Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting

This paper explores the impact of citizens' motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice just as 'consumers' reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Stability and change in party preferences.

This article analyses stability and volatility of party preferences using data from the Swiss Household-Panel (SHP), which, for the first time, allow studying transitions and stability of voters over several years in Switzerland. Analyses cover the years 1999- 2007 and systematically distinguish changes between party blocks and changes within party blocks. The first part looks at different patterns of change, which show relatively high volatility. The second part tests several theories on causes of such changes applying a multinomial random-effects model. Results show that party preferences stabilise with their duration and with age and that the electoral cycle, political sophistication, socio-structural predispositions, the household-context as well as party size and the number of parties each explain part of electoral volatility. Different results for withinand between party-block changes underlie the importance of that differentiation.

Party competition in regional elections: a framework for analysis

Whilst scholars have long recognised that processes of decentralisation create new regional arenas where distinct patterns of party competition are likely to emerge, there has been little systematic analysis of the dynamics of such competition. This working paper thus proposes a framework for analysing party competition between regional branches of state-wide parties, and autonomist parties, in regional arenas. Firstly, the different strategies political parties may adopt in response to their perceptions of voter preferences and to the strategies pursued by their competitors are identified. Secondly, different factors that impact on parties' strategic choices, and which may constrain a party's ability to select electorally optimal strategies in a given political context, are proposed.

Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies

This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.

IPH Manifesto for 2009 European Elections

The 2009 European Elections provide an opportunity to influence health at local and European Government level.  IPH has produced a short manifesto identifying 5 areas of action in public health for MEPs and political parties. The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) aims to improve health on the island of Ireland capitalising on benefits from North South cooperation. Our focus is tackling health inequalities and influencing public policies in favour of health.

The Strength of Promissory Representation : What Makes MPs Change their Positions ?

The paper analyses the positional congruence between pre-election statements in the Swiss voting assistance application "smartvote" and post-election behaviour in the Swiss lower house between 2003 and 2009. For this purpose, we selected 34 smartvote questions which subsequently came up in parliament. Unlike previous studies which assessed the program-to-policy linkage of governments or party groups the paper examines the question at the level of individual MPs which seems appropriate for political systems which follow the idea of power dispersion. While the average rate of political congruence is at some 85 percent, a multivariate analysis detects the underlying factors which push or curb a candidate's propensity to change his or her mind once elections are over. The results show that positional changes are more likely if (1) MPs are freshmen, (2) individual voting behaviour is invisible to the public, (3) the vote is not about a party's core issue, (4) the MP belongs to a party which is located in the political centre, and (5) if the pre-election statement is in disagreement with the majority position of the legislative party group. The last-mentioned factor is paramount: the farer away a candidate's pre-election profile from his or her party is located, the weaker turns out to be the electoral link of promissory representation.

Une approche strategique du vote : à propos de « vote par appobation, vote par note »

Ce texte a pour ambition de revenir sur une procédure d'expérimentation destinée à tester l'impact du vote par approbation ainsi que du vote par note sur l'ampleur de ce qu'on a coutume d'appeler le vote utile. Les résultats de ces expériences, menées lors des élections présidentielles françaises de 2007 et de 2012, ont fait l'objet de deux articles publiés dans la Revue économique. Notre objectif est ici d'attirer l'attention du lecteur sur la conception implicite qui sous-tend ces expériences : le vote comme outil de dévoilement des préférences individuelles. Une telle orientation se fait au détriment d'une conception stratégique du vote, c'est-à-dire le vote comme processus de coordination. Or, il nous semble que le propre du vote utile est précisément de s'inscrire dans une dimension stratégique du vote, dimension que la procédure expérimentale mise en place tend à gommer en ne fournissant pas aux votants de repères informationnels relatifs aux choix des autres votants. On parlera à cet effet d'isolation informationnelle. This text has the ambition to return to an experimental procedure designed to test the impact of approval voting as well as evaluating voting on the scope of what is called in French vote utile (strategic voting). The results of these experiences, held during the 2007 and 2012 French presidential elections, have been the object of two papers published in the Revue économique. Our aim is to catch the attention of readers on the implicit conception inherent to these experiences: voting as a means to reveal individual preferences. Such a direction is taken at the cost of a strategic conception of voting, i.e. voting as a coordination process. Yet, it seems to us that the main characteristic of strategic voting is precisely to be strategic. The design of the experimental procedure tends to erase this dimension, by depriving the voters of information on other voter's choices. This is what we call informational isolation.

The Strategic Adaptation of Party Organizations to New Information and Communication Technologies : A Study of Catalan and Spanish Parties

Aquest document se centra en els casos dels dos principals partits espanyols (PP i PSOE) i catalans (PSC i CDC) en el període immediatament després de les eleccions generals espanyoles de maig de 2008, quan aquests celebraren els seus congressos. En general, es poden distingir tres tipus d'actors: en primer lloc, els ciberactivistes que tracten d'obtenir el reconeixement formal de la seva activitat en els seus partits. Així com, els líders del partit que poden intentar promoure la presència del partit en el ciberespai, però que també poden romandre indecisos perquè no és clar l'impacte electoral a la xarxa del ciberactivisme. Finalment, alguns militants tradicionals (off-line) solen ser reticents al reconeixement del ciberactivisme perquè amenaça les recompenses previstes dins del partit. Aquest article mostra com els nostres partits varen respondre al desafiament del ciberactivisme i arriba a la conclusió que la seva situació electoral, mediada per la seva ideologia, estructura organitzativa i el tipus de militància, poden ajudar-nos a comprendre el grau diferent d'institucionalització en l'organització del partit.

A tale of two logits, compositional data analysis and zero observations

The application of compositional data analysis through log ratio trans-formations corresponds to a multinomial logit model for the shares themselves.This model is characterized by the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alter-natives (IIA). IIA states that the odds ratio in this case the ratio of shares is invariant to the addition or deletion of outcomes to the problem. It is exactlythis invariance of the ratio that underlies the commonly used zero replacementprocedure in compositional data analysis. In this paper we investigate using thenested logit model that does not embody IIA and an associated zero replacementprocedure and compare its performance with that of the more usual approach ofusing the multinomial logit model. Our comparisons exploit a data set that com-bines voting data by electoral division with corresponding census data for eachdivision for the 2001 Federal election in Australia

What explains electoral turnout in Swiss municipalities?

What explains the higher electoral turnout in some of the Swiss municipalities? Since there are important differences as far as size, socio-economic structure, importance, political systems and the prevailing political culture are concerned, the Swiss municipalities offer a laboratory-like field of research. Using aggregate level data from our own surveys and from official sources covering the whole country this paper investigates the determinants of voting turnout at the local level. It comes to the following conclusion: The level of electoral turnout in Swiss municipalities depends to an important extent on institutional variables. If the executive is elected in a citizens' assembly there are considerably fewer people participating than in elections at the polls. PR also has a positive effect on turnout, whereas it cannot be shown that having a local parliament leads to higher turnout (and thus to increased interest in politics). Another important variable is the size of a municipality. In smaller municipalities turnout is consistently higher than in bigger ones. As for the importance of Catholicism for turnout, our study confirms the findings of Freitag (2005) at the cantonal level. The Catholic milieu has a positive impact on participation

Electronic voting system for computer supported collaborative learning

The EVS4CSCL project starts in the context of a Computer Supported Collaborative Learning environment (CSCL). Previous UOC projects created a CSCL generic platform (CLPL) to facilitate the development of CSCL applications. A discussion forum (DF) was the first application developed over the framework. This discussion forum was different from other products on the marketplace because of its focus on the learning process. The DF carried out the specification and elaboration phases from the discussion learning process but there was a lack in the consensus phase. The consensus phase in a learning environment is not something to be achieved but tested. Common tests are done by Electronic Voting System (EVS) tools, but consensus test is not an assessment test. We are not evaluating our students by their answers but by their discussion activity. Our educational EVS would be used as a discussion catalyst proposing a discussion about the results after an initial query or it would be used after a discussion period in order to manifest how the discussion changed the students mind (consensus). It should be also used by the teacher as a quick way to know where the student needs some reinforcement. That is important in a distance-learning environment where there is no direct contact between the teacher and the student and it is difficult to detect the learning lacks. In an educational environment, assessment it is a must and the EVS will provide direct assessment by peer usefulness evaluation, teacher marks on every query created and indirect assessment from statistics regarding the user activity.

The Impact of the Electoral System on Political Campaigning : Are Candidates for the Council of States More Moderate than their Fellow Candidates for the National Council ?

It is commonly believed that majority voting enhances parties to cluster around the centre of the political space, whereas proportional systems (PR) foster great ideological divergence. The theoretical arguments for these expectations go back to the work of Downs (1957) and Duverger (1954). More recent studies, however, produced quite contradictory empirical findings. In this paper I will test whether similar arguments hold true for the positioning of candidates campaigning in different electoral systems. The elections for the two chambers of the Swiss Parliament and the data from the Swiss Electoral Studies (SELECTS) and the Swiss Voting Advice Application (VAA) smartvote offer an excellent - almost laboratory like - opportunity to do so empirically. The analyses show clearly, the theoretical claims that majority voting necessarily fosters more moderate positions find no support. The candidates for the Council of States, elected in a majority system, are not more moderate than their fellow party candidates for the National Council which are elected in a PR system.

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.