HAZARD AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR VOLCANOES IN THE CASCADE MOUNTAIN RANGE

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FIRE HAZARD IN COCONINO COUNTY, ARIZONA

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Fire Hazard in Coconino County, Arizona

Fire is a major management issue in the southwestern United States. Three spatial models of fire risk for Coconino County, Northern Arizona. These models were generated using thematic data layers depicting vegetation, elevation, wind speed and direction, and precipitation for January (winter), June (summer), and July (start of monsoon season). ArcGIS 9.0 was used to weight attributes in raster layers to reflect their influence on fire risk and to interpolate raster data layers from point data. Final models were generated using the raster calculator in the Spatial Analyst extension of ArcGIS 9.0. Ultimately, the unique combinations of variables resulted in three different models illustrating the change in fire risk during the year.

Hazard Areas Associated with Major Volcanoes in the Cascade Mountain Range

The Cascade Mountain Range in Washington State is the site of several active volcanoes that have the potential to erupt which would deeply affect the lives of those who live near them. This study explores the hazard areas associated with the five largest volcanoes in the region: Mt. Baker, Glacier Peak, Mt. Rainier, Mt. Adams and Mt. St. Helens. It was determined which geographic regions would be affected by tephra, pyroclastic blasts and lahar flows and the associated populations that live in each of these areas. The level of emergency preparedness necessary for a volcanic eruption could be better determined based on the findings of this study.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

Analysis of contagion from the constant conditional correlation model with Markov regime switching

Over the last decades, the analysis of the transmissions of international nancial events has become the subject of many academic studies focused on multivariate volatility models volatility. The goal of this study is to evaluate the nancial contagion between stock market returns. The econometric approach employed was originally presented by Pelletier (2006), named Regime Switching Dynamic Correlation (RSDC). This methodology involves the combination of Constant Conditional Correlation Model (CCC) proposed by Bollerslev (1990) with Markov Regime Switching Model suggested by Hamilton and Susmel (1994). A modi cation was made in the original RSDC model, the introduction of the GJR-GARCH model formulated in Glosten, Jagannathan e Runkle (1993), on the equation of the conditional univariate variances to allow asymmetric e ects in volatility be captured. The database was built with the series of daily closing stock market indices in the United States (SP500), United Kingdom (FTSE100), Brazil (IBOVESPA) and South Korea (KOSPI) for the period from 02/01/2003 to 09/20/2012. Throughout the work the methodology was compared with others most widespread in the literature, and the model RSDC with two regimes was de ned as the most appropriate for the selected sample. The set of results provide evidence for the existence of nancial contagion between markets of the four countries considering the de nition of nancial contagion from the World Bank called very restrictive. Such a conclusion should be evaluated carefully considering the wide diversity of de nitions of contagion in the literature.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Renegociação de dívidas e moral hazard: uma análise do efeito da política de descontos no pagamento de dívidas de cartões de crédito

O Brasil vem vivenciando um aumento na demanda por cartões de crédito, principalmente nas classes baixas. Entretanto, a população de menor renda e menor qualificação representa maior riscos para a operação. Este fato é evidenciado pelas altas taxas de inadimplência. Exposto isso, empresas se utilizam de estratégias de renegociação de dívida na tentativa de recuperar parte do investimento realizado. Entretanto, poucos foram os estudos acerca da consequência no longo prazo destas estratégias. Utilizando os experimentos realizados por uma empresa de cartão de crédito, cujas campanhas de renegociação variavam mês a mês, este estudo, procurou evidências de que as ofertas de renegociação de dívidas podem afetar a reputação da firma, fazendo com que clientes da rede mesma rede social deste que recebeu a oferta de renegociação também fiquem inadimplentes. Concluímos que o aumento do desconto nas negociações tem um efeito significativo sobre o incentivo do cliente em honrar suas obrigações junto a empresa, ou seja, o aumento de 0,01 p.p. no desconto dado aos clientes aumenta em 0,05 sua probabilidade em atrasar sua fatura no próximo período.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.