Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.

A game theoretical approach to the algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy

La hiérarchie de Wagner constitue à ce jour la plus fine classification des langages ω-réguliers. Par ailleurs, l'approche algébrique de la théorie de langages formels montre que ces ensembles ω-réguliers correspondent précisément aux langages reconnaissables par des ω-semigroupes finis pointés. Ce travail s'inscrit dans ce contexte en fournissant une description complète de la contrepartie algébrique de la hiérarchie de Wagner, et ce par le biais de la théorie descriptive des jeux de Wadge. Plus précisément, nous montrons d'abord que le degré de Wagner d'un langage ω-régulier est effectivement un invariant syntaxique. Nous définissons ensuite une relation de réduction entre ω-semigroupes pointés par le biais d'un jeu infini de type Wadge. La collection de ces structures algébriques ordonnée par cette relation apparaît alors comme étant isomorphe à la hiérarchie de Wagner, soit un quasi bon ordre décidable de largeur 2 et de hauteur ω. Nous exposons par la suite une procédure de décidabilité de cette hiérarchie algébrique : on décrit une représentation graphique des ω-semigroupes finis pointés, puis un algorithme sur ces structures graphiques qui calcule le degré de Wagner de n'importe quel élément. Ainsi le degré de Wagner de tout langage ω-régulier peut être calculé de manière effective directement sur son image syntaxique. Nous montrons ensuite comment construire directement et inductivement une structure de n''importe quel degré. Nous terminons par une description détaillée des invariants algébriques qui caractérisent tous les degrés de cette hiérarchie. Abstract The Wagner hierarchy is known so far to be the most refined topological classification of ω-rational languages. Also, the algebraic study of formal languages shows that these ω-rational sets correspond precisely to the languages recognizable by finite pointed ω-semigroups. Within this framework, we provide a construction of the algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy. We adopt a hierarchical game approach, by translating the Wadge theory from the ω-rational language to the ω-semigroup context. More precisely, we first show that the Wagner degree is indeed a syntactic invariant. We then define a reduction relation on finite pointed ω-semigroups by means of a Wadge-like infinite two-player game. The collection of these algebraic structures ordered by this reduction is then proven to be isomorphic to the Wagner hierarchy, namely a well-founded and decidable partial ordering of width 2 and height $\omega^\omega$. We also describe a decidability procedure of this hierarchy: we introduce a graph representation of finite pointed ω-semigroups allowing to compute their precise Wagner degrees. The Wagner degree of every ω-rational language can therefore be computed directly on its syntactic image. We then show how to build a finite pointed ω-semigroup of any given Wagner degree. We finally describe the algebraic invariants characterizing every Wagner degree of this hierarchy.

Understanding Online Game Players' Post-adoption Behavior: an Investigation of Social Network Games in China

Retaining players and re-attracting switching players has long been a central topic for SNG providers with regard to the post-adoption stage of playing an online game. However, there has not been much research which has explored players’ post-adoption behavior by incorporating the continuance intention and the switching intention. In addition, traditional IS continuance theories were mainly developed to investigate users’ continued use of utilitarian IS, and thus they may fall short when trying to explain the continued use of hedonic IS. Furthermore, compared to the richer literature on IS continuance, far too little attention has been paid to IS switching, leading to a dearth of knowledge on the subject, despite the increased incidence of the switching phenomenon in the IS field. By addressing the limitations of prior literature, this study seeks to examine the determinants of SNG players’ two different post-adoption behaviors, including the continuance intention and the switching intention. This study takes a positivist approach and uses survey research method to test five proposed research models based on Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 2; Use and Gratification Theory; Push-Pull-Mooring model; Cognitive Dissonance Theory; and a self-developed model respectively with empirical data collected from the SNG players of one of the biggest SNG providers in China. A total of 3919 valid responses and 541 valid responses were used to examine the continuance intention and the switching intention, respectively. SEM is utilized as the data analysis method. The proposed research models are supported by the empirical data. The continuance intention is determined by enjoyment, fantasy, escapism, social interaction, social presence, social influence, achievement and habit. The switching intention is determined by enjoyment, satisfaction, subjective norms, descriptive norms, alternative attractiveness, the need for variety, change experience, and adaptation cost. This study contributes to IS theories in three important ways. Firstly, it shows IS switching should be included in IS post-adoption research together with IS continuance. Secondly, a modern IS is usually multi-functional and SNG players have multiple reasons for using a SNG, thus a player’s beliefs about the hedonic, social and utilitarian perceptions of their continued use of the SNG exert significant effects on the continuance intention. Thirdly, the determinants of the switch ing intention mainly exert push, pull, and mooring effects. Players’ beliefs about their current SNG and the available alternatives, as well as their individual characteristics are all significant determinants of the switching intention. SNG players combine these effects in order to formulate the switching intention. Finally, this study presents limitations and suggestions for future research.

Customer involvement in lean startup principles: case of game development studio

The objective of this thesis is to better understand customer’s role in lean startup methodology. The aim is to find out how customers are involved in lean startup methodology implantation and increase the likelihood of new venture survival. This study emphasizes the usage of customers in shaping of new product development processes within companies, through iteration and constant communication. This communication facilitates the development of features that are requested by the customers and enhances the prospects of the new venture. The empirical part of the study is a single qualitative case study that uses action research to implement the lean startup methodology into a pre-revenue venture and examines its customer involvement processes. The studied case company is Karaoke d.o.o., developing a game called kParty. The study used the theory discussed in the literature review: customer involvement (in the survey and interviews conducted for the lean startup methodology), lean principles (through the implementation of lean startup methodology) and lean startup methodology, which are the central building parts of this thesis as a whole. The thesis contributes to the understanding of customer involvement in lean startup methodology, while giving practical implications of customer orientation and product market fitting.

The role of business model in computer game development organizations

The computer game industry has grown steadily for years, and in revenues it can be compared to the music and film industries. The game industry has been moving to digital distribution. Computer gaming and the concept of business model are discussed among industrial practitioners and the scientific community. The significance of the business model concept has increased in the scientific literature recently, although there is still a lot of discussion going on on the concept. In the thesis, the role of the business model in the computer game industry is studied. Computer game developers, designers, project managers and organization leaders in 11 computer game companies were interviewed. The data was analyzed to identify the important elements of computer game business model, how the business model concept is perceived and how the growth of the organization affects the business model. It was identified that the importance of human capital is crucial to the business. As games are partly a product of creative thinking also innovation and the creative process are highly valued. The same applies to technical skills when performing various activities. Marketing and customer relationships are also considered as key elements in the computer game business model. Financing and partners are important especially for startups, when the organization is dependent on external funding and third party assets. The results of this study provide organizations with improved understanding on how the organization is built and what business model elements are weighted.

Children' s school study : an experimental theory of verbal information and social attitudes. 'Estudio de la escuela primaria: una teoría experimental de la información verbal y las actitudes sociales'.

Determinar los conceptos diferenciales alcanzados por los alumnos de segunda etapa de EGB con respecto a los alumnos de primera etapa en el area de ciencias sociales. Medir mediante una escala de Likertel cambio de actitudes producido como consecuencia de los aprendizajes en el area de humanidades.. La muestra aleatoria la componían 284 alumnos (145 chicos y 139 chicas) de 5õ y 8õ de EGB y 3õ de BUP, alumnos en centros de un centro urbano (Cáceres) y 3 núcleos rurales de la misma provincia.. La investigación se divide en dos bloques, el primero de ellos, de corte más teórico, estudia la cibernética y la teoría de la información como ciencias y su aplicación en el campo de la psicopedagogía. Se determinan también los esquemas generales para la construcción de escalas de medida de actitudes, y se trata de determinar experimentalmente la existencia de diferencias significativas en el caudal lingüístico entre alumnos procedentes de un medio rural y los procedentes de un medio urbano. El segundo bloque, de corte experimental, analiza el concepto de escala usado en ciencias sociales, y se trata de determinar las actitudes que representan un mayor grado de madurez en la dimensión socio-política. Para ello se aplica a los sujetos de la muestra la Social-responsability Scale.. Escala Likert. Quessing-game method (modificado). Social Responsability Scale de Berkowitz y Lutzeman.. Análisis de Varianza. Análisis de correlación. En terminos de transinsformación didáctica puede considerarse que durante la segunda etapa de EGB hay adquisición de conocimientos que suponen un substancial enriquecimiento del caudal lingüístico. El ambiente posibilita y condiciona el enriquecimiento o desarrollo de las facultades individuales. Pueden establecerse correlaciones parciales entre la adquisión de conceptos y la evolución de actitudes..

Psychophysiological responses to appraisal dimensions in a computer game

A computer game was used to study psychophysiological reactions to emotion-relevant events. Two dimensions proposed by Scherer (1984a, 1984b) in his appraisal theory, the intrinsic pleasantness and goal conduciveness of game events, were studied in a factorial design. The relative level at which a player performed at the moment of an event was also taken into account. A total of 33 participants played the game while cardiac activity, skin conductance, skin temperature, and muscle activity as well as emotion self-reports were assessed. The self-reports indicate that game events altered levels of pride, joy, anger, and surprise. Goal conduciveness had little effect on muscle activity but was associated with significant autonomic effects, including changes to interbeat interval, pulse transit time, skin conductance, and finger temperature. The manipulation of intrinsic pleasantness had little impact on physiological responses. The results show the utility of attempting to manipulate emotion-constituent appraisals and measure their peripheral physiological signatures.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.

A game theoretical approach to the evolution of structured communication codes

Structured meaning-signal mappings, i.e., mappings that preserve neighborhood relationships by associating similar signals with similar meanings, are advantageous in an environment where signals are corrupted by noise and sub-optimal meaning inferences are rewarded as well. The evolution of these mappings, however, cannot be explained within a traditional language evolutionary game scenario in which individuals meet randomly because the evolutionary dynamics is trapped in local maxima that do not reflect the structure of the meaning and signal spaces. Here we use a simple game theoretical model to show analytically that when individuals adopting the same communication code meet more frequently than individuals using different codes-a result of the spatial organization of the population-then advantageous linguistic innovations can spread and take over the population. In addition, we report results of simulations in which an individual can communicate only with its K nearest neighbors and show that the probability that the lineage of a mutant that uses a more efficient communication code becomes fixed decreases exponentially with increasing K. These findings support the mother tongue hypothesis that human language evolved as a communication system used among kin, especially between mothers and offspring.

A Theory of voter experimentation in repeated elections

Nesse artigo, eu desenvolvo e analiso um modelo de dois perí odos em que dois polí ticos competem pela preferência de um eleitor representativo, que sabe quão benevolente é um dos polí ticos mas é imperfeitamente informado sobre quão benevolente é o segundo polí tico. O polí tico conhecido é interpretado como um incumbente de longo prazo, ao passo que o polí tico desconhecido é interpretado como um desa fiante menos conhecido. É estabelecido que o mecanismo de provisão de incentivos inerente às elei cões - que surge através da possibilidade de não reeleger um incumbente - e considerações acerca de aquisi cão de informa cão por parte do eleitor se combinam de modo a determinar que em qualquer equilí brio desse jogo o eleitor escolhe o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial do modelo - uma a cão à qual me refi ro como experimenta cão -, fornecendo assim uma racionaliza cão para a não reelei cão de incumbentes longevos. Especifi camente, eu mostro que a decisão do eleitor quanto a quem eleger no per odo inicial se reduz à compara cão entre os benefí cios informacionais de escolher o polí tico desconhecido e as perdas econômicas de fazê-lo. Os primeiros, que capturam as considera cões relacionadas à aquisi cão de informa cão, são mostrados serem sempre positivos, ao passo que as últimas, que capturam o incentivo à boa performance, são sempre não-negativas, implicando que é sempre ótimo para o eleitor escolher o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial.

Time series analysis for minority game simulations of financial markets

The minority game (MG) model introduced recently provides promising insights into the understanding of the evolution of prices, indices and rates in the financial markets. In this paper we perform a time series analysis of the model employing tools from statistics, dynamical systems theory and stochastic processes. Using benchmark systems and a financial index for comparison, several conclusions are obtained about the generating mechanism for this kind of evolution. The motion is deterministic, driven by occasional random external perturbation. When the interval between two successive perturbations is sufficiently large, one can find low dimensional chaos in this regime. However, the full motion of the MG model is found to be similar to that of the first differences of the SP500 index: stochastic, nonlinear and (unit root) stationary. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. B.V. All rights reserved.

Role playing game eletrônico: uma tecnologia lúdica para aprender e ensinar matemática

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Um modelo fuzzy-dea-game para estratégias de produção sob incerteza

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)