin reduces the use of the immune defences of workers. Altogether, these results indicate that the use of resin is a collective adaptation to prevent the spread of parasites. The emergence of medication in a social insect species illustrates that sociality does not only increase the exposure to parasites but also allows the emergence of social mechanisms to counter this threat. The number of reproducing queens per colony is a variable trait in ants. It has been suggested that polygyny (the occurrence of multiple queens within a colony), by increasing the colonial genetic diversity, improves disease resistance. In line with this hypothesis, we show that in a socially polymorphic ant (Formica selysi), an experimental increase of colony genetic diversity enhances disease resistance. However, we also suggest that factors covarying with queen number variation in the field have antagonistic effects on parasite resistance. We show for instance that polygyne workers seem to have lower immune defences. Parasites may also shape some aspects of ant queen reproductive biology. Ant queens mate at the beginning of their adult life, usually outside of the colony, and store sperm for several years to fertilize eggs. Males die shortly after mating and queens never remate later in life, which drastically reduces sexual conflicts. Moreover, mating and nest founding occur away from the collective defence mechanisms of the natal colony and might be associated with an increased risk of parasitism. We show that mating affects the immune defences of wood ant queens (F. paralugubris) in multiple ways that are consistent with mating wounds and increased risk of parasitism. We suggest that mating is associated with immunity costs in ants, despite the reduced level of sexual conflicts. Altogether, my thesis illustrates the diversity of anti-parasite mechanisms in ant societies. This sheds light on how sociality, by offering a new level of interactions, allows the evolution of original adaptations, which may explain the wide ecological success of social species.

International consumption risk sharing

This paper formally examines the implications of international consumptionrisk sharing for a panel of industrialized countries. We theoretically derivethe international consumption insurance proposition in a simple setup and showhow it should be modified in more complicated models. We empirically analyzethe implications of the theory for pairs of countries across frequencies of thespectrum and find that aggregate domestic consumption is almost completelyinsured against idiosyncratic real, demographic, fiscal and monetary shocksover short cycles, but that it covaries with these variables over medium andlong cycles. The cross equation restrictions imposed by the theory are, ingeneral, rejected. The policy implications of the results are discussed.

Health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts. An extended version of discrete choice of model demand

This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.

Real wage rigidities and the new Keynesian model

Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non trivial real imperfections.We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation-unemployment relation found in the data.

Demand for private health insurance: Is there a quality gap?

Quality of care is qualified as a main determinant of the demand forvoluntary private health insurance (PHI) in National Health Systems(NHS). This paper provides new evidence on the influence of the qualitygap between public and private health insurance and other demanddeterminants in the demand for PHI in Catalonia. The demand for PHI ismodelled as a demand for health care quality. Unlike previous studies, the database employed allows for the development of a link between thetheoretical and the empirical model dealing with unobserved heterogeneityand endogeneity issues. Results suggest that a rise in PHI qualityenhances an equivalent influence in the demand for PHI as an equalreduction of NHS quality. Income and price elasticity estimates areconsistent with the observed feature that PHI appears to be a luxurygood and individuals tend to be relatively insensible to tax relief'sand monetary co-payments in insurance contracts.

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).

Is lumpy investment really irrelevant for the business cycle?

New-Keynesian (NK) models can only account for the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks if it is assumed that aggregate capital accumulation is much smoother than it would be the case under frictionless firm-level investment, as discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). We find that lumpy investment, when combined with price stickiness and market power of firms,can rationalize this assumption. Our main result is in stark contrast with the conclusions obtained by Thomas (2002) in the context of a real business cycle (RBC) model. We use our model to explain the economic mechanism behind this difference in the predictions of RBC and NK theory.

Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisisfrom the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standardmonetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through whichmonetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbankmarket. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed,central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted bystandard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did notallow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design newchannels for liquidity injection.

Financial development, financial fragility and growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility(namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.