934 resultados para Metaphysics of reasons
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Bound with: Meditations and discourses on the glory of Christ / by John Owen.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Tr. of: Grundzuge der metaphysik.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Signed: J. A.
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Imprint varies: v. 2-3, London, Printed for T. Cadell [etc.]--v.4-6, Edinburgh, Printed for Bell & Bradfute [etc.]
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Translator's dedication signed: Hans De Veil.
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In this study the authors addressed whether or not community members use relevant risk factors to determine an appropriate level of skin protection behavior in the prevention of skin cancer. The authors conducted a postal survey with a community sample of 3,600 Queensland residents that they randomly selected from the Commonwealth electoral roll. The predictors of perceptions of doing enough skin protection included intrapersonal, social, and attitudinal influences. People protected themselves from the sun primarily out of a desire for future good health and on other occasions did not protect themselves from the sun because they were not out there long enough to get burnt. The predictors of perceptions of doing enough skin protection indicated that participants were aware of relevant risk factors. The main reasons that people protect themselves from the sun suggest that they are acting on many health promotion messages. However, skin cancer prevention programs need to move beyond increasing awareness and knowledge of the disease to providing a supportive environment and enhancing individual skills. Health promotion campaigns could reinforce appropriate risk assessment and shape an individual's decision about how much sun protection is needed.
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One of the curious things about this challenging book is that its ostensible subject— the Saxon medical and political scientist Hermann Conring (1606–1681)— is not mentioned in the title. Constantin Fasolt argues that we cannot know what Conring really thought or meant in his writings, which means that his topic cannot be Conring as such and must instead be that which occludes our knowledge of him, the titular limits of history. Given that we do in fact learn a good deal about Conring from Fasolt’s book, we can only hope that the decapitation of its subject will be rectified in a subsequent edition, or perhaps by the restorative work of librarians putting together subject headings. And yet Fasolt’s decision is understandable, for Conring is indeed a stalking-horse for a much bigger quarry: historiography and the historical consciousness. By “history” Fasolt understands a way of imposing intelligibility on the world, which is founded on the twin assumptions that the past is gone and unchangeable, and that the meaning of texts can be determined by placing them in their historical contexts (ix). In challenging this mode of intelligibility, Fasolt is not attempting to improve professiona history—it’s already as good as it can be—but to displace it. He regards his work as a declaration of “independence from historical consciousness” (32). At the same time, Fasolt insists that he is not simply jumping from historiography to philosophy, or attempting to preempt history with ontology (37-39). That has been tried by Nietzsche and Heidegger, who have been tainted by Nazism (Fasolt thinks unfairly). It has also been attempted by modern philosophers from Gadamer to Foucault and Charles Taylor who, in failing to address the “violence” that its mode of intelligibility does to the world, have not succeeded in outflanking history. Perhaps, Fasolt wonders, it is only the personal experience of those who have been subject to this violence—the experience of those who have been subject to historical examination—that can break the spell of history. Fasolt’s disclaimer notwithstanding, in the course of these remarks I shall argue that he is indeed jumping from history to philosophy, or attempting to outflank history by subjecting it to a particular metaphysical understanding. I shall do so in part by sketching the recent intellectual history of this move—a historical examination that I hope inflicts as little violence as possible on Fasolt’s argument.