Handbook of the law of contracts /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Handbook of the law of contracts,

Mode of access: Internet.

Cases on contracts and combinations in restraint of trade, selected from the decisions of English and American courts,

Paged continuously.

Selected cases on the law of quasi-contracts /

Mode of access: Internet.

NIOSH contracts and research agreements /

"November 1974."

Memorial of merchants, ship owners, and others, against the establishment by Congress, of additional lines of steamships under government contracts.

Signed by John Griswold and others.

Federal Grants and Contracts for Unclassified Research in the Life Sciences

Mode of access: Internet.

Protection of the individual as a research subject; grants, awards, contracts.

Mode of access: Internet.

National Defense Program: Contracts and Expenditures

Title varies: June-July 1940, National Defense Program: Contracts and Awards; July 12,1941, National Defense Program: Contract Award Listing

Are Media ‘Watchdogs’ of Illegal State Practices in Post-Cold War Liberal Democracies?: A Case-Study of the Coke Extradition

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Incentives and standards in agency contracts

This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are risk substitutes and are socially undesirable, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a risk-complementary role.

Fixed wages and bonuses in agency contracts: the case of a continuous state space

In this paper, we extend the state-contingent production approach to principal–agent problems to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. The approach is modelled on the treatment of optimal tax problems. The central observation is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal contract may involve a fixed wage with a bonus for above-normal performance. This is analogous to the phenomenon of "bunching" at the bottom in the optimal tax literature.