An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Gas Price Structure

We can say without hesitation that in energy markets a throughout data analysis is crucial when designing sophisticated models that are able to capture most of the critical market drivers. In this study we will attempt to investigate into Spanish natural gas prices structure to improve understanding of the role they play in the determination of electricity prices and decide in the future about price modelling aspects. To further understand the potential for modelling, this study will focus on the nature and characteristics of the different gas price data available. The fact that the existing gas market in Spain does not incorporate enough liquidity of trade makes it even more critical to analyze in detail available gas price data information that in the end will provide relevant information to understand how electricity prices are affected by natural gas markets. In this sense representative Spanish gas prices are typically difficult to explore given the fact that there is not a transparent gas market yet and all the gas imported in the country is negotiated and purchased by private companies at confidential terms.

Evaluación de las Consecuencias de la Nueva Regulación de la OMI sobre Combustibles Marinos

El 10 de octubre de 2008 la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) firmó una modificación al Anexo VI del convenio MARPOL 73/78, por la que estableció una reducción progresiva de las emisiones de óxidos de azufre (SOx) procedentes de los buques, una reducción adicional de las emisiones de óxidos de nitrógeno (NOx), así como límites en las emisiones de dióxido de Carbono (CO2) procedentes de los motores marinos y causantes de problemas medioambientales como la lluvia ácida y efecto invernadero. Centrándonos en los límites sobre las emisiones de azufre, a partir del 1 de enero de 2015 esta normativa obliga a todos los buques que naveguen por zonas controladas, llamadas Emission Control Area (ECA), a consumir combustibles con un contenido de azufre menor al 0,1%. A partir del 1 de enero del año 2020, o bien del año 2025, si la OMI decide retrasar su inicio, los buques deberán consumir combustibles con un contenido de azufre menor al 0,5%. De igual forma que antes, el contenido deberá ser rebajado al 0,1%S, si navegan por el interior de zonas ECA. Por su parte, la Unión Europea ha ido más allá que la OMI, adelantando al año 2020 la aplicación de los límites más estrictos de la ley MARPOL sobre las aguas de su zona económica exclusiva. Para ello, el 21 de noviembre de 2013 firmó la Directiva 2012 / 33 / EU como adenda a la Directiva de 1999. Tengamos presente que la finalidad de estas nuevas leyes es la mejora de la salud pública y el medioambiente, produciendo beneficios sociales, en forma de reducción de enfermedades, sobre todo de tipo respiratorio, a la vez que se reduce la lluvia ácida y sus nefastas consecuencias. La primera pregunta que surge es ¿cuál es el combustible actual de los buques y cuál será el que tengan que consumir para cumplir con esta Regulación? Pues bien, los grandes buques de navegación internacional consumen hoy en día fuel oil con un nivel de azufre de 3,5%. ¿Existen fueles con un nivel de azufre de 0,5%S? Como hemos concluido en el capítulo 4, para las empresas petroleras, la producción de fuel oil como combustible marino es tratada como un subproducto en su cesta de productos refinados por cada barril de Brent, ya que la demanda de fuel respecto a otros productos está bajando y además, el margen de beneficio que obtienen por la venta de otros productos petrolíferos es mayor que con el fuel. Así, podemos decir que las empresas petroleras no están interesadas en invertir en sus refinerías para producir estos fueles con menor contenido de azufre. Es más, en el caso de que alguna compañía decidiese invertir en producir un fuel de 0,5%S, su precio debería ser muy similar al del gasóleo para poder recuperar las inversiones empleadas. Por lo tanto, el único combustible que actualmente cumple con los nuevos niveles impuestos por la OMI es el gasóleo, con un precio que durante el año 2014 estuvo a una media de 307 USD/ton más alto que el actual fuel oil. Este mayor precio de compra de combustible impactará directamente sobre el coste del trasporte marítimo. La entrada en vigor de las anteriores normativas está suponiendo un reto para todo el sector marítimo. Ante esta realidad, se plantean diferentes alternativas con diferentes implicaciones técnicas, operativas y financieras. En la actualidad, son tres las alternativas con mayor aceptación en el sector. La primera alternativa consiste en “no hacer nada” y simplemente cambiar el tipo de combustible de los grandes buques de fuel oil a gasóleo. Las segunda alternativa es la instalación de un equipo scrubber, que permitiría continuar con el consumo de fuel oil, limpiando sus gases de combustión antes de salir a la atmósfera. Y, por último, la tercera alternativa consiste en el uso de Gas Natural Licuado (GNL) como combustible, con un precio inferior al del gasóleo. Sin embargo, aún existen importantes incertidumbres sobre la evolución futura de precios, operación y mantenimiento de las nuevas tecnologías, inversiones necesarias, disponibilidad de infraestructura portuaria e incluso el desarrollo futuro de la propia normativa internacional. Estas dudas hacen que ninguna de estas tres alternativas sea unánime en el sector. En esta tesis, tras exponer en el capítulo 3 la regulación aplicable al sector, hemos investigado sus consecuencias. Para ello, hemos examinado en el capítulo 4 si existen en la actualidad combustibles marinos que cumplan con los nuevos límites de azufre o en su defecto, cuál sería el precio de los nuevos combustibles. Partimos en el capítulo 5 de la hipótesis de que todos los buques cambian su consumo de fuel oil a gasóleo para cumplir con dicha normativa, calculamos el incremento de demanda de gasóleo que se produciría y analizamos las consecuencias que este hecho tendría sobre la producción de gasóleos en el Mediterráneo. Adicionalmente, calculamos el impacto económico que dicho incremento de coste producirá sobre sector exterior de España. Para ello, empleamos como base de datos el sistema de control de tráfico marítimo Authomatic Identification System (AIS) para luego analizar los datos de todos los buques que han hecho escala en algún puerto español, para así calcular el extra coste anual por el consumo de gasóleo que sufrirá el transporte marítimo para mover todas las importaciones y exportaciones de España. Por último, en el capítulo 6, examinamos y comparamos las otras dos alternativas al consumo de gasóleo -scrubbers y propulsión con GNL como combustible- y, finalmente, analizamos en el capítulo 7, la viabilidad de las inversiones en estas dos tecnologías para cumplir con la regulación. En el capítulo 5 explicamos los numerosos métodos que existen para calcular la demanda de combustible de un buque. La metodología seguida para su cálculo será del tipo bottom-up, que está basada en la agregación de la actividad y las características de cada tipo de buque. El resultado está basado en la potencia instalada de cada buque, porcentaje de carga del motor y su consumo específico. Para ello, analizamos el número de buques que navegan por el Mediterráneo a lo largo de un año mediante el sistema AIS, realizando “fotos” del tráfico marítimo en el Mediterráneo y reportando todos los buques en navegación en días aleatorios a lo largo de todo el año 2014. Por último, y con los datos anteriores, calculamos la demanda potencial de gasóleo en el Mediterráneo. Si no se hace nada y los buques comienzan a consumir gasóleo como combustible principal, en vez del actual fuel oil para cumplir con la regulación, la demanda de gasoil en el Mediterráneo aumentará en 12,12 MTA (Millones de Toneladas Anuales) a partir del año 2020. Esto supone alrededor de 3.720 millones de dólares anuales por el incremento del gasto de combustible tomando como referencia el precio medio de los combustibles marinos durante el año 2014. El anterior incremento de demanda en el Mediterráneo supondría el 43% del total de la demanda de gasóleos en España en el año 2013, incluyendo gasóleos de automoción, biodiesel y gasóleos marinos y el 3,2% del consumo europeo de destilados medios durante el año 2014. ¿Podrá la oferta del mercado europeo asumir este incremento de demanda de gasóleos? Europa siempre ha sido excedentaria en gasolina y deficitaria en destilados medios. En el año 2009, Europa tuvo que importar 4,8 MTA de Norte América y 22,1 MTA de Asia. Por lo que, este aumento de demanda sobre la ya limitada capacidad de refino de destilados medios en Europa incrementará las importaciones y producirá también aumentos en los precios, sobre todo del mercado del gasóleo. El sector sobre el que más impactará el incremento de demanda de gasóleo será el de los cruceros que navegan por el Mediterráneo, pues consumirán un 30,4% de la demanda de combustible de toda flota mundial de cruceros, lo que supone un aumento en su gasto de combustible de 386 millones de USD anuales. En el caso de los RoRos, consumirían un 23,6% de la demanda de la flota mundial de este tipo de buque, con un aumento anual de 171 millones de USD sobre su gasto de combustible anterior. El mayor incremento de coste lo sufrirán los portacontenedores, con 1.168 millones de USD anuales sobre su gasto actual. Sin embargo, su consumo en el Mediterráneo representa sólo el 5,3% del consumo mundial de combustible de este tipo de buques. Estos números plantean la incertidumbre de si semejante aumento de gasto en buques RoRo hará que el transporte marítimo de corta distancia en general pierda competitividad sobre otros medios de transporte alternativos en determinadas rutas. De manera que, parte del volumen de mercancías que actualmente transportan los buques se podría trasladar a la carretera, con los inconvenientes medioambientales y operativos, que esto produciría. En el caso particular de España, el extra coste por el consumo de gasóleo de todos los buques con escala en algún puerto español en el año 2013 se cifra en 1.717 millones de EUR anuales, según demostramos en la última parte del capítulo 5. Para realizar este cálculo hemos analizado con el sistema AIS a todos los buques que han tenido escala en algún puerto español y los hemos clasificado por distancia navegada, tipo de buque y potencia. Este encarecimiento del transporte marítimo será trasladado al sector exterior español, lo cual producirá un aumento del coste de las importaciones y exportaciones por mar en un país muy expuesto, pues el 75,61% del total de las importaciones y el 53,64% del total de las exportaciones se han hecho por vía marítima. Las tres industrias que se verán más afectadas son aquellas cuyo valor de mercancía es inferior respecto a su coste de transporte. Para ellas los aumentos del coste sobre el total del valor de cada mercancía serán de un 2,94% para la madera y corcho, un 2,14% para los productos minerales y un 1,93% para las manufacturas de piedra, cemento, cerámica y vidrio. Las mercancías que entren o salgan por los dos archipiélagos españoles de Canarias y Baleares serán las que se verán más impactadas por el extra coste del transporte marítimo, ya que son los puertos más alejados de otros puertos principales y, por tanto, con más distancia de navegación. Sin embargo, esta no es la única alternativa al cumplimiento de la nueva regulación. De la lectura del capítulo 6 concluimos que las tecnologías de equipos scrubbers y de propulsión con GNL permitirán al buque consumir combustibles más baratos al gasoil, a cambio de una inversión en estas tecnologías. ¿Serán los ahorros producidos por estas nuevas tecnologías suficientes para justificar su inversión? Para contestar la anterior pregunta, en el capítulo 7 hemos comparado las tres alternativas y hemos calculado tanto los costes de inversión como los gastos operativos correspondientes a equipos scrubbers o propulsión con GNL para una selección de 53 categorías de buques. La inversión en equipos scrubbers es más conveniente para buques grandes, con navegación no regular. Sin embargo, para buques de tamaño menor y navegación regular por puertos con buena infraestructura de suministro de GNL, la inversión en una propulsión con GNL como combustible será la más adecuada. En el caso de un tiempo de navegación del 100% dentro de zonas ECA y bajo el escenario de precios visto durante el año 2014, los proyectos con mejor plazo de recuperación de la inversión en equipos scrubbers son para los cruceros de gran tamaño (100.000 tons. GT), para los que se recupera la inversión en 0,62 años, los grandes portacontenedores de más de 8.000 TEUs con 0,64 años de recuperación y entre 5.000-8.000 TEUs con 0,71 años de recuperación y, por último, los grandes petroleros de más de 200.000 tons. de peso muerto donde tenemos un plazo de recuperación de 0,82 años. La inversión en scrubbers para buques pequeños, por el contrario, tarda más tiempo en recuperarse llegando a más de 5 años en petroleros y quimiqueros de menos de 5.000 toneladas de peso muerto. En el caso de una posible inversión en propulsión con GNL, las categorías de buques donde la inversión en GNL es más favorable y recuperable en menor tiempo son las más pequeñas, como ferris, cruceros o RoRos. Tomamos ahora el caso particular de un buque de productos limpios de 38.500 toneladas de peso muerto ya construido y nos planteamos la viabilidad de la inversión en la instalación de un equipo scrubber o bien, el cambio a una propulsión por GNL a partir del año 2015. Se comprueba que las dos variables que más impactan sobre la conveniencia de la inversión son el tiempo de navegación del buque dentro de zonas de emisiones controladas (ECA) y el escenario futuro de precios del MGO, HSFO y GNL. Para realizar este análisis hemos estudiado cada inversión, calculando una batería de condiciones de mérito como el payback, TIR, VAN y la evolución de la tesorería del inversor. Posteriormente, hemos calculado las condiciones de contorno mínimas de este buque en concreto para asegurar una inversión no sólo aceptable, sino además conveniente para el naviero inversor. En el entorno de precios del 2014 -con un diferencial entre fuel y gasóleo de 264,35 USD/ton- si el buque pasa más de un 56% de su tiempo de navegación en zonas ECA, conseguirá una rentabilidad de la inversión para inversores (TIR) en el equipo scrubber que será igual o superior al 9,6%, valor tomado como coste de oportunidad. Para el caso de inversión en GNL, en el entorno de precios del año 2014 -con un diferencial entre GNL y gasóleo de 353,8 USD/ton FOE- si el buque pasa más de un 64,8 % de su tiempo de navegación en zonas ECA, conseguirá una rentabilidad de la inversión para inversores (TIR) que será igual o superior al 9,6%, valor del coste de oportunidad. Para un tiempo en zona ECA estimado de un 60%, la rentabilidad de la inversión (TIR) en scrubbers para los inversores será igual o superior al 9,6%, el coste de oportunidad requerido por el inversor, para valores del diferencial de precio entre los dos combustibles alternativos, gasóleo (MGO) y fuel oil (HSFO) a partir de 244,73 USD/ton. En el caso de una inversión en propulsión GNL se requeriría un diferencial de precio entre MGO y GNL de 382,3 USD/ton FOE o superior. Así, para un buque de productos limpios de 38.500 DWT, la inversión en una reconversión para instalar un equipo scrubber es más conveniente que la de GNL, pues alcanza rentabilidades de la inversión (TIR) para inversores del 12,77%, frente a un 6,81% en el caso de invertir en GNL. Para ambos cálculos se ha tomado un buque que navegue un 60% de su tiempo por zona ECA y un escenario de precios medios del año 2014 para el combustible. Po otro lado, las inversiones en estas tecnologías a partir del año 2025 para nuevas construcciones son en ambos casos convenientes. El naviero deberá prestar especial atención aquí a las características propias de su buque y tipo de navegación, así como a la infraestructura de suministros y vertidos en los puertos donde vaya a operar usualmente. Si bien, no se ha estudiado en profundidad en esta tesis, no olvidemos que el sector marítimo debe cumplir además con las otras dos limitaciones que la regulación de la OMI establece sobre las emisiones de óxidos de Nitrógeno (NOx) y Carbono (CO2) y que sin duda, requerirán adicionales inversiones en diversos equipos. De manera que, si bien las consecuencias del consumo de gasóleo como alternativa al cumplimiento de la Regulación MARPOL son ciertamente preocupantes, existen alternativas al uso del gasóleo, con un aumento sobre el coste del transporte marítimo menor y manteniendo los beneficios sociales que pretende dicha ley. En efecto, como hemos demostrado, las opciones que se plantean como más rentables desde el punto de vista financiero son el consumo de GNL en los buques pequeños y de línea regular (cruceros, ferries, RoRos), y la instalación de scrubbers para el resto de buques de grandes dimensiones. Pero, por desgracia, estas inversiones no llegan a hacerse realidad por el elevado grado de incertidumbre asociado a estos dos mercados, que aumenta el riesgo empresarial, tanto de navieros como de suministradores de estas nuevas tecnologías. Observamos así una gran reticencia del sector privado a decidirse por estas dos alternativas. Este elevado nivel de riesgo sólo puede reducirse fomentando el esfuerzo conjunto del sector público y privado para superar estas barreras de entrada del mercado de scrubbers y GNL, que lograrían reducir las externalidades medioambientales de las emisiones sin restar competitividad al transporte marítimo. Creemos así, que los mismos organismos que aprobaron dicha ley deben ayudar al sector naviero a afrontar las inversiones en dichas tecnologías, así como a impulsar su investigación y promover la creación de una infraestructura portuaria adaptada a suministros de GNL y a descargas de vertidos procedentes de los equipos scrubber. Deberían además, prestar especial atención sobre las ayudas al sector de corta distancia para evitar que pierda competitividad frente a otros medios de transporte por el cumplimiento de esta normativa. Actualmente existen varios programas europeos de incentivos, como TEN-T o Marco Polo, pero no los consideramos suficientes. Por otro lado, la Organización Marítima Internacional debe confirmar cuanto antes si retrasa o no al 2025 la nueva bajada del nivel de azufre en combustibles. De esta manera, se eliminaría la gran incertidumbre temporal que actualmente tienen tanto navieros, como empresas petroleras y puertos para iniciar sus futuras inversiones y poder estudiar la viabilidad de cada alternativa de forma individual. ABSTRACT On 10 October 2008 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) signed an amendment to Annex VI of the MARPOL 73/78 convention establishing a gradual reduction in sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions from ships, and an additional reduction in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from marine engines which cause environmental problems such as acid rain and the greenhouse effect. According to this regulation, from 1 January 2015, ships travelling in an Emission Control Area (ECA) must use fuels with a sulphur content of less than 0.1%. From 1 January 2020, or alternatively from 2025 if the IMO should decide to delay its introduction, all ships must use fuels with a sulphur content of less than 0.5%. As before, this content will be 0.1%S for voyages within ECAs. Meanwhile, the European Union has gone further than the IMO, and will apply the strictest limits of the MARPOL directives in the waters of its exclusive economic zone from 2020. To this end, Directive 2012/33/EU was issued on 21 November 2013 as an addendum to the 1999 Directive. These laws are intended to improve public health and the environment, benefiting society by reducing disease, particularly respiratory problems. The first question which arises is: what fuel do ships currently use, and what fuel will they have to use to comply with the Convention? Today, large international shipping vessels consume fuel oil with a sulphur level of 3.5%. Do fuel oils exist with a sulphur level of 0.5%S? As we conclude in Chapter 4, oil companies regard marine fuel oil as a by-product of refining Brent to produce their basket of products, as the demand for fuel oil is declining in comparison to other products, and the profit margin on the sale of other petroleum products is higher. Thus, oil companies are not interested in investing in their refineries to produce low-sulphur fuel oils, and if a company should decide to invest in producing a 0.5%S fuel oil, its price would have to be very similar to that of marine gas oil in order to recoup the investment. Therefore, the only fuel which presently complies with the new levels required by the IMO is marine gas oil, which was priced on average 307 USD/tonne higher than current fuel oils during 2014. This higher purchasing price for fuel will have a direct impact on the cost of maritime transport. The entry into force of the above directive presents a challenge for the entire maritime sector. There are various alternative approaches to this situation, with different technical, operational and financial implications. At present three options are the most widespread in the sector. The first option consists of “doing nothing” and simply switching from fuel oil to marine gas oil in large ships. The second option is installing a scrubber system, which would enable ships to continue consuming fuel oil, cleaning the combustion gases before they are released to the atmosphere. And finally, the third option is using Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which is priced lower than marine gas oil, as a fuel. However, there is still significant uncertainty on future variations in prices, the operation and maintenance of the new technologies, the investments required, the availability of port infrastructure and even future developments in the international regulations themselves. These uncertainties mean that none of these three alternatives has been unanimously accepted by the sector. In this Thesis, after discussing all the regulations applicable to the sector in Chapter 3, we investigate their consequences. In Chapter 4 we examine whether there are currently any marine fuels on the market which meet the new sulphur limits, and if not, how much new fuels would cost. In Chapter 5, based on the hypothesis that all ships will switch from fuel oil to marine gas oil to comply with the regulations, we calculate the increase in demand for marine gas oil this would lead to, and analyse the consequences this would have on marine gas oil production in the Mediterranean. We also calculate the economic impact such a cost increase would have on Spain's external sector. To do this, we also use the Automatic Identification System (AIS) system to analyse the data of every ship stopping in any Spanish port, in order to calculate the extra cost of using marine gas oil in maritime transport for all Spain's imports and exports. Finally, in Chapter 6, we examine and compare the other two alternatives to marine gas oil, scrubbers and LNG, and in Chapter 7 we analyse the viability of investing in these two technologies in order to comply with the regulations. In Chapter 5 we explain the many existing methods for calculating a ship's fuel consumption. We use a bottom-up calculation method, based on aggregating the activity and characteristics of each type of vessel. The result is based on the installed engine power of each ship, the engine load percentage and its specific consumption. To do this, we analyse the number of ships travelling in the Mediterranean in the course of one year, using the AIS, a marine traffic monitoring system, to take “snapshots” of marine traffic in the Mediterranean and report all ships at sea on random days throughout 2014. Finally, with the above data, we calculate the potential demand for marine gas oil in the Mediterranean. If nothing else is done and ships begin to use marine gas oil instead of fuel oil in order to comply with the regulation, the demand for marine gas oil in the Mediterranean will increase by 12.12 MTA (Millions Tonnes per Annum) from 2020. This means an increase of around 3.72 billion dollars a year in fuel costs, taking as reference the average price of marine fuels in 2014. Such an increase in demand in the Mediterranean would be equivalent to 43% of the total demand for diesel in Spain in 2013, including automotive diesel fuels, biodiesel and marine gas oils, and 3.2% of European consumption of middle distillates in 2014. Would the European market be able to supply enough to meet this greater demand for diesel? Europe has always had a surplus of gasoline and a deficit of middle distillates. In 2009, Europe had to import 4.8 MTA from North America and 22.1 MTA from Asia. Therefore, this increased demand on Europe's already limited capacity for refining middle distillates would lead to increased imports and higher prices, especially in the diesel market. The sector which would suffer the greatest impact of increased demand for marine gas oil would be Mediterranean cruise ships, which represent 30.4% of the fuel demand of the entire world cruise fleet, meaning their fuel costs would rise by 386 million USD per year. ROROs in the Mediterranean, which represent 23.6% of the demand of the world fleet of this type of ship, would see their fuel costs increase by 171 million USD a year. The greatest cost increase would be among container ships, with an increase on current costs of 1.168 billion USD per year. However, their consumption in the Mediterranean represents only 5.3% of worldwide fuel consumption by container ships. These figures raise the question of whether a cost increase of this size for RORO ships would lead to short-distance marine transport in general becoming less competitive compared to other transport options on certain routes. For example, some of the goods that ships now carry could switch to road transport, with the undesirable effects on the environment and on operations that this would produce. In the particular case of Spain, the extra cost of switching to marine gas oil in all ships stopping at any Spanish port in 2013 would be 1.717 billion EUR per year, as we demonstrate in the last part of Chapter 5. For this calculation, we used the AIS system to analyse all ships which stopped at any Spanish port, classifying them by distance travelled, type of ship and engine power. This rising cost of marine transport would be passed on to the Spanish external sector, increasing the cost of imports and exports by sea in a country which relies heavily on maritime transport, which accounts for 75.61% of Spain's total imports and 53.64% of its total exports. The three industries which would be worst affected are those with goods of lower value relative to transport costs. The increased costs over the total value of each good would be 2.94% for wood and cork, 2.14% for mineral products and 1.93% for manufactured stone, cement, ceramic and glass products. Goods entering via the two Spanish archipelagos, the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands, would suffer the greatest impact from the extra cost of marine transport, as these ports are further away from other major ports and thus the distance travelled is greater. However, this is not the only option for compliance with the new regulations. From our readings in Chapter 6 we conclude that scrubbers and LNG propulsion would enable ships to use cheaper fuels than marine gas oil, in exchange for investing in these technologies. Would the savings gained by these new technologies be enough to justify the investment? To answer this question, in Chapter 7 we compare the three alternatives and calculate both the cost of investment and the operating costs associated with scrubbers or LNG propulsion for a selection of 53 categories of ships. Investing in scrubbers is more advisable for large ships with no fixed runs. However, for smaller ships with regular runs to ports with good LNG supply infrastructure, investing in LNG propulsion would be the best choice. In the case of total transit time within an ECA and the pricing scenario seen in 2014, the best payback periods on investments in scrubbers are for large cruise ships (100,000 gross tonnage), which would recoup their investment in 0.62 years; large container ships, with a 0.64 year payback period for those over 8,000 TEUs and 0.71 years for the 5,000-8,000 TEU category; and finally, large oil tankers over 200,000 deadweight tonnage, which would recoup their investment in 0.82 years. However, investing in scrubbers would have a longer payback period for smaller ships, up to 5 years or more for oil tankers and chemical tankers under 5,000 deadweight tonnage. In the case of LNG propulsion, a possible investment is more favourable and the payback period is shorter for smaller ship classes, such as ferries, cruise ships and ROROs. We now take the case of a ship transporting clean products, already built, with a deadweight tonnage of 38,500, and consider the viability of investing in installing a scrubber or changing to LNG propulsion, starting in 2015. The two variables with the greatest impact on the advisability of the investment are how long the ship is at sea within emission control areas (ECA) and the future price scenario of MGO, HSFO and LNG. For this analysis, we studied each investment, calculating a battery of merit conditions such as the payback period, IRR, NPV and variations in the investors' liquid assets. We then calculated the minimum boundary conditions to ensure the investment was not only acceptable but advisable for the investor shipowner. Thus, for the average price differential of 264.35 USD/tonne between HSFO and MGO during 2014, investors' return on investment (IRR) in scrubbers would be the same as the required opportunity cost of 9.6%, for values of over 56% ship transit time in ECAs. For the case of investing in LNG and the average price differential between MGO and LNG of 353.8 USD/tonne FOE in 2014, the ship must spend 64.8% of its time in ECAs for the investment to be advisable. For an estimated 60% of time in an ECA, the internal rate of return (IRR) for investors equals the required opportunity cost of 9.6%, based on a price difference of 244.73 USD/tonne between the two alternative fuels, marine gas oil (MGO) and fuel oil (HSFO). An investment in LNG propulsion would require a price differential between MGO and LNG of 382.3 USD/tonne FOE. Thus, for a 38,500 DWT ship carrying clean products, investing in retrofitting to install a scrubber is more advisable than converting to LNG, with an internal rate of return (IRR) for investors of 12.77%, compared to 6.81% for investing in LNG. Both calculations were based on a ship which spends 60% of its time at sea in an ECA and a scenario of average 2014 prices. However, for newly-built ships, investments in either of these technologies from 2025 would be advisable. Here, the shipowner must pay particular attention to the specific characteristics of their ship, the type of operation, and the infrastructure for supplying fuel and handling discharges in the ports where it will usually operate. Thus, while the consequences of switching to marine gas oil in order to comply with the MARPOL regulations are certainly alarming, there are alternatives to marine gas oil, with smaller increases in the costs of maritime transport, while maintaining the benefits to society this law is intended to provide. Indeed, as we have demonstrated, the options which appear most favourable from a financial viewpoint are conversion to LNG for small ships and regular runs (cruise ships, ferries, ROROs), and installing scrubbers for large ships. Unfortunately, however, these investments are not being made, due to the high uncertainty associated with these two markets, which increases business risk, both for shipowners and for the providers of these new technologies. This means we are seeing considerable reluctance regarding these two options among the private sector. This high level of risk can be lowered only by encouraging joint efforts by the public and private sectors to overcome these barriers to entry into the market for scrubbers and LNG, which could reduce the environmental externalities of emissions without affecting the competitiveness of marine transport. Our opinion is that the same bodies which approved this law must help the shipping industry invest in these technologies, drive research on them, and promote the creation of a port infrastructure which is adapted to supply LNG and handle the discharges from scrubber systems. At present there are several European incentive programmes, such as TEN-T and Marco Polo, but we do not consider these to be sufficient. For its part, the International Maritime Organization should confirm as soon as possible whether the new lower sulphur levels in fuels will be postponed until 2025. This would eliminate the great uncertainty among shipowners, oil companies and ports regarding the timeline for beginning their future investments and for studying their viability.

Potential effects of gas hydrate on human welfare

For almost 30 years. serious interest has been directed toward natural gas hydrate, a crystalline solid composed of water and methane, as a potential (i) energy resource, (ii) factor in global climate change, and (iii) submarine geohazard. Although each of these issues can affect human welfare, only (iii) is considered to be of immediate importance. Assessments of gas hydrate as an energy resource have often been overly optimistic, based in part on its very high methane content and on its worldwide occurrence in continental margins. Although these attributes are attractive, geologic settings, reservoir properties, and phase-equilibria considerations diminish the energy resource potential of natural gas hydrate. The possible role of gas hydrate in global climate change has been often overstated. Although methane is a “greenhouse” gas in the atmosphere, much methane from dissociated gas hydrate may never reach the atmosphere, but rather may be converted to carbon dioxide and sequestered by the hydrosphere/biosphere before reaching the atmosphere. Thus, methane from gas hydrate may have little opportunity to affect global climate change. However, submarine geohazards (such as sediment instabilities and slope failures on local and regional scales, leading to debris flows, slumps, slides, and possible tsunamis) caused by gas-hydrate dissociation are of immediate and increasing importance as humankind moves to exploit seabed resources in ever-deepening waters of coastal oceans. The vulnerability of gas hydrate to temperature and sea level changes enhances the instability of deep-water oceanic sediments, and thus human activities and installations in this setting can be affected.

Desenvolvimento de um método para diagnose de falhas na operação de navios transportadores de gás natural liquefeito através de redes bayesianas.

O Gás Natural Liquefeito (GNL) tem, aos poucos, se tornado uma importante opção para a diversificação da matriz energética brasileira. Os navios metaneiros são os responsáveis pelo transporte do GNL desde as plantas de liquefação até as de regaseificação. Dada a importância, bem como a periculosidade, das operações de transporte e de carga e descarga de navios metaneiros, torna-se necessário não só um bom plano de manutenção como também um sistema de detecção de falhas que podem ocorrer durante estes processos. Este trabalho apresenta um método de diagnose de falhas para a operação de carga e descarga de navios transportadores de GNL através da utilização de Redes Bayesianas em conjunto com técnicas de análise de confiabilidade, como a Análise de Modos e Efeitos de Falhas (FMEA) e a Análise de Árvores de Falhas (FTA). O método proposto indica, através da leitura de sensores presentes no sistema de carga e descarga, quais os componentes que mais provavelmente estão em falha. O método fornece uma abordagem bem estruturada para a construção das Redes Bayesianas utilizadas na diagnose de falhas do sistema.

On Ukrainian Gas Transit and South Stream. There may be more than meets the eye. CEPS Commentaries, 21 March 2014

The EU relies to a considerable degree on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Whereas Norwegian export pipelines are directly connected to the EU gas system, a major share of Russian gas flows through the Ukrainian territory before reaching consumers located other consumers located down in the supply chain (e.g. Slovakia, Hungary or Italy). But is the Ukrainian gas transit route still a risk? Will the construction of the South Stream pipeline further reduce the importance of Ukraine as a transit country? Or is there more at stake here than meets the eye?

Is Europe vulnerable to Russian gas cuts? CEPS Commentaries, 12 March 2014

The EU relies heavily on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Nearly 23% of the gas burned by the EU member states is produced in Russian gas fields. Ukraine remains one of the main supply routes for Russian gas flowing into Europe. Consequently, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Crimean Peninsula brought back memories of past gas supply disruptions, most notably of 2009. The question today is whether the EU in 2014 is equally vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies as it was five years ago. In this commentary, Arno Behrens and Julian Wieczorkiewicz look into two different scenarios. First, could Europe sustain longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia? And second, what impact would disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU? Essentially the authors argue that Russia is highly dependent on gas exports to Europe, while Europe could resort to alternatives to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply disruptions than it was five years ago.

A Gas Hub for Ukraine. CEPS Commentary, 11 June 2014

For many years, when natural gas was mentioned in conjunction with Ukraine, it meant nothing but trouble. But at the very moment when Ukraine's territorial integrity is at stake, natural gas could become part of the solution. Due to its massive storage potential, namely one-third that of the EU (or seven-times that of the UK), Ukraine is a natural candidate for an eastern European gas hub. Becoming an integrated part of the European gas market has economic and political merits – both for Ukraine and the EU.

A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

The gas target model for the Visegard 4 Region: conceptual analysis. OSW Report, May 2013

The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the Visegrad 4 countries (V4) to undertake closer collaboration in natural gas policy, notably by agreeing on a common security of supply strategy, including regional emergency planning, and a common implementation of the Gas Target Model (GTM) that European regulators have proposed for the medium-long term design of the EU gas market, and which has been endorsed by the Madrid Regulatory Forum. As a contribution to this collaboration, the present paper will analyse how the GTM may be implemented in the V4 region, with a view to maximize the benefits that arise from joint implementation. A most relevant conclusion of the GTM is that markets should be large enough to attract market players and investments, so that sufficient diversity of sources may be reached and market power indicators are kept below dangerous levels. In most cases, this requires physical and/or virtual interconnection of present markets, which is also useful to achieve the required security of supply standards, as envisaged in the Regulation 994/2010/EC.

The resource wealth burden - oil and gas sectors in the former USSR. OSW Study 12/2003

The former USSR area plays a great role in the international oil and gas market. Russia is a real gas giant, with the richest deposits of this material in the world. Russia is also the main exporter of natural gas to many European countries. Keeping a strong position in this market remains a priority for the Russian Federation's economic policy. Europe is a very attractive region because its demand for gas is expected to grow steadily, while its own gas production keeps decreasing. In the long term, the Far East will be an important market for Russian exports, too. According to estimates, demand there will grow even faster than in Europe. Caspian gas producers, for the time being, can not really compete with Russia in this field, and this status quo will most probably be preserved in the nearest future.

The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China. OSW COMMENTARY No. 139, 2014-06-16

The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).

First steps towards into the unknown. The possibilities prospects of unconventional gas extraction in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 106, 2013-04-24

Ukraine’s deposits of unconventional gas (shale gas, tight gas trapped in non-porous sandstone formations, and coal bed methane) may form a significant part of Europe’s gas reserves. Initial exploration and test drilling will be carried out in two major deposits: Yuzivska (Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts) and Oleska (Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts), to confirm the volume of the reserves. Shell and Chevron, respectively, won the tenders for the development of these fields in mid 2012. Gas extraction on an industrial scale is expected to commence in late 2018/ early 2019 at the earliest. According to estimates presented in the draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine 2030, annual gas production levels may range between 30 billion m3 and 47 billion m3 towards the end of the next decade. According to optimistic forecasts from IHS CERA, total gas production (from both conventional and unconventional reserves) could reach as much as 73 billion m3. However, this will require multi-billion dollar investments, a significant improvement in the investment climate, and political stability. It is clear at the present initial stage of the unconventional gas extraction project that the private interests of the Ukrainian government elite have played a positive role in initiating unconventional gas extraction projects. Ukraine has had to wait nearly four decades for this opportunity to regain its status of a major gas producer. Gas from unconventional sources may lead not only to Ukraine becoming self-sufficient in terms of energy supplies, but may also result in it beginning to export gas. Furthermore, shale gas deposits in Poland and Ukraine, including on the Black Sea shelf (both traditional natural gas and gas hydrates) form a specific ‘European methane belt’, which could bring about a cardinal change in the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eastern and Central Europe over the next thirty years.

Energy Union: Can Europe learn from Japan’s joint gas purchasing? CEPS Commentary, 11 December 2014

Japan’s two major electricity producing companies reached a preliminary agreement recently to establish a joint venture for the procurement of fossil fuel resources, primarily liquefied natural gas (LNG). The authors of this commentary ask whether this commercial initiative could serve as an example to Europe of how to increase the negotiating power of individual EU member states. They conclude that a private joint gas procurement company may indeed offer a solution for EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, instead of yet another source of confrontation. Given the political volatility in the region, it could well be the key to balancing out the need for security of supply with an offer to guarantee security of demand, thereby creating the climate for stable commercial relations.

Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.