An economic approach to consumer product ratings

In three essays we examine user-generated product ratings with aggregation. While recommendation systems have been studied extensively, this simple type of recommendation system has been neglected, despite its prevalence in the field. We develop a novel theoretical model of user-generated ratings. This model improves upon previous work in three ways: it considers rational agents and allows them to abstain from rating when rating is costly; it incorporates rating aggregation (such as averaging ratings); and it considers the effect on rating strategies of multiple simultaneous raters. In the first essay we provide a partial characterization of equilibrium behavior. In the second essay we test this theoretical model in laboratory, and in the third we apply established behavioral models to the data generated in the lab. This study provides clues to the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings in field implementations. We show theoretically that in equilibrium, ratings distributions do not represent the value distributions of sincere ratings. Indeed, we show that if rating strategies follow a set of regularity conditions, then in equilibrium the rate at which players participate is increasing in the extremity of agents' valuations of the product. This theoretical prediction is realized in the lab. We also find that human subjects show a disproportionate predilection for sincere rating, and that when they do send insincere ratings, they are almost always in the direction of exaggeration. Both sincere and exaggerated ratings occur with great frequency despite the fact that such rating strategies are not in subjects' best interest. We therefore apply the behavioral concepts of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and cursed equilibrium (CE) to the experimental data. Together, these theories explain the data significantly better than does a theory of rational, Bayesian behavior -- accurately predicting key comparative statics. However, the theories fail to predict the high rates of sincerity, and it is clear that a better theory is needed.

Value of information in product recovery decisions: A Bayesian approach

There is a widespread recognition of the need for better information sharing and provision to improve the viability of end-of-life (EOL) product recovery operations. The emergence of automated data capture and sharing technologies such as RFID, sensors and networked databases has enhanced the ability to make product information; available to recoverers, which will help them make better decisions regarding the choice of recovery option for EOL products. However, these technologies come with a cost attached to it, and hence the question 'what is its value?' is critical. This paper presents a probabilistic approach to model product recovery decisions and extends the concept of Bayes' factor for quantifying the impact of product information on the effectiveness of these decisions. Further, we provide a quantitative examination of the factors that influence the value of product information, this value depends on three factors: (i) penalties for Type I and Type II errors of judgement regarding product quality; (ii) prevalent uncertainty regarding product quality and (iii) the strength of the information to support/contradict the belief. Furthermore, we show that information is not valuable under all circumstances and derive conditions for achieving a positive value of information. © 2010 Taylor & Francis.