Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.

The Great Game around Turkmenistan. OSW Point of View, August 2008

The rise of a new leader of the state of Turkmenistan – President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who became ruler of the central Asian state after the 21-year rule of Saparmurad Niyazov, the self-proclaimed Turkmenbashi, who died on December 21, 2006 – has initiated changes in Turkmenistan’s political life. The new president has broken with the previous policy of self-isolation, and has directed the country towards openness to the outside world. Opportunities have thereby arisen for competitors in the ‘Great Game’, to gain political influence in Turkmenistan and access to hitherto unexploited Turkmen deposits of gas and oil. A new stage in the Great Game, which has been played for influence in Central Asia and control of access to its energy resources for many years, can thus be said to have been launched, and Turkmenistan has become the main setting for it. The major actors involved are Russia, the United States, China and the European Union.

Indirect fall-out from the June 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan: the case of Kara-Suu. EUCAM Commentary No. 14, June 2011

The Kyrgyz town of Kara-Suu lies on the border with Uzbekistan, some 25 kilometres from Osh, the city most affected by the conflict between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks on 10-17 June 2010. With a population of around 21,000, of which 67% are ethnic Uzbek, Kara-Suu also serves as the administrative centre of the Kara-Suu district, which includes the village of Nariman, with a predominantly Uzbek population and notorious as the scene of several high-profile and brutal murders, as well as suburbs of Osh.

Go Gorno-Badakhshan. EUCAM Commentary No. 19, October 2011

The autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO) in Tajikistan offers one of the world’s most impressive landscapes. The Pamir Mountains with peaks of up to 7,500 meters is second only to the Himalayas. Culturally the region also has much to offer with a variety of well-preserved traditions and numerous languages. GBAO, which makes up 45 per cent of Tajikistan’s territory but only 3 per cent of its population, is however extremely isolated. From Dushanbe there are adventurous but irregular flights in late spring, summer and early autumn but most travellers will need to take a bumpy 17 hour car journey. Other options to reach GBAO are equally challenging, either mountain passes from China’s Xinjiang region and the city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan or crossing the Panj River from northeast Afghanistan where a few bridges have been built.

Promises and hurdles in EU-Kazakhstan energy cooperation. EUCAM Commentary No. 20, November 2011

Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim Massimov, once referred to energy cooperation as the ‘core’ of relations between his country and the European Union (EU). Indeed, there is great mutual interest in this area. Six percent of the EU’s crude oil imports and 16 percent of its uranium imports come from Kazakhstan. And around 80 percent of the latter’s oil exports go towards Europe. For Kazakhstani producers, access to European lucrative and reliable markets is of utmost importance. Over the last several years, the thrust of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy was aimed at increasing the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that pumps Kazakhstani oil to Europe. Moreover, Kazmunaigaz’s (KMG) – the national oil and gas company – major external investment was in the Romanian oil company Rompetrol.

The Kyrgyzstani Presidential Elections: Atambaev’s Challenges. EUCAM Commentary No. 21, November 2011

After much anticipation and anxiety about the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, there is a feeling of relief that Almazbek Atambaev won the contest with an overwhelming majority, making a second round of elections unnecessary. The presidential race passed off without violence and unrest, which many in Kyrgyzstan consider an achievement in itself. The scale of Atambaev’s majority took many commentators by surprise as some had predicted a low turnout and a strong oppositional challenge. But according to the Central Electoral Commission, the turnout was 61.28 percent and Atambaev gained 63 percent of the votes. The elections were observed by 792 international observers from 56 countries. Although international observers have criticized electoral irregularities, pointing to incomplete voter registrations and ballot stuffing, overall the elections were assessed as encouraging.

International report on Kyrgyz June violence released. EUCAM Commentary No. 12, May 2011

After months of delays, leaks and rumours, the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) has finally published on 3 May its report looking into the events of 10-15 June 2010 in the Kyrgyz oblasts of Osh and Jalalabad, which led to the death of 470 people, 74 percent of them ethnic Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz authorities have reacted to this report arguing that the report's authors relied too much on accounts by Uzbeks and that the research was incomplete.

Kazakhstan’s voting enthusiasm. EUCAM Commentary No. 11, April 2011

The Kazakhstani political landscape will not be shaken by similar tremors to those that have rocked North Africa and the Middle East in recent months. President Nazarbayev who has been at the helm of Kazakhstan's political architecture since the fall of the Soviet Union is destined to stay. This is in spite of hopes that economic development coupled with the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship would spur the democratisation of the oil-rich state and lead to the rise of a natural successor for the 70 year old leader.

The 2010 OSCE Kazakhstan Chairmanship: Carrot Devoured, Results Missing. EUCAM Policy Brief No. 15, April 2011

This brief looks at Kazakhstan’s chairmanship through the prism of the EU’s relations with Central Asian states and examines what lessons the EU can draw from the Kazakhstan chairmanship. The OSCE Chairmanship and the agreement to hold the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana, despite it not having a Summit-like agenda were significant ‘carrots’ given to Kazakhstan. Did these carrots bring any results, and is there any reason to offer more such carrots to Kazakhstan or to other Central Asian states?

Kyrgyzstan: Balancing on the Verge of Stability. EUCAM Policy Brief No. 19, July 2011

Following the ‘revolution’ in April 2010, the subsequent interethnic violence in June and the recent international inquiry into these events, Kyrgyzstan is not in safe waters yet. The coming period leading up to the Presidential elections will be important for the country’s stability. What is the current situation in the South of the country, which saw clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and what are the expectations for the presidential elections? Is Kyrgyzstan on the road to democracy, and what role can external actors play?

Afghan Opium and the EU: Fighting the War Economy through Development Cooperation. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 4, 2014

Opium is at the heart of the war economy in Afghanistan, involving a broad range of actors. It generates a sustainable violence cycle and, while international troops withdraw from the country, threatens the Afghan government’s reconstruction efforts. The European Union (EU) plays an important part in the debate on how to deal with this issue. Several counter-narcotics policies have been implemented since 2001 and have mostly failed. This paper looks at these failures and questions the European Union’s ability to help tackle the problem of opium in Afghanistan. It argues that a comprehensive development response, backed by counter-narcotics incentives, could unfasten the spiral of the war economy. It also argues that the EU has developed relevant policies based on poverty alleviation and a structural approach to the opium issue but still lacks the means for action and for donor coordination in order to significantly influence the situation.

Is the "Dubai model" a new paradigm for growth and investment strategies for oil-based economies? Case study: Eurasia. ACES Working Papers No. 8, 2008

The first part of the paper addresses the theoretical background of economic growth and competitive advantage models. Although there is a whole set of research on a relationship between foreign direct investments and economic growth, little has been said on foreign direct investments and national competitive advantage with respect to economic growth of oil and gas abundant countries of Middle East and Central Asia. The second part of our paper introduces the framework of the so-called "Dubai Model" in detail and outlines the key components necessary to develop sustainable comparative advantage for the oil-rich economies. The third part proceeds with the methodology employed to measure the success of the "Dubai Model" in the UAE and in application to other regions. The last part brings the results and investigates the degree to which other oil and gas countries in the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran) have adopted the so-called "Dubai Model". It also examines if the Dubai Model is being employed in the Eurasian (Central Asian) oil and gas regions of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The objective is to gauge if the Eurasian economies are employing the traditional growth strategies of oil-rich non-OECD countries in managing their natural resources or are they adopting the newer non-traditional model of economic growth, such as the "Dubai Model."

Prepared for a Symposium on Country Development at the European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems Research, Vienna, Austria, April 2012 (Untitled). ACES Working Papers, April 2012

In Kazakhstan doctoral students are not expected to make a contribution to knowledge, as is required at Western universities. Rather, their task is to become familiar with what is known and then make policy recommendations for Kazakhstan. For example, how can the human capital in Kazakhstan be improved? This is a very broad subject for a PhD dissertation. However, it does require a holistic perspective, and such dissertation topics may create an opportunity for systems scientists. When Russell Ackoff created the Social Systems Sciences PhD program at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, he had his students solve practical problems for business or government managers. That program graduated a large number of people who became consultants. A few became academics in several countries. The program created a philosophy and methods for holistic management. Large issues in developing countries may be a source of clients for systems scientists who want to further develop philosophy, theories and methods by working with large social systems.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

Tajikistan: a chronic stagnation. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 200/15.03.2016

Since gaining its independence Tajikistan has faced severe political, economic and social problems. The last several months has seen a clear increase in their intensity. This is in part caused by the deteriorating economic situation in Russia and the significant fall of remittances from the Tajik labour migrants in Russia, as well as by President Emomali Rahmon’s rising authoritarianism. Despite this intensification, qualitatively speaking Tajikistan’s problems have been unchanged for years. Besides the state’s structural weakness, the main cause is the ongoing neo-colonial dependence on Russia, which effectively limits Dushanbe’s room for political manoeuvre and keep Tajikistan in Russia’s sphere of control. This dependence on the one hand protects the country from collapsing, but on the other it precludes the development of the state, resulting in Tajikistan’s enduring stagnation. Similar processes also take place in other countries of post-Soviet Central Asia. However, in the case of Tajikistan the dependence and stagnation it causes are the strongest and their mechanisms most easily observed.