Mathematical notebook, and commonplace book, circa 1689-1769

Manuscript notebook, possibly kept by Harvard students, containing 17th century English transcriptions of arithmetic and geometry texts, one of which is dated 1689-1690; 18th century transcriptions from John Ward’s “The Young Mathematician’s Guide”; and notes on physics lectures delivered by John Winthrop, the Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy at Harvard from 1738 to 1779. The notebook also contains 18th century reading notes on Henry VIII, Tudor succession, and English history from Daniel Neal’s “The History of the Puritans” and David Hume’s “History of England,” and notes on Ancient history, taken mainly from Charles Rollin’s “The Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes and Persians, Macedonians and Grecians.” Additionally included are an excerpt from Plutarch’s “Lives” and transcriptions of three articles from “The Gentleman’s Magazine, and Historical Chronicle,” published in 1769: “A Critique on the Works of Ovid”; a book review of “A New Voyage to the West-Indies”; and “Genuine Anecdotes of Celebrated Writers, &.” The flyleaf contains the inscription “Semper boni aliquid operis facito ut diabolus te semper inveniat occupatum,” a variation on a quote of Saint Jerome that translates approximately as “Always good to do some work so that the devil may always find you occupied.” In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Harvard College undergraduates often copied academic texts and lecture notes into personal notebooks in place of printed textbooks. Winthrop used Ward’s textbook in his class, while the books of Hume, Neal, and Rollin were used in history courses taught at Harvard in the 18th century.

Ed-Dürer ül-müntehabât ül-mensûre fî ıslâh il-galatat il-meşhûre

[Mehmed Hafid Efendi].

Essays on Firm Heterogeneity with Empirical Applications in Economic History and Agricultural Economics

This thesis uses models of firm-heterogeneity to complete empirical analyses in economic history and agricultural economics. In Chapter 2, a theoretical model of firm heterogeneity is used to derive a statistic that summarizes the welfare gains from the introduction of a new technology. The empirical application considers the use of mechanical steam power in the Canadian manufacturing sector during the late nineteenth century. I exploit exogenous variation in geography to estimate several parameters of the model. My results indicate that the use of steam power resulted in a 15.1 percent increase in firm-level productivity and a 3.0-5.2 percent increase in aggregate welfare. Chapter 3 considers various policy alternatives to price ceiling legislation in the market for production quotas in the dairy farming sector in Quebec. I develop a dynamic model of the demand for quotas with farmers that are heterogeneous in their marginal cost of milk production. The econometric analysis uses farm-level data and estimates a parameter of the theoretical model that is required for the counterfactual experiments. The results indicate that the price of quotas could be reduced to the ceiling price through a 4.16 percent expansion of the aggregate supply of quotas, or through moderate trade liberalization of Canadian dairy products. In Chapter 4, I study the relationship between farm-level productivity and participation in the Commercial Export Milk (CEM) program. I use a difference-in-difference research design with inverse propensity weights to test for causality between participation in the CEM program and total factor productivity (TFP). I find a positive correlation between participation in the CEM program and TFP, however I find no statistically significant evidence that the CEM program affected TFP.

The History and Challenges of Cohesion Policies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 2, February 2014

From Introduction. Regional economic disequilibria was viewed as both an obstacle to and result of integration (European Commission 1965; European Commission 1962; European Commission 1969). Even within the Treaty of Rome, the Community tried to establish mechanisms to alleviate regional inequality. However, it was not until 1975 that the main mechanism of regional policy was established as a result of British and Irish enlargement: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Since then, cohesion policy has become a significant EU expenditure accounting for €347bn, or 35.7% of the total EU budget for 2007-13(European Commission Regional Policy-Info Regio 2012). It has also become a key policy linked to enlargement. The underlying principle of cohesion policy assumes that the market alone cannot solve development problems and therefore government intervention is needed. This notion is in direct contrast to the underlying principle of EU competition policy, which asserts that the free market can solve economic development problems (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). The logic underlying cohesion policy is not only counter to EU competition policy, but also regulatory policies. Unlike other EU policies, cohesion policy is not a sectoral policy, but rather territorial in nature (Leonardi, 2006). Thus at times EU regulatory policy has also unintentionally worked counter to the goals of regional policy, sometimes disadvantaging poorer regions (Dudek, 2005). As the Community has sought to ameliorate regional disparities, it meant that all levels of government: local, regional, national and supranational would need to be involved, however, member states have different territorial governance and European regional development programs have to varying degrees impacted the relationship and policy responsibility of different levels of government (Leonardi, 2006; Bachtler and Michie 1993; Marks, 1993). The very nature of regional development policy has provoked a re-examination of subsidiarity, or which level of government is the lowest and most appropriate level. The discussion of policy formulation and implementation at the lowest level possible also addresses the issue of the democratic deficit. Some argue that the closer government is to the people the more responsive and representative it is. Democracy, however, also implies that public funds are used in a transparent way and for public rather than private good. Yet, as we examine the history and current situation of EU regional funds we find that corruption and misuse still abound. Thus, to understand the history of regional policy it is imperative to look at the major transformations of the policy, how regional policy has impacted subsidiarity and the quality of democracy, become an important instrument of enlargement and contradicted or conflicted with other EU policies.