[Admittatur of Samuel F. McCleary], 1837 August 28

Printed copy of the 1833 abstract of laws and regulations with the admittatur of undergraduate Samuel F. McCleary signed by President Josiah Quincy on August 28, 1837.

[Admittatur of Isaac F. Shepard], 1838 August 28

Printed copy of an undated abstract of laws and regulations with the admittatur of undergraduate Isaac F. Shepard signed by President Josiah Quincy on August 28, 1837.

[Admittatur of Thomas Bartlett Hall], 1840 August 25

Printed copy of an undated abstract of laws and regulations with the admittatur of undergraduate Thomas B. Hall signed by President Josiah Quincy on August 25, 1840. The admittatur identifies Hall as a freshman.

[Certificate of admission of Thomas B. Hall], 1840 August 27

Printed copy of an undated abstract of laws and regulations with the admittatur of undergraduate Thomas Bartlett Hall to the Sophomore class on probation signed by President Josiah Quincy on August 27, 1840. The admittatur identifies Hall as a sophomore.

[Certificate of admission of Justin Winsor], 1849 July 20

Printed copy of an undated abstract of laws and regulations with the admittatur of undergraduate Justin Winsor signed by President Jared Sparks on July 20, 1849.

[Certificate of admission of Charles Ammi Cutter], 1851 July 15

Photocopy of an abstract of laws and regulations, and the certificate of admission of undergraduate Charles Ammi Cutter signed by President Jared Sparks on July 15, 1851.

[Certificate of admission of Elihu Chauncey], 1857 September 4

Printed copy of an abstract of laws and regulations, and the certificate of admission of undergraduate Elihu Chauncey signed by President James Walker on September 4, 1857.

[Certificate of admission of W. P. Alexander], 1866 July 17

Printed copy of an abstract of laws and regulations, and the certificate of admission of undergraduate W. P. Alexander signed by President Thomas Hill on July 17, 1866.

[Certificate of admission of F. H. Viaux], 1866-1867

Printed copy of an abstract of laws and regulations, and the certificate of admission of undergraduate F. H. Viaux signed by President Thomas Hill on July 17, 1866, and a Certificate of Matriculation signed by President Hill on January 28, 1867.

The Turkish Empire in Europe, Asia, and Africa: dividid into all its governments, together with the other territories that are tributary to it, as also the dominions of ye Emperor of Marocco [sic] according to the newest and most exact observations

by H. Moll.

The Putin doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. OSW Commentary No. 131, 28.03.2014

The statements made in recent weeks by Russian officials, and especially President Vladimir Putin, in connection with Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine, may suggest that the emergence of a certain doctrine of Russian foreign and security policy is at hand, especially in relation to the post-Soviet area. Most of the arguments at the core of this doctrine are not new, but recently they have been formulated more openly and in more radical terms. Those arguments concern the role of Russia as the defender of Russian-speaking communities abroad and the guarantor of their rights, as well as specifically understood good neighbourly relations (meaning in fact limited sovereignty) as a precondition that must be met in order for Moscow to recognise the independence and territorial integrity of post-Soviet states. However, the new doctrine also includes arguments which have not been raised before, or have hitherto only been formulated on rare occasions, and which may indicate the future evolution of Russia’s policy. Specifically, this refers to Russia’s use of extralegal categories, such as national interest, truth and justice, to justify its policy, and its recognition of military force as a legitimate instrument to defend its compatriots abroad. This doctrine is effectively an outline of the conceptual foundation for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. It offers a justification for the efforts to restore the unity of the ‘Russian nation’ (or more broadly, the Russian-speaking community), within a bloc pursuing close integration (the Eurasian Economic Union), or even within a single state encompassing at least parts of that area. As such, it poses a challenge for the West, which Moscow sees as the main opponent of Russia’s plans to build a new order in Europe (Eurasia) that would undermine the post-Cold War order.

How far do the borders of the west extend? Russian/Polish strategic conflicts in the period 1990-2010. OSW Report, 2010-03-18

From a historical perspective, the last two decades can almost be regarded as a 'golden age' of Polish-Russian relations. This is the first time in several centuries that a sovereign Poland and Russia have been able to develop mutual relations without resorting to force; moreover, they have established a bilateral legal basis and put into practice its provisions on "the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the nations' right to self-determination. This does not change the fact that since 1990 the atmosphere between the two countries has much more often been chilly and tense. Contrary to the widely-held belief, Polish-Russian conflicts do not stem from genetic Russophobia on the part of Poland, or irrational prejudice on the part of Russia. Their substance is real and concerns strategic issues. At the deepest level, though, this is a dispute about how far the borders of the Western world extend, and about the Russian Federation's sphere of influence. However, it is not a clash between two states; moreover, Poland is certainly not the most important actor in this regard, although due to the historical context and its geographic location, it is one of the countries that lies closest to the 'line of contact', and is therefore particularly entangled in the disagreement.

Russia in Serbia – soft power and hard interests. OSW COMMENTARY No. 150, 2014-10-29

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Serbia on 16 October has demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to secure its interests in the Balkans and use Belgrade in its confrontation with the West. It seems, however, that Russia does not have much to offer to Serbia’s authorities, which are reluctant to make more concessions towards Russia. However, Moscow has already gained a strong position in Serbia, which is due to the country’s dependence on Russian natural resources and, in particular, strong support for Russian policy on the part of Serbian elites and society. The traditional pro-Russian attitudes have been strengthened as a result of a series of Russia-inspired, wide-ranging soft power initiatives which have proved so successful that a large part of society has begun to believe that Russia’s interests are consistent with Serbia’s. Russia’s increasingly active policy towards Serbia and the Serbian minorities in the neighbouring countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo – has been part of a larger plan aimed at hampering the integration of the Balkan states with the Euro-Atlantic structures and maintaining an area of instability and frozen conflicts in the EU’s near neighbourhood. Russia’s policy is also becoming increasingly effective due to the EU states’ diminishing support for Balkan countries’ European integration.

Russian gas industry - current condition and prospects; New regional 'in-security' system in Central Asia; Caspian oil and gas: the facts at the end of the year 2000. OSW Study 1/2001

Russian gas industry: The current condition of the gas industry is one of the most crucial factors influencing the Russian state·s functioning, internal situation and international position. Not only is gas the principal energy resource in Russia, it also subsidises other sectors of the economy. Status of the main European gas exporter strengthens also Russia's importance in the international arena. New regional in-security: Ten years have passed since the Central Asian states declared their independence, but their relationship with Russia still remains close, and the latter treats them as its exclusive zone of influence. A crucial reason for keeping Central Asia within the orbit of Moscow·s influence is the fact that Russia exercises control over the most important transport routes out of the region of raw materials for the power industry, on which the economic development of Asia depends on. But this is the only manifestation of Central Asia·s economic dependence on Russia. Moscow lacks solid economic instruments (i.e. investment input or power industry dependence) to shape the situation in the region. Caspian oil and gas: Caspian stocks of energy resources are not, and most probably will not be, of any great significance on the world scale. Nevertheless it is the Caspian region which will have the opportunity to become an oil exporter which will reduce the dependence of the European countries on Arabian oil, and which will guarantee Russia the quantities of gas which are indispensable both for meeting its internal demands and for maintaining its current level of export. For Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the confirmation of the existence of successive oil strata is not only an opportunity to increase income, but also an additional bargaining chip in the game for the future of the whole region. The stake in this game is the opportunity to limit the economic, and by extension the political influences of Russia in the region.

An inexhaustible source of income? The significance of Belarusian refineries and the outlook for the future. OSW Commentary No. 81, 2012-06-20

Belarus generated a surplus at US$1.9 billion in foreign trade in goods and services in the first four months of 2012 as compared to a deficit of US$2.8 billion for the same timeframe a year earlier. Minsk owes this, its highest positive trade balance since 1991, mainly to a significant increase in exports of petroleum products manufactured by the refineries in Navapolatsk and Mazyr. This is a consequence of the favourable contract for supplies of Russian oil until 2015 which Belarus signed in December last year. This contract has resulted in a de facto resumption of Russia subsidising Belarus. The favourable conditions of Russian oil supplies will allow the Belarusian refineries to remain the driving force of the country’s economy, and the Belarusian government will not allow them to be privatised, which Russia has been seeking for years. The two refineries initiated an ambitious modernisation programme, which is aimed at increasing their output and improving the quality of their production. Owing to this, their share in the market of petroleum products in the region, including on the Polish market, may grow within the next few years.