Decentralization and corruption: evidence from primary health-care programmes

The aim of this article is to evaluate whether there is an association between decentralization and corruption. In order to do so we analyse Brazilian health-care programmes that are run locally. To construct objective measures of corruption, we use the information from the reports of the auditing programme of the local governments of Brazil. Results point that there is no relationship between decentralization and corruption, whatever the measure of decentralization used.

As súmulas vinculantes no Brasil e a necessidade de limites ao ativismo judicial

O Autor aborda que, a partir do fortalecimento da jurisdição constitucional, Constituição/1988, novas técnicas interpretativas serão permitidas, no intuito de ampliar a atuação jurisdicional em assuntos tradicionalmente de alçada dos Poderes Legislativo e Executivo.

El protocolo judicial en España

Programa de doctorado: Nuevas perspectivas del Derecho Privado

Fighting corruption with pyramids: A Law and Economics approach to combating corruption in post-socialist countries

Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. Based on this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. Applying this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. Critics argue that “one size does not fit all” because the institutional setting of countries around the world varies. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. The socialist past left traces on institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation, particularly in the domain of public administration. If the idiosyncrasy of these countries is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. The implementation of this model is based on three regulatory pyramids: anti-corruption, disciplinary anti-corruption and criminal anti-corruption pyramid. This approach asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds.