Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Pollinator guild organization and its consequences for reproduction in three synchronopatric species of Tibouchina (Melastomataceae)

Pollinator guild organization and its consequences for reproduction in three synchronopatric species of Tibouchina (Melastomataceae). In co-flowering plant species, pollinator sharing can result in interspecific pollen transfer and fecundity reduction. Competition will be relaxed whenever there is a large amount of initial pollen supply or if each plant species occupies different habitat patches. Reproduction in Tibouchina cerastifolia (Naudin) Cogn., T. clinopodifolia (DC.) Cogn. and T. gracilis (Bonpl.) Cogn. was studied in an area of Atlantic rainforest to examine whether synchronopatry induces time partitioning among pollinator species. Eleven bee species comprised the pollinator guild. Among pollinators, there were overlaps in bee species composition and in flower visitation time. Direct competition for pollen in Tibouchina Aubl. at the study site seems to lead to different activity periods among the bee species, in which Bombus pauloensis Friese,1913 was most active earlier, while the other species were active later in the day. Bombus pauloensis, the largest bee species recorded on Tibouchina flowers, was the most important and efficient pollinator. This species harvested pollen before the other species and had the shortest handling time. The plants reproduced sexually by selfing or outcrossing, and hybridization was not avoided by incompatibility reactions at the style. The avoidance of direct competition for pollen and no pollinator partitioning among the synchronopatric species of Tibouchina may reflect a facilitative interaction among these pioneer plants.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

New findings regarding return autocorrelation anomalies and the importance of non-trading periods

In this paper, differences in return autocorrelation across weekdays havebeen investigated. Our research provides strong evidence of the importanceon non-trading periods, not only weekends and holidays but also overnightclosings, to explain return autocorrelation anomalies. While stock returnsare highly autocorrelated, specially on Mondays, when daily returns arecomputed on a open-to-close basis, they do not exhibit any significantlevel of autocorrelation. Our results are compatible with theinformation processing hypotheses as an explanation of the weekendeffect.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Weed control trials with fibre mulch, glyphosate and terbuthylazine in Scots pine plantations

Summary

Reaudit letter to the City of Ottumwa for the period July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006, as well as certain issues applicable to the year ended June 30, 2005 and subsequent periods

Reaudit letter to the City of Ottumwa for the period July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006, as well as certain issues applicable to the year ended June 30, 2005 and subsequent periods

Impact of fisheries on activity, diet and predatory interactions between yellow-legged and Audouin's gulls breeding at the Chafarinas Is.

Interactions between yellow-legged Larus cachinnans and Audouin´s Larus audouinii gulls and fisheries operating around the Chafarinas Islands, located 4.5 km off the Moroccan Mediterranean coast, are reviewed. At the Chafarinas archipelago two distinct types of fisheries operate: trawlers and purse seines. Gulls take advantage of both fisheries. They scavenge trawler discards and congregate around shoals of fish attracted to the surface by the purse-seine lamps. When both trawlers and purse-seine boats are in operation, the diet of both gull species is similar, with epipelagic fish accounting for over 60% of the biomass, partially collected in association with the purse-seine fishery. When only trawlers operated yellow-legged gulls, but not Audouin´s gulls, augmented their diet mainly with human waste from refuse dumps, suggesting that competition for food between the two species is mainly limited to the periods when resources made available by fishery activities are abundant. Likewise, when only trawlers operated, there was an increase in the predation pressure on eggs and chicks of Audouin´s gulls. In particular, during the week of celebrations for the holy lamb festival when neither fishery operated, egg losses of Audouin´s gull increased dramatically, suggesting that severe food shortage caused by the cessation of fishing can result in an increased predation pressure by yellow-legged gulls, affecting Audouin´s gull productivity. These results suggest a novel socio-ecological link between gulls, fisheries and local feasts.

Experimental evidence that intra-specific competition in seagrass meadows reduces reproductive potential in the sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus (Lamarck)

To better understand the biological controls that regulate sea urchin dynamics, we studied the effects of potential inter- and intra-specific competition for food on several biological variables of the main sea urchin in the Mediterranean (Paracentrotus lividus). We carried out a caging experiment in which we manipulated sea urchin density (natural vs. high density) and herbivorous fish (Sarpa salpa) accessibility (free access vs. exclusion) in a Posidonia oceanica meadow. No evidence of competition between fish and urchins was detected. Neither density-dependent mortality nor changes in the somatic variables were found; however, we detected that intra-specific competition affected the reproductive potential of P. lividus. The gonad index of urchins at high population densities was ca. 30% lower than that of urchins at natural densities. As a spawning event had just occurred when urchins were collected, these differences probably reflect differences in reserve content, which may compromise the following reproductive period and decrease survival in the long term, as the gonads are also used as storage organs. For the time period studied, mortality rates appeared to be independent of local densities. The results indicate that a long-term negative feedback mechanism appears to take place in P. lividus in response to increased population density.

Multicopy suppression of a gacA mutation by the infC operon in Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0: competition with the global translational regulator RsmA.

The gacA gene of the biocontrol strain Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0 codes for a response regulator which, together with the sensor kinase GacS (=LemA), is required for the production of exoenzymes and secondary metabolites involved in biocontrol, including hydrogen cyanide (HCN). A gacA multicopy suppressor was isolated from a cosmid library of strain CHA0 and identified as the infC-rpmI-rplT operon, which encodes the translation initiation factor IF3 and the ribosomal proteins L35 and L20. The efficiency of suppression was about 30%, as determined by the use of a GacA-controlled reporter construct, i.e. a translational hcnA'-'lacZ fusion. Overexpression of the rsmA gene (coding for a global translational repressor) reversed the suppressive effect of the amplified infC operon. This finding suggests that some product(s) of the infC operon can compete with RsmA at the level of translation in P. fluorescens CHA0 and that important biocontrol traits can be regulated at this level.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.