Uma API criptográfica para aplicações embarcadas

This document presents GEmSysC, an unified cryptographic API for embedded systems. Software layers implementing this API can be built over existing libraries, allowing embedded software to access cryptographic functions in a consistent way that does not depend on the underlying library. The API complies to good practices for API design and good practices for embedded software development and took its inspiration from other cryptographic libraries and standards. The main inspiration for creating GEmSysC was the CMSIS-RTOS standard, which defines an unified API for embedded software in an implementation-independent way, but targets operating systems instead of cryptographic functions. GEmSysC is made of a generic core and attachable modules, one for each cryptographic algorithm. This document contains the specification of the core of GEmSysC and three of its modules: AES, RSA and SHA-256. GEmSysC was built targeting embedded systems, but this does not restrict its use only in such systems – after all, embedded systems are just very limited computing devices. As a proof of concept, two implementations of GEmSysC were made. One of them was built over wolfSSL, which is an open source library for embedded systems. The other was built over OpenSSL, which is open source and a de facto standard. Unlike wolfSSL, OpenSSL does not specifically target embedded systems. The implementation built over wolfSSL was evaluated in a Cortex- M3 processor with no operating system while the implementation built over OpenSSL was evaluated on a personal computer with Windows 10 operating system. This document displays test results showing GEmSysC to be simpler than other libraries in some aspects. These results have shown that both implementations incur in little overhead in computation time compared to the cryptographic libraries themselves. The overhead of the implementation has been measured for each cryptographic algorithm and is between around 0% and 0.17% for the implementation over wolfSSL and between 0.03% and 1.40% for the one over OpenSSL. This document also presents the memory costs for each implementation.

Efficient Secure Computation for Real-world Settings and Security Models

Secure computation involves multiple parties computing a common function while keeping their inputs private, and is a growing field of cryptography due to its potential for maintaining privacy guarantees in real-world applications. However, current secure computation protocols are not yet efficient enough to be used in practice. We argue that this is due to much of the research effort being focused on generality rather than specificity. Namely, current research tends to focus on constructing and improving protocols for the strongest notions of security or for an arbitrary number of parties. However, in real-world deployments, these security notions are often too strong, or the number of parties running a protocol would be smaller. In this thesis we make several steps towards bridging the efficiency gap of secure computation by focusing on constructing efficient protocols for specific real-world settings and security models. In particular, we make the following four contributions: - We show an efficient (when amortized over multiple runs) maliciously secure two-party secure computation (2PC) protocol in the multiple-execution setting, where the same function is computed multiple times by the same pair of parties. - We improve the efficiency of 2PC protocols in the publicly verifiable covert security model, where a party can cheat with some probability but if it gets caught then the honest party obtains a certificate proving that the given party cheated. - We show how to optimize existing 2PC protocols when the function to be computed includes predicate checks on its inputs. - We demonstrate an efficient maliciously secure protocol in the three-party setting.

Provable Security for Cryptocurrencies

The past several years have seen the surprising and rapid rise of Bitcoin and other “cryptocurrencies.” These are decentralized peer-to-peer networks that allow users to transmit money, tocompose financial instruments, and to enforce contracts between mutually distrusting peers, andthat show great promise as a foundation for financial infrastructure that is more robust, efficientand equitable than ours today. However, it is difficult to reason about the security of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin is a complex system, comprising many intricate and subtly-interacting protocol layers. At each layer it features design innovations that (prior to our work) have not undergone any rigorous analysis. Compounding the challenge, Bitcoin is but one of hundreds of competing cryptocurrencies in an ecosystem that is constantly evolving. The goal of this thesis is to formally reason about the security of cryptocurrencies, reining in their complexity, and providing well-defined and justified statements of their guarantees. We provide a formal specification and construction for each layer of an abstract cryptocurrency protocol, and prove that our constructions satisfy their specifications. The contributions of this thesis are centered around two new abstractions: “scratch-off puzzles,” and the “blockchain functionality” model. Scratch-off puzzles are a generalization of the Bitcoin “mining” algorithm, its most iconic and novel design feature. We show how to provide secure upgrades to a cryptocurrency by instantiating the protocol with alternative puzzle schemes. We construct secure puzzles that address important and well-known challenges facing Bitcoin today, including wasted energy and dangerous coalitions. The blockchain functionality is a general-purpose model of a cryptocurrency rooted in the “Universal Composability” cryptography theory. We use this model to express a wide range of applications, including transparent “smart contracts” (like those featured in Bitcoin and Ethereum), and also privacy-preserving applications like sealed-bid auctions. We also construct a new protocol compiler, called Hawk, which translates user-provided specifications into privacy-preserving protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs.

Documento electrónico y título valor electrónico

El presente trabajo tiene por objeto precisar los conceptos jurídicos doctrinarios sobre documento, documento electrónico y título valor electrónico, fundamentándonos en la ley modelo de comercio electrónico aprobada por la ONU, la legislación de la Unión Económica Europea, la Ley 527 de l999, el decreto reglamentario No 1.747 del 11 de septiembre de 2000, la legislación complementaria sobre protección de derechos fundamentales, la doctrina y la jurisprudencia. Para ello, diremos que el comercio electrónico se enmarca dentro de la preceptiva del artículo 2 de la Constitución Política que consagra como principios del Estado social de Derecho la libertad de empresa, la intervención del Estado para regular la economía, y la protección de los derechos fundamentales de la persona humana y propiciar el bienestar de todos los ciudadanos. Por ello esta actividad puede ser desarrollada libremente por cualquier persona, siempre que respete los derechos fundamentales, como el derecho a la intimidad, la dignidad, la información, la salud pública, el habeas data, el sistema penal, la seguridad nacional y el interés general. Nos dedicaremos entonces a analizar qué se entiende por documento, características, requisitos de validez, prueba y eficacia de los documentos electrónicos y aplicación en las transacciones de bolsa y similares, el documento electrónico, el título valor electrónico y el tratamiento legal que al documento se le da en nuestra legislación.