The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.

The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments. CEPS Policy Brief No. 328, March 2015

The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to default. Applying a large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure towards breaking the bank-government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss-given government default. But what would be the impact of the application of the large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This CEPS Policy Brief presents the results of a simulation exercise performed for 109 systemic banks in the eurozone, showing that their eurozone government debt portfolios would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion, if a 50% of own-funds cap would be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset purchase programme further creates momentum to start gradually implementing the restriction.

EU citizenship, Citizenship and identity beyond national borders. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 10, October 2013

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of European Union citizenship. All citizens of the 28 EU member states are also EU citizens through the very fact that their countries are members of the EU. Acquired EU citizenship gives them the right to free movement, settlement and employment across the EU, the right to vote in European elections, and also on paper the right to consular protection from other EU states' embassies when abroad. The concept of citizenship in Europe – and indeed anywhere in the world – has been evolving over the years, and continues to evolve. Against this time scale, the concept of modern citizenship as attached to the nation-state would seem ephemeral. The idea of EU citizenship therefore does not need to be regarded as a revolutionary phenomenon that is bound to mitigate against the natural inclination of European citizens towards national identities, especially in times of economic and financial crises. In fact, the idea of EU citizenship has even been criticised by some scholars as being of little substantive value in addition to whatever rights and freedoms European citizens already have. Nonetheless the ‘constitutional moment’ that the Maastricht Treaty achieved for the idea of EU citizenship has served more than just symbolic value – the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, for instance. The idea of EU citizenship also put pressure on the Union and its leaders to address the perceived democratic deficit that the EU is often accused of. In attempts to cement the political rights of EU citizens, the citizens’ initiative was included in Lisbon Treaty allowing citizens to directly lobby the European Commission for new policy initiatives or changes.

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

Western Strategic Poverty: The Ukrainian Crisis and the New World Order. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 Special Issue, March 2014

From Introduction. The Ukrainian crisis, which deepened in February with the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, has exposed a serious poverty of strategy and leadership from Europe and the US. Such a lack of strategic vision in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, considered by Nicholas Burns among others, as one of the greatest crises in Europe since 1991, diverges between the European Union and the US. It is undeniable that the western leadership is unable to get its act together. In the US, the perpetual fratricide between the republicans and democrats over anything is affecting the development and implementation of sound foreign policies, while in the EU, there is no clear European leadership emerging, neither from the 28 Member States nor the High Representative and Presidents of the Council and Commission. The EU is once again facing its perpetual policy of risk aversion. On the one hand, the US remains conflicted in identifying its identity in this post-liberal world order, while the EU difficulty faces the inevitable limitation of its soft power. With a West in crisis, no decent strategy and/or policy to unravel, or at least contain, the Ukrainian crisis can emerge in this axiomatic moment with the making of the new world order.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Banks and the political economy of the sovereign debt crisis in Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #18, 2013-2014

This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort to euroarea financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did not. It undertakes a structured comparison, dissecting the sovereign debt crisis into a banking crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It argues that the distinctive features of bank business models and of national banking systems in Italy and Spain have considerable analytical leverage in explaining the different scenarios of the crises in each country. This ‘bank-based’ analysis contributes to the flourishing literature that examines changes in banking with a view to account for the differentiated impact of the global banking crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis in the euroarea later.

Financial regulatory transparency: new data and implications for EU policy. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/20, December 2015

International financial institutions have promoted financial regulatory transparency, or the publication by supervisors of financial industry data. Financial regulatory transparency enhances market stability and increases democratic legitimacy. • We introduce a new index of financial regulatory data transparency: the FRT Index. It measures how countries report to international financial institutions basic macroprudential data about their financial systems.The Index covers 68 high-income and emerging-market economies over 22 years (1990-2011). • We find a number of striking trends over this period. European Union members are generally more opaque than other high-income countries.This finding is especially relevant given efforts to create an EU capital markets union. • Globally, financial regulatory data transparency has increased. However, there is considerable variation. Some countries have become significantlymore transparent, while others have become much more opaque. Reporting tends to decline during financial crises. • We propose that the EU institutions take on a greater role in coordinating and possibly enforcing reporting of bank and non-bank institution data. Similar to the United States, a reporting requirement should be part of any EU general deposit insurance scheme.

Migration and Asylum Data for Policy-making in the European Union – The problem with numbers. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 89/March 2016

Among many other problems, the migration, humanitarian and policy crises in the European Union in 2015 and early 2016 have highlighted a pressing need for reliable, timely and comparable statistical data on migration, asylum and arrivals at national borders. In this fast-moving policy field, data production and the timeliness of dissemination have seen some improvements but the sources of data remain largely unchanged at national level. In this paper the author examines the reasons for some of the problems with the data for policy and for public discussion, and makes a set of recommendations that call for a complete and updated inventory of data sources and for an evaluation of the quality of data used for policy-making.

Growth and Euro Area Stability: The Double Dividend of a Deepened European Single Market for Services. Bertelsmann Stiftung Background Note 26 June 2015

The European Commission’s recent single market initiatives have a second important benefit beyond growth that is often overlooked: Deepening the Single Market for goods and services can also reduce imbalances in the euro area and limit its vulnerability to crises. A further integration of the Single Market thus provides a double dividend of growth and stability. This is the main issue addressed in this background note.

Macedonia: a superficial democracy in the shadow of crises. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 206/31.03.2016

Until 2008, Macedonia was leading the process of EU and NATO integration, and (after Croatia) was the fastest-reforming Western Balkan country. However, since Macedonia’s negotiations on joining the EU and NATO were blocked, in connection with its dispute with Greece, the Macedonian government has moved away from a policy of reform towards reinforcing its autocratic system and consolidating society behind nationalist slogans. Also the EU, which had hitherto been the driving force behind the changes, has due to its internal crises been paying little attention to violations of democratic standards in the Republic of Macedonia, tensions in relations between the Slavic Macedonians and the Albanian minority (which make up over 25% of the population), and the country’s permanent political domestic crises.

The role of mechanistic target of rapamycin (mTOR) pathway and synaptic protein GABAA-R in cortical GABAergic cell connectivity

Quelque 30 % de la population neuronale du cortex mammalien est composée d’une population très hétérogène d’interneurones GABAergiques. Ces interneurones diffèrent quant à leur morphologie, leur expression génique, leurs propriétés électrophysiologiques et leurs cibles subcellulaires, formant une riche diversité. Après leur naissance dans les éminences ganglioniques, ces cellules migrent vers les différentes couches corticales. Les interneurones GABAergiques corticaux exprimant la parvalbumin (PV), lesquels constituent le sous-type majeur des interneurones GABAergiques, ciblent spécifiquement le soma et les dendrites proximales des neurones principaux et des neurones PV+. Ces interneurones sont nommés cellules à panier (Basket Cells –BCs) en raison de la complexité morphologique de leur axone. La maturation de la connectivité distincte des BCs PV+, caractérisée par une augmentation de la complexité de l’axone et de la densité synaptique, se déroule graduellement chez la souris juvénile. Des travaux précédents ont commencé à élucider les mécanismes contrôlant ce processus de maturation, identifiant des facteurs génétiques, l’activité neuronale ainsi que l’expérience sensorielle. Cette augmentation marquante de la complexité axonale et de la synaptogénèse durant cette phase de maturation suggère la nécessité d’une synthèse de protéines élevée. La voie de signalisation de la cible mécanistique de la rapamycine (Mechanistic Target Of Rapamycin -mTOR) a été impliquée dans le contrôle de plusieurs aspects neurodéveloppementaux en régulant la synthèse de protéines. Des mutations des régulateurs Tsc1 et Tsc2 du complexe mTOR1 causent la sclérose tubéreuse (TSC) chez l’humain. La majorité des patients TSC développent des problèmes neurologiques incluant des crises épileptiques, des retards mentaux et l’autisme. D’études récentes ont investigué le rôle de la dérégulation de la voie de signalisation de mTOR dans les neurones corticaux excitateurs. Toutefois, son rôle dans le développement des interneurones GABAergiques corticaux et la contribution spécifique de ces interneurones GABAergiques altérés dans les manifestations de la maladie demeurent largement inconnus. Ici, nous avons investigué si et comment l’ablation du gène Tsc1 perturbe le développement de la connectivité GABAergique, autant in vitro que in vivo. Pour investiguer le rôle de l’activation de mTORC1 dans le développement d’une BC unique, nous avons délété le gène Tsc1 en transfectant CRE-GFP dirigé par un promoteur spécifique aux BCs dans des cultures organotypiques provenant de souris Tsc1lox. Le knockdown in vitro de Tsc1 a causé une augmentation précoce de la densité des boutons et des embranchements terminaux formés par les BCs mutantes, augmentation renversée par le traitement à la rapamycine. Ces données suggèrent que l’hyperactivation de la voie de signalisation de mTOR affecte le rythme de la maturation des synapses des BCs. Pour investiguer le rôle de mTORC1 dans les interneurones GABAergiques in vivo, nous avons croisé les souris Tsc1lox avec les souris Nkx2.1-Cre et PV-Cre. À P18, les souris Tg(Nkx2.1-Cre);Tsc1flox/flox ont montré une hyperactivation de mTORC1 et une hypertrophie somatique des BCs de même qu’une augmentation de l’expression de PV dans la région périsomatique des neurones pyramidaux. Au contraire, à P45 nous avons découvert une réduction de la densité des punctas périsomatiques PV-gephyrin (un marqueur post-synaptique GABAergique). L’étude de la morphologie des BCs en cultures organotypiques provenant du knock-out conditionnel Nkx2.1-Cre a confirmé l’augmentation initiale du rythme de maturation, lequel s’effondre ensuite aux étapes développementales tardives. De plus, les souris Tg(Nkx2.1Cre);Tsc1flox/flox montrent des déficits dans la mémoire de travail et le comportement social et ce d’une façon dose-dépendante. En somme, ces résultats suggèrent que l’activation contrôlée de mTOR régule le déroulement de la maturation et la maintenance des synapses des BCs. Des dysfonctions de la neurotransmission GABAergique ont été impliquées dans des maladies telles que l’épilepsie et chez certains patients, elles sont associées avec des mutations du récepteur GABAA. De quelle façon ces mutations affectent le processus de maturation des BCs demeuret toutefois inconnu. Pour adresser cette question, nous avons utilisé la stratégie Cre-lox pour déléter le gène GABRA1, codant pour la sous-unité alpha-1 du récepteur GABAA dans une unique BC en culture organotypique. La perte de GABRA1 réduit l’étendue du champ d’innervation des BCs, suggérant que des variations dans les entrées inhibitrices en raison de l’absence de la sous-unité GABAAR α1 peuvent affecter le développement des BCs. La surexpression des sous-unités GABAAR α1 contenant des mutations identifiées chez des patients épileptiques ont montré des effets similaires en termes d’étendue du champ d’innervation des BCs. Pour approfondir, nous avons investigué les effets de ces mutations identifiées chez l’humain dans le développement des épines des neurones pyramidaux, lesquelles sont l’endroit privilégié pour la formation des synapses excitatrices. Somme toute, ces données montrent pour la première fois que différentes mutations de GABRA1 associées à des syndromes épileptiques peuvent affecter les épines dendritiques et la formation des boutons GABAergiques d’une façon mutation-spécifique.

Cs-137 and Co-60 isotopes and sedimentation rates in Late Holcene sediments from the Northwestern Black Sea

Results of measurements of Cs-137 and Co-60 concentrations in bottom sediments of the Northwestern Black Sea indicate inhomogenity of their distribution both over the studied area and along sediment cores. Intermittency of sediment layers with different concentration of radionuclides in the cores reflects active horizontal movements and redistribution of sediments on the shelf and continental slope. As a result sediment layers dated by the Chernobyl mark as seven years old were found in the 5-7 cm depth layer. Maximum Cs-137 concentration in the surface sedimentary layer on the shelf was 42 mBq/g. Maximum Co-60 concentration of 1320 mBq/g was measured due to a hot particle. No correlation was found between Cs-137 and the Co-60 contents.

Les crises de l'industrie horlogère dans le canton de Neuchatel ...

Thèse--Univ. de Neuchâtel.

An overall assessment of TARP and financial stability : hearing before the Congressional Oversight Panel, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session, March 4, 2011.

Shipping list no.: 2011-0270-P.