Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2004

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2005

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2006

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2007

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2008

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2009

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2010

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2011

Agency Performance Report

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Report, FY2012

Agency Performance Report

Water planning law and government.

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done. The question then becomes who has the legal authority or responsibility to do what? Are new laws and programs needed or can existing ones be used to implement the recommendations? ... This document is divided into four main parts. The first, “Carrots and Sticks” looks at two basic approaches — regulatory and non-regulatory — that can be, and are, used to carry out water policy. Both have advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered. The second, “The powers of federal, state and local governments…,” looks at the constitutional powers the federal government and state and local governments have to carry out water policy. An initial look at the U. S. Constitution might suggest the federal government’s regulatory authority over water is limited but, in fact, its powers are very substantial. States have considerable authority to do a number of things but have to be mindful of any federal efforts that might conflict with those state efforts. And local governments can only do those things the state constitution or state legislature says they can do and must conform to any requirements or limitations on those powers that are contained in the enabling acts. Parts three and four examine in more detail the main programs and agencies at the federal level as well as Iowa’s state and local levels and the roles they play in national and state water policy.

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Plan, FY 2014

The Agency Performance Report for the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy is published in accordance with the Accountable Government Act. The information provided illustrates accountability to stakeholders and citizens. The report is indicative of the agency’s progress in achieving goals consistent with the enterprise strategic plan, the agency strategic plan and agency performance plan.

Review of Automated Vehicle Technology: Policy and Implementation Implications; Version 1.0; RB28-015, 2016

This report provides recommendations for the state of Iowa over the next five years in regards to automated vehicle policy development. These administrative, planning, legal, and community strategy recommendations for government agencies include: • Encouraging automation by preparing government agencies, infrastructure, leveraging procurement, and advocating for safety mandates • Adjusting long range planning processes by identifying and incorporating a wide range of new automation scenarios • Beginning to analyze and, as necessary, clarify existing law as it apples to automated driving • Auditing existing law • Enforcing existing laws • Ensuring vehicle owners and operators bear the true cost of driving • Embracing flexibility by giving agencies the statutory authority to achieve regulatory goals through different means, allowing them to make small-scale exemptions to statutory regimes and clarifying their enforcement discretion • Thinking locally and preparing publicly • Sharing the steps being taken to promote (as well as to anticipate and regulate) automated driving • Instituting public education about automated vehicle technologies.

Argemone mexicana decoction versus artesunate-amodiaquine for the management of malaria in Mali: policy and public-health implications.

A classic way of delaying drug resistance is to use an alternative when possible. We tested the malaria treatment Argemone mexicana decoction (AM), a validated self-prepared traditional medicine made with one widely available plant and safe across wide dose variations. In an attempt to reflect the real situation in the home-based management of malaria in a remote Malian village, 301 patients with presumed uncomplicated malaria (median age 5 years) were randomly assigned to receive AM or artesunate-amodiaquine [artemisinin combination therapy (ACT)] as first-line treatment. Both treatments were well tolerated. Over 28 days, second-line treatment was not required for 89% (95% CI 84.1-93.2) of patients on AM, versus 95% (95% CI 88.8-98.3) on ACT. Deterioration to severe malaria was 1.9% in both groups in children aged </=5 years (there were no cases in patients aged >5 years) and 0% had coma/convulsions. AM, now government-approved in Mali, could be tested as a first-line complement to standard modern drugs in high-transmission areas, in order to reduce the drug pressure for development of resistance to ACT, in the management of malaria. In view of the low rate of severe malaria and good tolerability, AM may also constitute a first-aid treatment when access to other antimalarials is delayed.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.