The Hidden World of Multilateralism? Treaty Commitments of Newly Democratized States in Europe

Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.

Seals and the Need for more Deference to Vienna by WTO Adjudicators

This paper asks how World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the Appellate Body (AB) take public international law (PIL) into account when interpreting WTO rules as a part of international economic law (IEL). Splendid isolation of the latter is not new; indeed it is intended by the negotiators of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). At the same time, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is quite clear when it provides the general rules and the supplementary means of treaty interpretation. Despite such mandatory guidance, WTO adjudicators (when given a choice and assuming they see the conflict) prefer deference to WTO law over deference to Vienna and take a dogmatic way out of interpretation quandaries. The AB and panels make abundant reference to Vienna, though less so to substantive PIL. Often times, however, they do so simply in order to buttress their findings of violations of WTO rules. Perhaps tellingly, however, none of the reports in EC – Seals contains even a single mention of VCLT, despite numerous references to international standards addressing indigenous rights and animal welfare. In the longer term, and absent a breakthrough on the negotiation front, this pattern of carefully eschewing international treaty law and using PIL just for the sake of convenience could have serious consequences for the credibility and acceptance of the multilateral trading system. Following the adage ‘negotiate or litigate’ recourse to WTO dispute settlement increases when governments are less ready to make treaty commitments commensurate with the challenges of globalisation. This is true even for ‘societal choice’ cases on the margins of classic trade disputes. We will argue here that it is precisely for cases such as these that VCLT and PIL should be used more systematically by panels and the AB. Failing that, instead of building bridges for more coherent international regulation, WTO adjudicators could burn those same bridges which the DSU interpretation margin leaves open for accomplishing their job which is to find a ‘positive solution’. Worse, judicial incoherence could return to WTO dispute settlement like a boomerang and damage the credibility and thus the level of acceptance of the multilateral trading system per se.

Notes on the diplomatic history of the Jewish question : with texts of protocols, treaty stipulations and other public acts and official documents

by Lucien Wolf

Predicting recurrence after unprovoked venous thromboembolism: prospective validation of the updated Vienna Prediction Model.

The updated Vienna Prediction Model for estimating recurrence risk after an unprovoked venous thromboembolism (VTE) has been developed to identify individuals at low risk for VTE recurrence in whom anticoagulation (AC) therapy may be stopped after 3 months. We externally validated the accuracy of the model to predict recurrent VTE in a prospective multicenter cohort of 156 patients aged ≥65 years with acute symptomatic unprovoked VTE who had received 3 to 12 months of AC. Patients with a predicted 12-month risk within the lowest quartile based on the updated Vienna Prediction Model were classified as low risk. The risk of recurrent VTE did not differ between low- vs higher-risk patients at 12 months (13% vs 10%; P = .77) and 24 months (15% vs 17%; P = 1.0). The area under the receiver operating characteristic curve for predicting VTE recurrence was 0.39 (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.25-0.52) at 12 months and 0.43 (95% CI, 0.31-0.54) at 24 months. In conclusion, in elderly patients with unprovoked VTE who have stopped AC, the updated Vienna Prediction Model does not discriminate between patients who develop recurrent VTE and those who do not. This study was registered at www.clinicaltrials.gov as #NCT00973596.

Increasing popular participation in the treaty-making process : the legislative process of Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution of Thailand

Historically, the authority to conclude international treaties was exclusively exercised by administrative bodies (or the chief of state). However, recent studies pointed out that the present legislative bodies have come to play a more active role through ratification or the review of treaties in European and American countries. Harrington (2005) studied judicial reform in British dominions and criticized the past executive-dominant treaty-making process as a “democratic deficit” due to a fear that under this system the nation might be bound by international agreements for which a consensus had not been obtained. These studies indicated that people’s participation in the treaty-making process has increased on a global basis, but neither of them provides sufficient descriptive evidence regarding why and how such procedures were established. The present paper therefore attempts to solve these questions by analyzing the legislative and political process of the treaty-making procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 constitution as a case study.