907 resultados para Incentive salience
Resumo:
This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.
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This paper presents a pilot project to reinforce participatory practices in standardization. The INTERNORM project is funded by the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. It aims to create an interactive knowledge center based on the sharing of academic skills and the experiences accumulated by the civil society, especially consumer associations, environmental associations and trade unions to strengthen the participatory process of standardization. The first objective of the project is action-oriented: INTERNORM provides a common knowledge pool supporting the participation of civil society actors to international standard-setting activities by bringing them together with academic experts in working groups and by providing logistic and financial support to their participation to meetings of national and international technical committees. The second objective of the project is analytical: the standardization action initiated through INTERNORM provides a research field for a better understanding of the participatory dynamics underpinning international standardization. The paper presents three incentives that explain civil society (non-)involvement in standardization that try to overcome conventional resource-based hypotheses: an operational incentive, related to the use of standards in the selective goods provided by associations to their membership; a thematic incentive, provided by the setting of priorities by strategic committees created in some standardization organization; a rhetorical incentive, related to the discursive resource that civil society concerns offers to the different stakeholders.
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We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contractingproblems involving incentive constraints. Under these constraints,the corresponding maximization (sup) problems fails to have arecursive solution. Our approach consists of studying the Lagrangian.We show that, under standard assumptions, the solution to theLagrangian is characterized by a recursive saddle point (infsup)functional equation, analogous to Bellman's equation. Our approachapplies to a large class of contractual problems. As examples, westudy the optimal policy in a model with intertemporal participationconstraints (which arise in models of default) and intertemporalcompetitive constraints (which arise in Ramsey equilibria).
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We study how barriers to business start-up affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. As a result, countries with large barriers experience lower income and growth. Our results are consistent with cross-country evidence showing that the cost of business start-up is negatively correlated with the level and growth of income.
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We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.
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This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.
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Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academicinformation is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned aboutthe possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicingbundling. In this paper, we analyze the private and social incentives forthe publishers to use bundling in the context of STM electronic journalmarket. In the short run in which the number of journals is exogenouslygiven, we find a strong conflict between the two incentives: each publisherfinds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit butreduces social welfare. However, in the long run we find that publishersmight have higher incentives to introduce new journals under bundlingthan without bundling and, in this case, bundling can reduce the industryprofit while increasing social welfare. Finally, we examine publishers incentive to provide links to the websites of the rival publishers underbundling and show that even asymmetric publishers have incentive tointerconnect.
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This paper analyzes the formation of Research Corporations as an alternative governance structure for performing R&D compared to pursuing in-house R&D projects. Research Corporations are privatefor-profit research centers that bring together several firms with similar research goals. In a Research Corporation formal authority over the choice of projects is jointly exercised by the top management of the member firms. A private for-profit organization cannot commit not to interfere with the project choice of the researchers. However, increasing the number of member firms of the Research Corporation reduces the incentive of member firms to meddle with the research projects of researchers because exercising formal authority over the choice of research projects is a public good. The Research Corporation thus offers researchers greater autonomy than a single firm pursuing an identical research program in its in-house R&D department. This attracts higher ability researchers to the Research Corporation compared to the internal R&D department. The paper uses the theoretical model to analyze the organization of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). The facts of this case confirm the existence of a tension between control over the choice of research projects and the ability of researchers that the organization is able to attract or hold onto.
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The emphasis on integrated care implies new incentives that promote coordinationbetween levels of care. Considering a population as a whole, the resource allocation systemhas to adapt to this environment. This research is aimed to design a model that allows formorbidity related prospective and concurrent capitation payment. The model can be applied inpublicly funded health systems and managed competition settings.Methods: We analyze the application of hybrid risk adjustment versus either prospective orconcurrent risk adjustment formulae in the context of funding total health expenditures for thepopulation of an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia during years 2004 and2005.Results: The hybrid model reimburses integrated care organizations avoiding excessive risktransfer and maximizing incentives for efficiency in the provision. At the same time, it eliminatesincentives for risk selection for a specific set of high risk individuals through the use ofconcurrent reimbursement in order to assure a proper classification of patients.Conclusion: Prospective Risk Adjustment is used to transfer the financial risk to the healthprovider and therefore provide incentives for efficiency. Within the context of a National HealthSystem, such transfer of financial risk is illusory, and the government has to cover the deficits.Hybrid risk adjustment is useful to provide the right combination of incentive for efficiency andappropriate level of risk transfer for integrated care organizations.
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The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.
Resumo:
O objectivo do estudo foi o de verificar o efeito do sorriso na percepção psicológica da pessoa em jovens, adultos, idosos e jovens negros. Pretendia-se verificar se o sorriso contribui para os traços diferenciais entre os grupos humanos em estudo e se o mesmo era descritor de género. O estudo envolveu um delineamento transversal analítico ou estudo não-experimental, também classificado por estudo pós-facto, estudo de observação passiva ou estudo correlacional e de observação, de comparação entre grupos, mediante o juízo ou julgamento psicológico da face neutra e do tipo de sorriso contrastados, de matriz factorial 4 x 2 x 2 (face neutra, sorriso fechado, sorriso superior, sorriso largo; género dos estímulos; género dos respondentes) e a sua finalidade foi descrever a percepção psicológica do sorriso em função das variáveis género do estímulo, género do respondente e grupo étnico, na Escala de Percepção do Sorriso (EPS), em formato diferenciador semântico, com 19 itens bipolares opostos, tendo a avaliação sido feita numa escala ordinal de 1 a 7 pontos, nas dimensões Avaliação (12 itens) e Movimento Expressivo (7 itens) resultante dos estudos preliminares sobre a atractividade facial (estudo preliminar 1) e a escolha de dípolos de adjectivos preditores para percepção psicológica da face neutra (estudo preliminar 2). Nos estudos principais 1, 2 e 3 foram utilizados 24 estímulos fotográficos apresentando o tipo de sorriso (fechado, superior e largo) e a face neutra (12 do estímulo mulher e 12 do estímulo homem) referentes aos três grupos etários (18-25 anos, 40-50 anos e 60-70 anos) e a Escala de Percepção do Sorriso (EPS) foi aplicada a uma amostra não probabilística ou intencional do tipo homogénea de 480 participantes portugueses de ambos os géneros (240 mulheres e 240 homens) distribuídos por grupos etários de jovens (80 mulheres e 80 homens, média: 22.2 anos), adultos (80 mulheres e 80 homens, média: 43.1 anos) e idosos (80 mulheres e 80 homens, média: 65.0 anos) No estudo principal 4, foram utilizados 8 estímulos fotográficos apresentando o tipo de sorriso (fechado, superior e largo) e a face neutra (4 do estímulo mulher e 4 do estímulo homem) de universitários de Cabo Verde, a estudar em Portugal, e a Escala de Percepção do Sorriso (EPS) foi aplicada a uma amostra não probabilística ou intencional do tipo homogénea de 160 participantes de ambos os géneros (80 mulheres e 80 homens) e estudantes universitários portugueses (média: 21.8 anos). Os resultados revelam e confirmam o efeito do sorriso na percepção psicológica da pessoa, à semelhança de outros estudos, isto é, sorrir torna a percepção psicológica mais positiva ou negativa e verifica-se que tal sucede em função do género do estímulo e do género do respondente. As diferenças significativas na percepção da face neutra e tipo de sorriso contrastados são justificadas pela pertença de género de quem os percepciona e pela pertença do género de quem é percepcionado. Tal apenas não sucede no factor Avaliação do grupo dos adultos. Os resultados obtidos indicam que, quer no factor Avaliação quer no factor Movimento Expressivo, os tipos de sorriso largo e superior são os que registam médias ponderadas mais elevadas. Pelo contrário, a face neutra e o sorriso fechado registam valores menos elevados na percepção. A análise da percepção da pessoa em função da face neutra e tipo de sorriso contrastados revelou uma correspondência entre a expressão facial, o género do estímulo e o género do respondente. No factor Avaliação, a mulher é percepcionada mais positivamente que o homem, verificando-se o inverso no factor Movimento Expressivo no grupo dos adultos e dos idosos. Verificou-se efeito do sorriso na percepção psicológica dos estímulos de cor negra. No grupo dos jovens que percepcionaram estímulos de cor negra, o homem é considerado mais positivo que a mulher em ambos os factores. O efeito significativo do género revela que a sua percepção é condicionada pelo seu próprio género. Os resultados apontam ainda para a configuração pronunciada de uma hierarquização ascendente da face neutra e tipo de sorriso contrastados em dois conjuntos bem delimitados e distinguindo diferentes formas topográficas de sorrir: a face neutra e o sorriso fechado e o sorriso superior e o sorriso largo.
Resumo:
O objectivo do estudo foi o de verificar o efeito do sorriso na percepção psicológica da pessoa em jovens, adultos, idosos e jovens negros. Pretendia-se verificar se o sorriso contribui para os traços diferenciais entre os grupos humanos em estudo e se o mesmo era descritor de género. O estudo envolveu um delineamento transversal analítico ou estudo não-experimental, também classificado por estudo pós-facto, estudo de observação passiva ou estudo correlacional e de observação, de comparação entre grupos, mediante o juízo ou julgamento psicológico da face neutra e do tipo de sorriso contrastados, de matriz factorial 4 x 2 x 2 (face neutra, sorriso fechado, sorriso superior, sorriso largo; género dos estímulos; género dos respondentes) e a sua finalidade foi descrever a percepção psicológica do sorriso em função das variáveis género do estímulo, género do respondente e grupo étnico, na Escala de Percepção do Sorriso (EPS), em formato diferenciador semântico, com 19 itens bipolares opostos, tendo a avaliação sido feita numa escala ordinal de 1 a 7 pontos, nas dimensões Avaliação (12 itens) e Movimento Expressivo (7 itens) resultante dos estudos preliminares sobre a atractividade facial (estudo preliminar 1) e a escolha de dípolos de adjectivos preditores para percepção psicológica da face neutra (estudo preliminar 2). Nos estudos principais 1, 2 e 3 foram utilizados 24 estímulos fotográficos apresentando o tipo de sorriso (fechado, superior e largo) e a face neutra (12 do estímulo mulher e 12 do estímulo homem) referentes aos três grupos etários (18-25 anos, 40-50 anos e 60-70 anos) e a Escala de Percepção do Sorriso (EPS) foi aplicada a uma amostra não probabilística ou intencional do tipo homogénea de 480 participantes portugueses de ambos os géneros (240 mulheres e 240 homens) distribuídos por grupos etários de jovens (80 mulheres e 80 homens, média: 22.2 anos), adultos (80 mulheres e 80 homens, média: 43.1 anos) e idosos (80 mulheres e 80 homens, média: 65.0 anos) No estudo principal 4, foram utilizados 8 estímulos fotográficos apresentando o tipo de sorriso (fechado, superior e largo) e a face neutra (4 do estímulo mulher e 4 do estímulo homem) de universitários de Cabo Verde, a estudar em Portugal, e a Escala de Percepção do Sorriso (EPS) foi aplicada a uma amostra não probabilística ou intencional do tipo homogénea de 160 participantes de ambos os géneros (80 mulheres e 80 homens) e estudantes universitários portugueses (média: 21.8 anos). Os resultados revelam e confirmam o efeito do sorriso na percepção psicológica da pessoa, à semelhança de outros estudos, isto é, sorrir torna a percepção psicológica mais positiva ou negativa e verifica-se que tal sucede em função do género do estímulo e do género do respondente. As diferenças significativas na percepção da face neutra e tipo de sorriso contrastados são justificadas pela pertença de género de quem os percepciona e pela pertença do género de quem é percepcionado. Tal apenas não sucede no factor Avaliação do grupo dos adultos. Os resultados obtidos indicam que, quer no factor Avaliação quer no factor Movimento Expressivo, os tipos de sorriso largo e superior são os que registam médias ponderadas mais elevadas. Pelo contrário, a face neutra e o sorriso fechado registam valores menos elevados na percepção. A análise da percepção da pessoa em função da face neutra e tipo de sorriso contrastados revelou uma correspondência entre a expressão facial, o género do estímulo e o género do respondente. No factor Avaliação, a mulher é percepcionada mais positivamente que o homem, verificando-se o inverso no factor Movimento Expressivo no grupo dos adultos e dos idosos. Verificou-se efeito do sorriso na percepção psicológica dos estímulos de cor negra. No grupo dos jovens que percepcionaram estímulos de cor negra, o homem é considerado mais positivo que a mulher em ambos os factores. O efeito significativo do género revela que a sua percepção é condicionada pelo seu próprio género. Os resultados apontam ainda para a configuração pronunciada de uma hierarquização ascendente da face neutra e tipo de sorriso contrastados em dois conjuntos bem delimitados e distinguindo diferentes formas topográficas de sorrir: a face neutra e o sorriso fechado e o sorriso superior e o sorriso largo.
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In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).
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This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.
Resumo:
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.