Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.

The contract management responsibility system in China : an institutional interpretation

Thesis is about the enterprise reform in China in general, and the Contract Management Responsibility System (the CMRS) in particular. The latter is a new institutional arrangement to deal with the relation between the government and the state-owned enterprise which has always been at the centre of the enterprise reform. The focus of the research is on the process of institutionalization in order to study the problems of the emergence of a free enterprise system in China. The research is conducted by four in-depth case studies to reveal how the CMRS is running and what interaction is taking place between the government and the state-owned enterprise under the system. Drawing on the empirical work, the thesis analyzes the features of the CMRS and the characteristics of its implementation process with respect to the structural-institutional paradigm, and the property rights approach. The research shows that to establish a market-type relation between the government and the enterprise is a complicated and dynamic process. It involves the understanding of the two different economic mechanisms, market and planning, and the interations taken by two parties. It concludes that the CMRS is an unstable system, either going back to the previous system or moving towards a market system, because its dynamic and control dimension are dysfunctional.

Digital image watermarking

In recent years, interest in digital watermarking has grown significantly. Indeed, the use of digital watermarking techniques is seen as a promising mean to protect intellectual property rights of digital data and to ensure the authentication of digital data. Thus, a significant research effort has been devoted to the study of practical watermarking systems, in particular for digital images. In this thesis, a practical and principled approach to the problem is adopted. Several aspects of practical watermarking schemes are investigated. First, a power constaint formulation of the problem is presented. Then, a new analysis of quantisation effects on the information rate of digital watermarking scheme is proposed and compared to other approaches suggested in the literature. Subsequently, a new information embedding technique, based on quantisation, is put forward and its performance evaluated. Finally, the influence of image data representation on the performance of practical scheme is studied along with a new representation based on independent component analysis.

Does ownership always matter? Evidence from the Indian banking industry

Existing empirical evidence on the ownership-performance issue is weighted towards the property rights hypothesis that private enterprises are superior to public enterprises. However, very few studies examine a developing country in which the strong link between the market for corporate control and the efficiency of private enterprises assumed by the property rights hypothesis may not be satisfied. Our study of the Indian banking industry confirms our expectation that, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, there may not be significant differences in the performance of private and public enterprises. Our analysis highlights the importance of creating appropriate institutions prior to pursuing privatization in developing countries.

Shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry

We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of the shadow economy on entrepreneurial entry, utilising 1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data merged with macro level variables. A simple correlation coefficient suggests a positive linear link between the size of the shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry. However, this masks more complex relationships. With appropriate controls and instrumenting for potential endogeneity where required, the impact of the shadow economy on entry is found to be negative, based on a linear specification. Moreover, there is also evidence of nonlinearity: entrepreneurial entry is least likely when the shadow economy is of medium size. We attribute the negative effects of shadow economy on entry to perceived strong competition faced by new entrants when the shadow economy is widespread. At the individual level, an extensive shadow economy has a more negative impact on respondents who are risk averse. In addition, in the economies where property rights are strong, the negative impact of the shadow economy is weaker.

Which institutions encourage entrepreneurs to create larger firms

We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain variation in different types of entrepreneurship across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generates hypotheses about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rights and especially intellectual property rights, and a larger state on entrepreneurs who plan to grow faster. We test these hypotheses using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys in 55 countries for 2001-2006, applying a multilevel estimation framework. We confirm our main hypotheses but we find no significant impact from intellectual property rights.

Entrepreneurial entry:which institutions matter?

In this paper we explore the relationship between the individual decision to become an entrepreneur and the institutional context. We pinpoint the critical roles of property rights and the size of the state sector for entrepreneurial activity and test the relationships empirically by combining country-level institutional indicators for 44 countries with working age population survey data taken from the Global Enterprise Monitor. A methodological contribution is the use of factor analysis to reduce the statistical problems with the array of highly collinear institutional indicators. We find that the key institutional features that enhance entrepreneurial activity are indeed the rule of law and limits to the state sector. However, these results are sensitive to the level of development.

Hierarchy of governance institutions and the pecking order of privatisation

This article discusses property rights, corporate governance frameworks and privatisation outcomes in the Central–Eastern Europe and Central Asia (CEECA) region. We argue that while CEECA still suffers from deficient ‘higher order’ institutions, this is not attracting sufficient attention from international institutions like EBRD and the World Bank, which focus on ‘lower order’ indicators. We discuss factors that may alleviate the negative impact of the weakness in institutional environment and argue for the pecking order of privatisation, where equivalent privatisation is given a priority but speed is not compromised.

Institutional environment, innovative entrepreneurial entry and venture capital financing

We analyse the determinants of high growth expectations entrepreneurial entry (HGE) using individual data drawn on working age population, based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for the 1998-2004 period. Individual level explanatory variables are combined with country-level factors. Our results suggest that availability of venture capital and intellectual proper rights protection are strong predictors of HGE. In addition, we also find that innovative start-ups are associated with highest growth expectations in countries with extensive supply of venture capital and strongest intellectual property rights. Once we introduce venture capital, we detect no significant effects of other elements of financial systems on high-powered entry.

Finance and entrepreneurial entry

This paper investigates the determinants of both the volume of finance and the sources of finance of business start-ups in 42 countries. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for 1998-2003, we jointly examine how the institutional business environment and individual characteristics of entrepreneurs affect the financing of entrepreneurs. We find that the property rights system is the most significant determinant of both the total volume of finance and of the use of external finance for the individual start-up project. In addition, our findings suggest that that the supply of informal finance is associated with the higher share of external sources in start-up finance, whereas the size of the formal financial sector appears to play a more important role for the volume of entrepreneurial self-finance. Our results suggest that the use of external finance by start-ups correlates with the extent of financial restrictions in a country in a non-monotonic way. We find that some financial restrictions may enhance the use of external funds by entrepreneurs, yet the sign of this effect reverses and the coefficient becomes stronger for the high level of financial repression by the government. Finally, our findings imply that the characteristics of the start-up finance are also affected by various individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, their growth intentions and ownership structure.

Start-up financing:a comparative perspective

We investigate the determinants of start-up financing in 41 countries, using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys for 1998-20032. High quality of property rights increases both the total volume of finance and the use of external finance for the individual start-up. The size of the formal financial sector affects the start-up finance via enhancing the volume of self-finance. In addition, the use of external finance by start-ups correlates with the extent of financial restrictions in a country in a non-linear way. Supply of informal finance may to some extent substitute for the use of formal finance.

Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial growth aspirations?

We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain entrepreneurial growth aspirations across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generates hypotheses at the national level about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rights and greater government activity on entrepreneurs' aspirations to increase employment. We further explore whether individual's social networks compensate for weaknesses in national institutions. We use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys in 42 countries for 2001-2006, applying a multilevel estimation framework to test our ideas. We find that the relationship between growth aspiring entrepreneurs and institutions is complex; they benefit simultaneously from strong government (in the sense of property rights enforcement), and smaller government, but are constrained by corruption. Social networks mediate some but not all institutional deficiencies. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Case Comment : Jones v Kernott:which road to Rome?

Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 (SC) Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17; [2007] 2 A.C. 432 (HL). Casenote explores the implications of the ruling in Jones v Kernott by the Supreme Court and assesses its implications for English Property Law. Building on the commonwealth experience the casenote calls for the intorduction of a statutory scheme so as to allow courts to reallocate property rights to unmarried cohabitants in the event of relationship breakdown.

Hanchett-Stamford V (1) HM Attorney-General and (2) Dr William Johnston Jordan [2008] Ewhc 330 (CH), 2008 WL 1968855

Casenote considers meaning and impact of ruling of High Court in Hanchett Stamford v HM A.G. The decision of Mr Justice Lewison in Hanchett-Stamford v HM Attorney General and Dr William Johnston Jordan1 provides us with a useful analysis of the legal principles relating to the thorny issues of: (i) how unincorporated associations hold property; (ii) the applicability of the law of charities to unincorporated associations and (iii) the property rights of a declining membership upon the dissolution of such associations.

Entrepreneurship, social capital, and institutions:social and commercial entrepreneurship across nations

We model and test the relationship between social and commercial entrepreneurship drawing on social capital theory. We propose that the country prevalence rate of social entrepreneurship is an indicator of constructible nation-level social capital and enhances the likelihood of individual commercial entry. We further posit that both social and commercial entrepreneurial entry is facilitated by certain formal institutions, namely strong property rights and (low) government activism, albeit the latter impacts each of these types of entrepreneurship differently. We apply bivariate discrete choice multilevel modeling to population-representative samples in 47 countries and find support for these hypotheses. © 2013 Baylor University.