999 resultados para Unilateral Policy
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the role of standing facilities in the determination of the demand for reserves in the overnight money market. In particular, we study how the asymmetric nature of the deposit and lending facilities could be used as a powerful policy tool for the simultaneous control of prices and quantities in the market for daily funds.
Resumo:
Manual dexterity, a prerogative of primates, is under the control of the corticospinal (CS) tract. Because 90-95% of CS axons decussate, it is assumed that this control is exerted essentially on the contralateral hand. Consistently, unilateral lesion of the hand representation in the motor cortex is followed by a complete loss of dexterity of the contralesional hand. During the months following lesion, spontaneous recovery of manual dexterity takes place to a highly variable extent across subjects, although largely incomplete. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that after a significant postlesion period, manual performance in the ipsilesional hand is correlated with the extent of functional recovery in the contralesional hand. To this aim, ten adult macaque monkeys were subjected to permanent unilateral motor cortex lesion. Monkeys' manual performance was assessed for each hand during several months postlesion, using our standard behavioral test (modified Brinkman board task) that provides a quantitative measure of reach and grasp ability. The ipsilesional hand's performance was found to be significantly enhanced over the long term (100-300 days postlesion) in six of ten monkeys, with the six exhibiting the best, though incomplete, recovery of the contralesional hand. There was a statistically significant correlation (r = 0.932; P < 0.001) between performance in the ipsilesional hand after significant postlesion period and the extent of recovery of the contralesional hand. This observation is interpreted in terms of different possible mechanisms of recovery, dependent on the recruitment of motor areas in the lesioned and/or intact hemispheres.
Resumo:
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a framework that explicitly accounts for policymakers' uncertainty about the channels of transmission of oil prices into the economy. More specfically, I examine the robust response to the real price of oil that US monetary authorities would have been recommended to implement in the period 1970 2009; had they used the approach proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2005b) to incorporate model uncertainty and learning into policy decisions. In this context, I investigate the extent to which regulator' changing beliefs over different models of the economy play a role in the policy selection process. The main conclusion of this work is that, in the specific environment under analysis, one of the underlying models dominates the optimal interest rate response to oil prices. This result persists even when alternative assumptions on the model's priors change the pattern of the relative posterior probabilities, and can thus be attributed to the presence of model uncertainty itself.
Resumo:
Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.
Resumo:
The aim of the study was to determine the influence of the dissection of the palate during primary surgery and the type of orthognathic surgery needed in cases of unilateral total cleft. The review concerns 58 children born with a complete unilateral cleft lip and palate and treated between 1994 and 2008 at the appropriate age for orthognathic surgery. This is a retrospective mixed-longitudinal study. Patients with syndromes or associated anomalies were excluded. All children were treated by the same orthodontist and by the same surgical team. Children are divided into 2 groups: the first group includes children who had conventional primary cleft palate repair during their first year of life, with extensive mucoperiosteal undermining. The second group includes children operated on according to the Malek surgical protocol. The soft palate is closed at the age of 3 months, and the hard palate at 6 months with minimal mucoperiosteal undermining. Lateral cephalograms at ages 9 and 16 years and surgical records were compared. The need for orthognathic surgery was more frequent in the first than in the second group (60% vs 47.8%). Concerning the type of orthognathic surgery performed, 2- or 3-piece Le Fort I or bimaxillary osteotomies were also less required in the first group. Palate surgery following the Malek procedure results in an improved and simplified craniofacial outcome. With a minimal undermining of palatal mucosa, we managed to reduce the amount of patients who required an orthognathic procedure. When this procedure was indicated, the surgical intervention was also greatly simplified.
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We examine the evolution of monetary policy rules in a group of inflation targeting countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom) applying moment- based estimator at time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. Using this novel flexible framework, our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy rules change gradually pointing to the importance of applying time-varying estimation framework. Second, the interest rate smoothing parameter is much lower that what previous time-invariant estimates of policy rules typically report. External factors matter for all countries, albeit the importance of exchange rate diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest rates on inflation is particularly strong during the periods, when central bankers want to break the record of high inflation such as in the U.K. or in Australia at the beginning of 1980s. Contrary to common wisdom, the response becomes less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting suggesting the positive effect of this regime on anchoring inflation expectations. This result is supported by our finding that inflation persistence as well as policy neutral rate typically decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting.
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Estimated Taylor rules became popular as a description of monetary policy conduct. There are numerous reasons why real monetary policy can be asymmetric and estimated Taylor rule nonlinear. This paper tests whether monetary policy can be described as asymmetric in three new European Union (EU) members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), which apply an inflation targeting regime. Two different empirical frameworks are